





THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"



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THE
"SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART
QQ. CLXXI.—CLXXXIX.

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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART.

QUESTION CLXXI.

OF PROPHECY.

(*In Six Articles.*)

AFTER treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple difference between men as regards things connected with the soul's habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to 1 Cor. xii. 4, 7. *There are diversities of graces, . . . and to one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, etc.* Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (*ibid.*) that *there are diversities of operations.* For the purpose of operation in Martha, who *was busy about much serving*, which pertains to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, *who sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word* (Luke x. 39, 40), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. iv. 11, *And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors:* and this pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. xii. 5): *There are diversities of ministries.*

With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under prophecy, since prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed by all and are matters of faith, and as to yet higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to wisdom. Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the discernment of spirits. Moreover it extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to knowledge, as we shall explain further on (Q. CLXXVII.). Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.

Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division of prophecy.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge? (2) Whether it is a habit? (3) Whether it is only about future contingencies? (4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy? (5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit? (6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROPHECY PERTAINS TO KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. xlvi. 14) that after death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (xlix. 18) it is said of Joseph that *his bones were visited, and after death they prophesied*. Now no knowledge remains

in the body or in the bones after death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (1 Cor. xiv. 3): *He that prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification.* Now speech is not knowledge itself but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, Every cognitive perfection excludes folly and madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is written (Osee ix. 7): *Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad.** Therefore prophecy is not a cognitive perfection.

Obj. 4. Further, Just as revelation regards the intellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as *inspiration* or *revelation*, according to Cassiodorus (*Prolog. super Psalm. i.*). Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the intellect more than to the affections.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Kings ix. 9): *For he that is now called a prophet, in time past was called a seer.* Now sight pertains to knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge.

I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things afar off (*procul*) and removed from man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name from $\pi\rho\delta$, † that is *afar*, and $\phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, that is an *apparition*, because things appear to them from afar. Wherefore, as Isidore states (*Etym. vii.*), *in the Old Testament, they were called seers, because they saw what others saw not, and surveyed things hidden in mystery.* Hence among heathen nations they were known as *vates*, on account of their power of mind (*vi mentis*), ‡ as the same author had previously remarked (*ibid.*).

Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. xii. 7): *The manifesta-*

* Vulg.,—*and the spiritual man was mad.*

† This is not a derivation but an explanation. Moreover, not $\pi\rho\delta$, but $\pi\omicron\omicron\rho\delta$ is the Greek for *afar*. The correct derivation is indicated further on.

‡ The Latin *vates* is from the Greek $\phi\acute{\alpha}\rho\eta\varsigma$, and may be rendered *soothsayer*.

tion of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit, and further on (xiv. 12): *Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church*, it follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they know through being taught of God, according to the saying of Isa. xxi. 10, *That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto you*. Accordingly, as Isidore says (*ibid.*), prophets may be described as *præfatores* (*foretellers*), because they fell from afar, that is, speak from a distance, and foretell the truth about things to come.

Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the operation of the Divine power, according to Mark xvi. 20, *They . . . preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed*. Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic utterances. Wherefore it is written (Deut. xxxiv. 10, 11): *There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders*.

Reply Obj. 1. These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic utterances.

Reply Obj. 3. Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. xxiii. 16): *Hearken not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord*, and (Ezech. xiii. 3): *Wo to the foolish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing*.

Reply Obj. 4. It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is written (Ezech. ii. 6): *Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee*. This raising of the

intention is brought about by the motion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: *And the Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet.* After the mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the things of God; hence the text continues: *And I heard Him speaking to me.* Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards the raising of the mind, according to Job xxxii. 8, *The inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding*: while revelation is necessary, as regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to Job xii. 22, *He discovereth great things out of darkness.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROPHECY IS A HABIT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prophecy is a habit. For according to *Ethic. ii. 5, there are three things in the soul, power, passion, and habit.* Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all men, since the powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not a passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXII., A. 2); whereas prophecy pertains principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing *Article.* Therefore prophecy is a habit.

Obj. 2. Further, Every perfection of the soul, which is not always in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.

Obj. 3. Further, Prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as stated above (I.-II., Q. CX., A. 2). Therefore prophecy is a habit.

On the contrary, A habit is something *whereby we act*

when we will, as the Commentator* says (*De Anima*, iii.). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kings iii. 15), *who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and fill his mind with things to come*, as Gregory observes (*Hom. i. super Ezech.*). Therefore prophecy is not a habit.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Eph. v. 13), *all that is made manifest is light*, because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the material sight takes place through material light, so too the manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that surpasses natural reason, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, it follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of natural reason. Hence the saying of Mich. vii. 8: *When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light*. Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy, which is clearly false. For Gregory says (*Hom. i. super Ezech.*): *Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a gift*. Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kings iv. 27): *Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me*. The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form, perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active intellect the

* Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198.

intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an abiding and complete form, according to Ps. xxxv. 10, *In Thy light we shall see light.*

It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's soul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated Exod. xxxii. 22: *When My glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock*, etc., and 3 Kings xix. 11: *Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth*, etc. Hence it is that even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Isa. l. 4): *In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master.* This is also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that *the Lord spake* to such and such a prophet, or that *the word of the Lord*, or *the hand of the Lord was made upon him.*

But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.

Reply Obj. 1. This division of the Philosopher's does not comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before having the habit of that action.

However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the Philosopher says (*De Anima*, iii.) that *to understand is, in a way, to be passive.* For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowledge

the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the Divine light.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion,—thus wood once ignited is more easily ignited again,—so too in the prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew,—thus when the mind has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its former devotion. Hence Augustine says in his book on praying to God (*Ep. cxxx. 9*) that our prayers need to be frequent, *lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is kindled.*

We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his being deputed by God, according to Jer. i. 5, *And I made thee a prophet unto the nations.*

Reply Obj. 3. Every gift of grace raises man to something above human nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance of the act,—for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom,—and for such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the act,—for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His creatures,—and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROPHECY IS ONLY ABOUT FUTURE CONTINGENCIES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prophecy is only about future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says (*Prol. super Psalt. i.*) that *prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with invariable truth.* Now issues pertain to future contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future contingencies alone.

Obj. 2. Further, According to 1 Cor. xii. the grace of

prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things; and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits; and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts are differentiated by their objects, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LIV., A. 2). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future contingencies alone.

Obj. 3. Further, Difference of object causes difference of species, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LIV., A. 2). Therefore, if one prophecy is about future contingencies, and another about other things, it would seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom. i. super Ezech.*) that some prophecies are about the future, for instance (Isa. vii. 14), 'Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'; some are about the past, as (Gen. i. 1), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'; some are about the present, as (I. Cor. xiv. 24, 25), 'If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made manifest.' Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone.

I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the body's sight extends to all colours, and the soul's natural knowledge extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect. Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made to Isaias (vi. 1), where it is written, *I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated.* Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to natural bodies, according to the words of Isa. xl. 12, *Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand?* etc. It also contains matters relating to human conduct, according to

Isa. lviii. 7, *Deal thy bread to the hungry, etc.*; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events, according to Isa. xlvii. 9, *Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood.*

Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it must be observed that the more remote things are from our knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know by human sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kings v. 26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor. xiv. 25; and again in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.

The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such are the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying: *Holy, Holy, Holy, etc.* (Isa. vi. 3).

The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated universally and by its very nature, takes precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (*Hom. i. super Ezech.*): *And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its significance when he speaks of the past or present.*

Reply Obj. 1. Prophecy is there defined according to its

proper signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from the other gratuitous graces.

Reply Obj. 2. This is evident from what has just been said. We might also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine revelation; whereas those that are the matter of wisdom, knowledge, and the interpretation of speeches, can be known by man through natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the enlightening of the Divine light. As to faith, although it is about things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the things believed, but with a man's certitude of assent to things known by others.

Reply Obj. 3. The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine light, which being one gives unity of species to prophecy, although the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY THE DIVINE REVELATION A PROPHET KNOWS ALL THAT CAN BE KNOWN PROPHETICALLY ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos iii. 7): *The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets.* Now whatever is revealed prophetically is something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is revealed to the prophet.

Obj. 2. Further, *God's works are perfect* (Deut. xxxii. 4). Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated in the foregoing *Article*. Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since *the perfect is that which lacks nothing* (*Phys.* iii.). Therefore all possible matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.

Obj. 3. Further, The Divine light which causes prophecy

is more powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar. Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom. i. super Ezech.*) that *sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind, and nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to the future.* Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of prophecy.

I answer that, Things which differ from one another need not exist simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above (I.-II., Q. LXV., AA. 1, 3) that all the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on account of prudence or charity. Now all the things that are known through some principle are connected in that principle and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them may be known, and some not.

Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see in itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the special revelation of this or that matter.

Reply Obj. 1. The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every one, but some to one, and some to another.

Reply Obj. 2. Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is

written (1 Cor. xiii. 8) that *prophecies shall be made void*, and that *we prophesy in part*, i.e. imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (*verse 10*): *When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away*. Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to which prophecy is directed.

Reply Obj. 3. He who has a science knows the principles of that science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends; wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself; wherefore the comparison fails.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PROPHET ALWAYS DISTINGUISHES WHAT HE SAYS BY HIS OWN SPIRIT FROM WHAT HE SAYS BY THE PROPHETIC SPIRIT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit. For Augustine states (*Conf. vi. 13*) that his mother said *she could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could not express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul*. Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.

Obj. 2. Further, *God commands nothing impossible*, as Jerome (Pelagius) says (*Expos. Symbol. ad Damas.*). Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. xxiii. 28): *The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word with truth*. Therefore the prophet can distinguish what he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.

Obj. 3. Further, The certitude resulting from a Divine light is greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is much more certain that he has it.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom. i. super Ezech.*): *It must be observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit.*

I answer that, The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways: in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious instinct to which the human mind is subjected without knowing it, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit. ii. 17*). Accordingly the prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (*Jer. xxvi. 15*): *In truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your hearing.* Else, were he not certain about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet's certitude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his only begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been most certain of the Divine revelation.

On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to error, *they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost,* and from Him they hear the truth, so that they re-*

* For instance cf. 2 Kings vii. 3 *seqq.*

proach themselves for having said what was untrue, as Gregory adds (ibid.).

The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the objections is clear.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THINGS KNOWN OR DECLARED PROPHETICALLY
CAN BE FALSE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that things known or declared prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated above (A. 3). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.

Obj. 2. Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (xxxviii. 1): *Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not live,* and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings xx. 6). Again the Lord said (Jer. xviii. 7, 8): *I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them.* This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, according to Jon. iii. 10: *The Lord (Vulg.,—God) had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not.* Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.

Obj. 3. Further, In a conditional proposition, whenever the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the premises in a syllogism: and a syllogism whose premises are necessary always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in 1 *Poster.* text. 17. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the following conditional proposition must needs be true: *If a thing has been prophesied, it will be.* Now the antecedent

of this conditional proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.

On the contrary, Cassiodorus says (*Prol. in Psalt. i.*) that *prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with invariable truth*. Now the truth of prophecy would not be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.

I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 1, 3, 5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now the truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense when he says (*super Dan. ii.*) that *prophecy is the seal of the Divine foreknowledge*. Consequently the same truth must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the First Part (Q. XIV., AA. 13, 15; Q. XVI., A. 8). Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in the First Part (Q. XXII., A. 4) the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is an impressed likeness or seal of the Divine foreknowledge, does not by its invariable truth exclude the contingency of future things.

Reply Obj. 2. The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And though future contin-

gencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again, though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation, because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this saying of Isaias (vii. 14): *Behold a virgin shall conceive*. Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way we are to understand the saying of Isaias (xxxviii. 1): *Thou shalt die, and not live*; in other words, 'The disposition of thy body has a tendency to death': and the saying of Jonas (iii. 4), *Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed*, that is to say, *Its merits demand that it should be destroyed*. God is said to repent, metaphorically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel.*

Reply Obj. 3. Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as the truth of the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in the *Article*, the conditional proposition: *If this was prophesied, it will be*, is true in the same way as the proposition: *If this was foreknown, it will be*: for in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in the First Part (Q. XIV., A. 13, *ad 2*).

* Cf. P. I., Q. XIX., A. 7, *ad 2*.

QUESTION CLXXII.

OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY.

(In Six Articles.)

WE must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether prophecy is natural? (2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels? (3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy? (4) Whether a good life is requisite? (5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons? (6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROPHECY CAN BE NATURAL?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory says (*Dial.* iv. 26) that *sometimes the mere strength of the soul is sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things* : and Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 13) that *the human soul, according as it is withdrawn from the senses of the body, is able to foresee the future.** Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.

Obj. 2. Further, The human soul's knowledge is more alert while one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (*De Somn. et Vigil.*).† Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.

Obj. 3. Further, Man, by his nature, is more perfect than

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXVI., A. 4, *ad 2.*

† Cf. *De Divinat. per Somn.* which is annexed to the work quoted.

dumb animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature.

Obj. 4. Further, It is written (Prov. xxix. 18): *When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad*; wherefore it is evident that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now nature does not fail in necessities. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. i. 21): *For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.* Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 6, ad 2) prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated in the First Part (Q. XIV., A. 13). Wherefore suchlike foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such effects. Suchlike knowledge of the future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 13): *Some have deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination.* This seems to be in accord with the opinion

of Plato, who (*De Repub.* vi.) held that our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow suchlike future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion Augustine says (*loc. cit.*): *How is it that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes to have it?*

Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 6, 7), it is better to have recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of his understanding.

Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First, because the former can be about any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is according to the unchangeable truth, while the latter is not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 1), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.

Reply Obj. 1. When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances,* and also is more inclined to receive

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXVIII., A. 4, *ad 2.*

the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) that *the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature*, inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power, because according to Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 13), *if this were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed*, which is clearly false.

Reply Obj. 2. Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as stated above (Q. XCV., A. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleeping.

Reply Obj. 3. Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination, especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man still more.

Reply Obj. 4. The prophetic light extends even to the direction of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROPHETIC REVELATION COMES THROUGH
THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prophetic revelation does not come through the angels. For it is written (Wis. vii. 27) that Divine wisdom *conveyeth herself into holy souls, and maketh the friends of God, and the prophets.* Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately. Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the medium of the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, Prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. xii. 4, *There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.* Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.

Obj. 3. Further, Cassiodorus says (*Prol. in Psalt. i.*) that *prophecy is a Divine revelation*; whereas if it were conveyed by the angels, it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by means of the angels.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier. iv.*): *Our glorious fathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers*; and he is speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is conveyed by means of the angels.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. xiii. 1), *Things that are of God are well ordered.** Now the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius (*loc. cit. ; Eccl. Hier. v.*), is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the angels hold a middle position between God and men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed

* Vulg.,—*Those that are, are ordained of God.*

by Divine enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels.

Reply Obj. 1. Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression; whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel also can form an impression, as stated in the First Part (Q. CXI., A. 1), wherefore the comparison fails between the two.

Reply Obj. 2. The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by means of the angels.

Reply Obj. 3. The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A NATURAL DISPOSITION IS REQUISITE FOR PROPHECY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos i. 2, *The Lord will roar from Sion*, says: *Anyone who wishes to make a comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is inspired by the lion's roar.* Now that which is received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural disposition.

Obj. 2. Further, The considerations of prophecy are more lofty than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the considerations of acquired science,

since many are prevented by natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculative sciences. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the contemplation of prophecy.

Obj. 3. Further, Natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew* that *at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation.* Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is requisite for prophecy.

On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx. in Ev.): *He, namely the Holy Ghost, fills the boy harpist and makes him a psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a prophet.* Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (I Cor. xii. 2): *All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), prophecy in its true and exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so neither does He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation.

* The quotation is from Origen, *Hom. vi. in Num.*

Reply Obj. 1. It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation does not change a man with a view to his prophesying. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.

Reply Obj. 2. The considerations of science proceed from a natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 3. A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion, whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A GOOD LIFE IS REQUISITE FOR PROPHECY ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a good life is requisite for prophecy. For it is written (Wis. vii. 27) that the wisdom of God *through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, and maketh the friends of God, and prophets.* Now there can be no holiness without a good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and sanctifying grace.

Obj. 2. Further, Secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according to Jo. xv. 15, *But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you.* Now God reveals his secrets to the prophets (Amos iii. 7). Therefore it would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Matth. vii. 15): *Beware of false prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.* Now all who are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by grace.

Obj. 4. Further, The Philosopher says (*De Somn. et Vigil.**) that *if interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be bestowed on any but the best.* Now it is evident that the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the best men.

On the contrary, To those who had said, *Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name?* this reply is made: *I never knew you* (Matth. vii. 22, 23). Now *the Lord knoweth who are His* (2 Tim. ii. 19). Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God's by grace.

I answer that, A good life may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace. Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv. 18): *A man is not transferred from the left side to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a lover of God and of his neighbour.* Hence whatever can be without charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts. First, on account of their respective acts: for prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is perfected by charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. xiii.) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. xii. 7, *The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit;*

* Cf. *De Divinat. per Somn.* which is annexed to the work quoted.

and is not directly intended to unite man's affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the proper root of this goodness.

If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings iv. 38) that they *dwelt together with* (Vulg.,—*before*) Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 1. Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and such are those whom Divine wisdom, conveying itself by sanctifying grace to their minds, makes friends of God and prophets. Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Matth. vii. 22, *Have not we prophesied in Thy name?* says: *Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear.*

Reply Obj. 2. Gregory (*Hom. xxvii. in Ev.*) expounding this passage says: *Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of perfect love.* In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to prophets.

Reply Obj. 3. Not all wicked men are ravaging wolves, but only those whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says (*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix.**)

* Among the works of S. John Chrysostom, and falsely ascribed to him.

that *Catholic teachers, though they be sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravenous wolves, because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians.* And since prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.

Reply Obj. 4. God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY PROPHECY COMES FROM THE DEMONS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no prophecy comes from the demons. For prophecy is a *Divine revelation*, according to Cassiodorus (*Prolog. in Psalt. i.*). But that which is done by a demon is not Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon.

Obj. 2. Further, Some kind of enlightenment is requisite for prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 2). Now the demons do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the First Part (Q. CXIX., A. 3). Therefore no prophecy can come from the demons.

Obj. 3. Further, A sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on Rom. xii. 6, *Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith*, says: *Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied.* Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (3 Kings xviii. 19): *Gather unto me all Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel's table.* Now these were

worshippers of demons. Therefore it would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 1), prophecy denotes knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature. Hence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain things remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those things which God alone knows are remote simply and most of all.

Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as *false prophets*, or *prophets of idols*. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 19): *When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes as these, namely visions, he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a false prophet.*

Reply Obj. 1. Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and simple acceptation.

Reply Obj. 2. The demons reveal what they know to men, not by enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by audible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true prophecy.

Reply Obj. 3. The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom says (*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix.**) that *some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never.* Wherefore it is written (Deut. xviii. 21, 22): *If in silent thought thou answer: How shall I know the word that*

* Falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PROPHETS OF THE DEMONS EVER FORETELL THE TRUTH?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth. For Ambrose says that *Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost.* Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the Holy Ghost, because *there is no concord between Christ and Belial** (2 Cor. vi. 15). Therefore it would seem that they never foretell the truth.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of untruth, according to 3 Kings xxii. 22, *I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.* Now the prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 6). Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.

Obj. 3. Further, It is said of the devil (Jo. viii. 44) that *when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and the father thereof, i.e. of lying.* Now by inspiring his prophets, the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's minister to declare the truth, since *light hath no fellowship with darkness†* (2 Cor. vi. 14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth.

On the contrary, A gloss on Num. xxi. 21 says that *Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and the magic art.* Now he foretold many true things, for instance that which is to be found Num. xxiv. 17: *A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall spring up*

* *What concord hath Christ with Belial?*

† *Vulg.,—What fellowship hath light with darkness?*

from Israel. Therefore even the prophets of the demons foretell the truth.

I answer that, As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede says (*Comment. in Luc. xvii. 12*) that *no teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with falsehood*. Hence the teaching of the demons, with which they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by the semblance of truth, ever as the will is seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says (*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix.**): *The devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie*.

Reply Obj. 1. The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to him (Num. xxii. 12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He foretells certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness to it, and also in order that men, by believing such things, may be more easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true things about Christ.

Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they may foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the author of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the good spirits, as Augustine declares (*Gen. ad Lit. xii.*): so that even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 2. A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore

* Falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

He never says what is not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes false, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Those things are called the demons' own, which they have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell the truth, as stated above. Moreover God makes use of them to make known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already stated.

QUESTION CLXXIII.

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHEPIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence? (2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone? (3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses? (4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things prophesied?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PROPHETS SEE THE VERY ESSENCE OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the prophets see the very essence of God, for a gloss on Isa. xxxviii. 1, *Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die and not live*, says: *Prophets can read in the book of God's foreknowledge in which all things are written.* Now God's foreknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very essence.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* ix. 7) that *in that eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with the mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions.* Now, of all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine things. Therefore they, especially, see the Divine essence.

Obj. 3. Further, Future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets with unalterable truth. Now future contingencies exist thus in God alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself.

On the contrary, The vision of the Divine essence is not made void in heaven; whereas prophecy is made void, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 8. Therefore prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence.

I answer that, Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb. xi. 13) that *they were beholding . . . afar off*. But those who are in heaven and in the state of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were, from near at hand, according to Ps. cxxxix. 14, *The upright shall dwell with Thy countenance*. Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge differs from the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so that it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect, and when the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. xiii. 10).

Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that the prophets see the very essence of God (which they call the *mirror of eternity*), not however in the way in which it is the object of the blessed, but as containing the types* of future events. But this is altogether impossible. For God is the object of bliss in His very essence, according to the saying of Augustine (*Conf.* v. 4): *Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these*, i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both because the Divine essence is itself the type of all things that are made,—the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a relationship to the creature;—and because knowledge of a thing in itself,—and such is the knowledge of God as the object of heavenly bliss,—precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something else,—and such is the

* Cf. P. I., Q. XV.

knowledge of God as containing the types of things. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as containing the types of creatures, and yet not as the object of bliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not the vision of the very essence of God, and that the prophets do not see in the Divine essence itself the things they do see, but that they see them in certain images, according as they are enlightened by the Divine light.

Wherefore Dionysius (*Cæl. Hier.* iv.), in speaking of prophetic visions, says that *the wise theologian calls that vision divine which is effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through the seer being rapt in divine things.* And these images illumined by the Divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine essence: since in a mirror images are formed from other things, and this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet's mind thus enlightened may be called a mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the Divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called the *mirror of eternity*, as representing God's foreknowledge, for God in His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 6, *ad* 3).*

Reply Obj. 1. The prophets are said to read the book of God's foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God's foreknowledge on the prophet's mind.

Reply Obj. 2. Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of his existence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth on man's mind, so that he is able to know himself.

Reply Obj. 3. From the very fact that future contingencies are in God according to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress a like knowledge on the prophet's mind without the prophet seeing God in His essence.

* Cf. P. I., Q. XIV., A. 13.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER, IN PROPHEPIC REVELATION, NEW SPECIES*
OF THINGS ARE IMPRESSED ON THE PROPHET'S
MIND, OR MERELY A NEW LIGHT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, but only a new light. For a gloss of Jerome on Amos. i. 2 says that *prophets draw comparisons from things with which they are conversant*. But if prophetic vision were effected by means of species newly impressed, the prophet's previous experience of things would be inoperative. Therefore no new species are impressed on the prophet's soul, but only the prophetic light.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 9), *it is not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet*; wherefore it is declared (Dan. x. 1) that *there is need of understanding in a vision*. Now intellective vision, as stated in the same book (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 5), is not effected by means of images, but by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that prophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species on the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, By the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man with something that surpasses the faculty of human nature. Now man can by his natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore it would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are impressed, but merely an intellectual light.

On the contrary, It is written (Os. xii. 10): *I have multiplied their visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the prophets*. Now multiplicity of visions results, not from a diversity of intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but from a diversity of species, whence similitudes also result. Therefore it seems that in prophetic

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXV., A. 2.

revelation new species of things are impressed, and not merely an intellectual light.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 9), *prophetic knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect.* Now two things have to be considered in connexion with the knowledge possessed by the human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and the judgment of the things represented. Now when anything is represented to the human mind under the form of species and according to the order of nature, the things must be represented first to the senses, secondly to the imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are changed by the species derived from the phantasms, which change results from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in the imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only as received from the senses, but also transformed in various ways, either on account of some bodily transformation (as in the case of people who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the co-ordination of the phantasms, at the command of reason, for the purpose of understanding something. For just as the various arrangement of the letters of the alphabet conveys various ideas to the understanding, so the various co-ordination of the phantasms produces various intelligible species in the intellect.

As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power of the intellectual light.

Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which surpasses the natural faculty in both these respects, namely as to the judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and as to the acceptance or representation of things, which is effected by means of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to prophetic revelation in the second of these respects, but not in the first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs of speech, but he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does.

But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge.

Wherefore if certain things are divinely represented to any man by means of imaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (Gen. xli. 1-7) and to Nabuchodonosor (Dan. iv. 1-2), or even by bodily likenesses, as happened to Balthasar (Dan. v. 5), such a man is not to be considered a prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. Wherefore some have called this *prophetic ecstasy*, and such is divination by dreams. And yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be enlightened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in imagination by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 9), *especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so, to wit, as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things corporeal, and understand them by the quickness of his intellect.*

Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind, sometimes externally by means of the senses,—thus Daniel saw the writing on the wall (Dan. v. 25),—sometimes by means of imaginary forms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through the senses (for instance, if images of colours were imprinted on the imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely co-ordinated from those derived from the senses,—thus Jeremiah saw the *boiling caldron . . . from the face of the north* (Jer. i. 10),—or by the direct impression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of those who receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon or the apostles.

But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human mind,—sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others, as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose understanding our Lord opened *that they might understand the scriptures* (Luke xxiv. 45); and to this pertains the interpretation of speeches:—sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine truth, of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course of nature;—sometimes for the purpose of discerning truth-

fully and efficaciously what is to be done, according to Isa. lxiii. 14, *The Spirit of the Lord was their leader.*

Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes by the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting species anew, or by a new co-ordination of species.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in the *Article*, sometimes in prophetic revelation imaginary species previously derived from the senses are divinely co-ordinated so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and then previous experience is operative in the production of the images, but not when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.

Reply Obj. 2. Intellectual vision is not effected by means of bodily and individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* ix. 11) that *the soul possesses a certain likeness of the species known to it.* Sometimes this intelligible image is, in prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it results from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the prophetic light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures in the imagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light.

Reply Obj. 3. It is true that man is able by his natural powers to form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering these pictures, but not so that they be directed to the representation of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect, since for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural light.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PROPHECIC VISION IS ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED
BY ABSTRACTION FROM THE SENSES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num. xii. 6): *If there be among you a prophet of*

the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. Now a gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter, *a vision that takes place by dreams and apparitions consists of things which seem to be said or done.* But when things seem to be said or done, which are neither said nor done, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

Obj. 2. Further, When one power is very intent on its own operation, other powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are very intent on hearing something fail to see what is before them. Now in the prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted, and intent on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

Obj. 3. Further, The same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends to the acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at the same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem necessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

Obj. 4. *On the contrary,* It is written (I Cor. xiv. 32): *The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.* Now this were impossible if the prophet were not in possession of his faculties, but abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that prophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing *Article*, the prophetic revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by impression or co-ordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the outward presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented to the prophet's mind by means of sensible species,—whether these be divinely formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses (Exod. iii. 2), and the writing shown to

Daniel (Dan. v. 25),—or whether they be produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine providence to be prophetically significant of something, as, for instance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noe.

Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary when the prophet's mind is enlightened by an intellectual light, or impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment of the intellect is effected by its turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7).

When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest the things thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation. Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is incomplete, so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he sees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 12): *Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just as bodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with our eyes one who is present, and at the same time we see with the soul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes.*

Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered cause. This cause may be natural,—for instance, a dream,—or spiritual,—for instance, the intenseness of the prophet's contemplation; thus we read of Peter (Acts x. 9) that while he was praying in the supper-room* *he fell into an ecstasy*,—or he may be carried away by the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel (i. 3): *The hand of the Lord was upon him.*

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom imaginary pictures were formed or co-ordinated,

* Vulg.,—*the house-top*, or *upper-chamber*.

either while asleep, which is denoted by the word *dream*, or while awake, which is signified by the word *vision*.

Reply Obj. 2. When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its application leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is intent, in its act, upon the co-ordination of or judgment concerning objects of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses.

Reply Obj. 3. The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there is no abstraction from the senses when the prophet's mind is led to judge or co-ordinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty things.

Reply Obj. 4. The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed (as Priscilla and Montanus maintained). But as regards the prophetic revelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets are subject to the spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROPHETS ALWAYS KNOW THE THINGS WHICH
THEY PROPHECY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the prophets always know the things which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 9), *those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses of bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind was brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by them.* Now what is understood cannot be unknown. Therefore the prophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies.

Obj. 2. Further, The light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light, is not ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.

Obj. 3. Further, Prophecy is directed for man's enlightenment; wherefore it is written (2 Pet. i. 19): *We have the more firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.* Now nothing can enlighten others unless it be lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is first enlightened so as to know what he declares to others.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. xi. 51): *And this he (Caiphas) spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation,* etc. Now Caiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he prophesies.

I answer that, In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to the principal agent. Now the prophet's mind is moved not only to apprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to one only, and in each case there may be a defect in the prophet's knowledge. For when the prophet's mind is moved to think or apprehend a thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and sometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed to him.

Again, sometimes the prophet's mind is moved to speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the words he utters; like David who said (2 Kings xxiii. 2): *The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken by me;* while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose mind is moved to utter certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost means by them, as was the case with Caiphas (Jo. xi. 51).

Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man's mind to do something, sometimes the latter understands the meaning

of it, like Jeremias who hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (Jer. xiii. 1-11); while sometimes he does not understand it;—thus the soldiers, who divided Christ's garments, understood not the meaning of what they did.

Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy Ghost to think something, or signify something by word or deed, this belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct. Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet's mind is a defective instrument, as stated in the *Article*, even true prophets know not all that the Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or even do.

And this suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*, since the arguments given at the beginning of the *Article* refer to true prophets whose minds are perfectly enlightened from above.

QUESTION CLXXIV.

OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) The division of prophecy into its species. (2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without imaginative vision? (3) The various degrees of prophecy. (4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets? (5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet? (6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROPHECY IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO THE PROPHECY OF DIVINE PREDESTINATION, OF FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND OF DENUNCIATION?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prophecy is unfittingly divided according to a gloss on Matth. i. 23, *Behold a virgin shall be with child*, where it is stated that *one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished so that its fulfilment is independent of our will, for instance the one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called denunciation, which is significative of God's disapproval.* For that which results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine

foreknowledge, since the prophets *read in the book of foreknowledge*, as a gloss says on Isa. xxxviii. 1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to alteration. For it is written (Jer. xviii. 7, 8): *I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent*—and this pertains to the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (verses 9, 10): *I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good that I have spoken to do unto it.* Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of promise.

Obj. 3. Further, Isidore says (*Etym. vii.*) that there are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an *ecstasy*, which is the transport of the mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts therein. The second kind is a *vision*, as we read in Isaias, who says (vi. 1): *I saw the Lord sitting*, etc. The third kind is a *dream*: thus Jacob, in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a *voice from heaven*, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gen. xxii. 11): *Lay not thy hand upon the boy.* The sixth kind is *taking up a parable*, as in the example of Balaam (Num. xxiii., xxiv.). The seventh kind is the *fulness of the Holy Ghost*, as in the case of nearly all the prophets. Further, he mentions three kinds of vision; one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a third by the eyes of the mind. Now these are not included in the aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient.

On the contrary stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed.

I answer that, The species of moral habits and acts are

distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy is something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is divided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 6, *ad* 2) that the future is contained in the Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we have the prophecy of denunciation, which is not always fulfilled; but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God foreknows certain things in themselves,—either as to be accomplished by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of predestination, since, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 30), *God predestines things which are not in our power*,—or as to be accomplished through man's free-will, and of such is the prophecy of foreknowledge. This may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards good alone. And since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only two species to prophecy, namely of foreknowledge, and of denunciation.

Reply Obj. 1. Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connexion with future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is common to every species of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 2. The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But it is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings.

Reply Obj. 3. Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying,—either according to man's cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned both by

him and by Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 6),—or according to the different ways in which the prophetic current is received. Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the *fulness of the Holy Ghost* which he mentions in the seventh place. As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions three, namely *dreams*, to which he gives the third place; *vision*, which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and *ecstasy*, which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is,—either a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as a *cloud*, which he mentions in the fourth place,—or a *voice* sounding from without and conveyed to man's hearing,—this he puts in the fifth place,—or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a similitude, and this pertains to the *parable* to which he assigns the sixth place.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PROPHECY WHICH IS ACCOMPANIED BY INTELLECTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE VISION IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THAT WHICH IS ACCOMPANIED BY INTELLECTIVE VISION ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the prophecy which has intellectual and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellectual vision alone. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 9): *He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who excels in both ways*, and this refers to the prophet who has intellectual together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy is more excellent.

Obj. 2. Further, The greater a thing's power is, the greater

the distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains chiefly to the mind, as stated above (Q. CLXXIII., A. 2). Therefore apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater than that which is confined to the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, Jerome (*Prolog. in Lib. Reg.*) distinguishes the prophets from the sacred writers. Now all those whom he calls prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with imaginative vision, than those who had intellective vision alone.

Obj. 4. Further, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier. i.*) that *it is impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened round about by the many-coloured sacred veils.* Now the prophetic revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms.

On the contrary, A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that *the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by the mere inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream.*

I answer that, The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in God's essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a supernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.

Moreover the prophet's mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better understanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in commendation of David's prophecy (2 Kings xxiii. 3): *The strong one of Israel spoke to me, and further on (verse 4): As the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without clouds.*

Reply Obj. 1. When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the intellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater than all.

Reply Obj. 2. The same judgment does not apply to things that are sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of something else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent's power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if he is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed from health. On the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a sick person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own sake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth. Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it less.

Reply Obj. 3. The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter from being simply better than the

former: thus the knowledge of the blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer, although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge, because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, provided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may know some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human reason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special reason that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence they spoke as God's representatives, saying to the people: *Thus saith the Lord*: but not so the authors of the 'sacred writings,' several of whom treated more frequently of things that can be known by human reason, not in God's name, but in their own, yet with the assistance of the Divine light withal.

Reply Obj. 4. In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is said to be without imaginary vision.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEGREES OF PROPHECY CAN BE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THE IMAGINARY VISION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the degrees of prophecy cannot be distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of something else, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, *ad* 2. Therefore it would seem that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various imaginary visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does not entail a difference of prophecy.

Obj. 3. Further, According to a gloss (*Cassiod. super Prolog. Hieron. in Psalt.*), prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams, and visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be distinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision and dreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds.

On the contrary, The medium differentiates the degrees of knowledge: thus science based on immediate* premises is more excellent than science based on mediate† premises or than opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now imaginary vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to imaginary vision.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXIII., A. 2), the prophecy wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed through an imaginary vision, holds the mean between the prophecy wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision, and that wherein

* *Propter quid.*

† *Quia.*

through the intelligible light and without an imaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to human conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to prophecy than is action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an inward instinct, is moved to perform some outward action. Thus it is related of Samson (Jud. xv. 14) that *the Spirit of the Lord came strongly upon him, and as the flax* is wont to be consumed at the approach of fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed*. The second degree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an inward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related of Solomon (3 Kings iv. 32, 33) that *he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and of creeping things and of fishes: and all of this came from divine inspiration, for it was stated previously (verse 29): God gave to Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much*.

Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so called, because they do not attain to supernatural truth. The prophecy wherein supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary vision is differentiated first according to the difference between dreams which occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is awake. The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since the prophetic light that draws a man away to supernatural things while he is awake and occupied with sensible things would seem to be stronger than that which finds a man asleep and withdrawn from objects of sense. Secondly, the degrees of this prophecy are differentiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since words are the most expressive signs of intelligible truth, it would seem to be a higher degree of prophecy when the prophet, whether awake or asleep, hears words expressive of an intelligible truth, than when he sees things significative of truth, for

* *Lina*. S. Thomas apparently read *ligna* (wood).

instance *the seven full ears of corn* signified *seven years of plenty* (Gen. xli. 22, 26). In suchlike signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, according as the signs are more expressive, for instance when Jeremias saw the burning of the city under the figure of a boiling caldron (Jer. i. 13). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy when a prophet not only sees signs of words or deeds, but also, either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or showing something to him, since this proves the prophet's mind to have approached nearer to the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height of a degree of prophecy may be measured according to the appearance of the person seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by him under the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under the form of a man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet whether asleep or awake, under the appearance of God, according to Isa. vi. 1, *I saw the Lord sitting*.

But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein an intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without any imaginary vision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so called, as stated in the foregoing *Article, ad 3*; and consequently the degrees of prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision.

Reply Obj. 1. We are unable to know how to distinguish the intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs. Hence the difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the difference in the things presented to the imagination.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 2), prophecy is by way, not of an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore there is nothing inconsistent if one and the same prophet, at different times, receive various degrees of prophetic revelation.

Reply Obj. 3. The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to the prophetic revelation, but to the announce-

ment, which is made according to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 1).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MOSES WAS THE GREATEST OF THE PROPHETS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Moses was not the greatest of the prophets. For a gloss on the beginning of the Psalter says that *David is called the prophet by way of excellence.* Therefore Moses was not the greatest of all.

Obj. 2. Further, Greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the sun and moon to stand still (Jos. x. 12-14), and by Isaias, who made the sun to turn back (Isa. xxxviii. 8), than by Moses, who divided the Red Sea (Exod. xiv. 21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by Elias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. xlvi. 4, 5): *Who can glory like to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below.* Therefore Moses was not the greatest of the prophets.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Matth. xi. 11) that *there hath not risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the Baptist.* Therefore Moses was not greater than all the prophets.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xxxiv. 10): *There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses.*

I answer that, Although in some respect one or other of the prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest of all. For, as stated above (A. 3; Q. CLXXI., A. 1), in prophecy we may consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by imaginary vision, but also the announcement and the confirmation by miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets. First, as regards the intellectual vision, since he saw God's very essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 27). Hence it is written (Num.

xii. 8) that he saw God *plainly and not by riddles*. Secondly, as regards the imaginary vision, which he had at his call as it were, for not only did he hear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God, and this not only while asleep, but even when he was awake. Hence it is written (Exod. xxxiii. 11) that *the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend*. Thirdly, as regards the working of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation of unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (Deut. xxxiv. 10, 11): *There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He sent by him, to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his whole land.*

Reply Obj. 1. The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and expressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation.

Reply Obj. 2. These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were greater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were wrought on a whole people.

Reply Obj. 3. John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller revelation, as stated in 2 Cor. iii.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A DEGREE OF PROPHECY IN THE BLESSED ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed. For, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, Moses saw the divine essence, and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed can be called prophets.

Obj. 2. Further, Prophecy is a divine revelation. Now divine revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even blessed angels can be prophets.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (Matth. xiii. 57), when He says: *A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country.* Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be called prophets.

Obj. 4. Further, It is written of Samuel (Ecclus. xlvi. 23): *He lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of the nation.* Therefore other saints can likewise be called prophets after they have died.

On the contrary, The prophetic word is compared (2 Pet. i. 19) to a *light that shineth in a dark place.* Now there is no darkness in the blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.

I answer that, Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth as being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the part of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth is not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this truth will be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and such most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the part of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained completely to his ultimate perfection, according to 2 Cor. v. 6, *While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord.*

Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they cannot be called prophets.

Reply Obj. 1. This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision, wherefore he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision did not entirely lose the character of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 2. The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as being far distant, but as already wholly united to

God; wherefore their revelation has not the character of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer.* Consequently the notion of prophecy is not applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer.

Reply Obj. 4. Samuel had not yet attained to the state of blessedness. Wherefore although by God's will the soul itself of Samuel foretold to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by God, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with the saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference that this is stated to have been brought about by the demons' art, because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint, or to force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the power of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself declares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by Elias to the King's messengers who were sent to consult the god of Accaron (4 Kings i.).

It might also be replied† that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and the bystanders who were of this opinion.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEGREES OF PROPHECY CHANGE AS TIME GOES ON?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine things, as stated above (Q. CLXXIII., AA. 2, 4). Now according to Gregory (*Hom. xvi. in Ezech.*), *knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on*. Therefore

* Cf. P. III., QQ. IX. *seqq.*

† The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture. Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXIX., A. 8, *ad* 2.

degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to the process of time.

Obj. 2. Further, Prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing the things revealed to them. For it is written (1 Kings iii. 1) that before the time of Samuel *the word of the Lord was precious*, i.e. rare; and yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like manner the books of the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of Isaias, to whom it was said (Isa. viii. 1): *Take thee a great book and write in it with a man's pen*, after which many prophets wrote their prophecies. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy made progress.

Obj. 3. Further, Our Lord said (Matth. xi. 13): *The prophets and the law prophesied until John*; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was in Christ's disciples in a much more excellent manner than in the prophets of old, according to Eph. iii. 5, *In other generations the mystery of Christ was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit*. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy advanced.

On the contrary, As stated above (A. 4), Moses was the greatest of the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore prophecy did not advance in degree as time went on.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 4; Q. CLXXIII., AA. 2, 4) prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according to Ps. xlii. 3, *Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me*. Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true knowledge of God, according to Heb. xi. 6, *He that cometh to God must believe that He is*; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's incarnation, according to Jo. xiv. 1, *You believe in God, believe also in Me*. Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as its end,

it progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps. civ. 15, *Do no evil to My prophets*, which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Exod. vi. 2, 3): *I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God Almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them*; because previously the patriarchs had been taught to believe in God, One and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Exod. iii. 14): *I am Who am*; and this name is signified by Jews in the word *Adonai* on account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son of God Himself, according to Matth. xxviii. 19: *Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost*.

In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which was given first. Now the first revelation, before the Law, was given to Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no such revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of one God. A less excellent revelation was made to Isaac, being founded on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gen. xxvi. 24): *I am the God of Abraham thy father*, and in like manner to Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 12): *I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac*. Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which was given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation

all the other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the time of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the revelation vouchsafed to the apostles, concerning the faith in One God and three Persons, according to Matth. xvi. 18, *On this rock*, i.e. of thy confession, *I will build My Church*.

As to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the nearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the more fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. iii. 5).

As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation varied not according to the course of time, but according as circumstances required, because as it is written (Prov. xxix. 18), *When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad*. Wherefore at all times men were divinely instructed about what they were to do, according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.

Reply Obj. 1. The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time before Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xviii. 27), *just as in the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most explicitly to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon, which is Rome, and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were to be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles testifying in word and writing to that great event to come, the promises, namely, which were made to Abraham*. For while prophets were scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that they began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being set up with greater publicity, which at some future time were to benefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city, Rome to wit, was being built, which was to govern the nations.

The reason why it behoved that nation to have a number of prophets especially at the time of the kings, was that then

it was not over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it behoved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have prophets to teach them what to do.

Reply Obj. 3. The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, *This does not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For we read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens, daughters of Philip, prophesied.* John, too, wrote a prophetic book about the end of the Church; and at all times there have not been lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of human acts. Thus Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, v. 26) that *the emperor Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian desert, and whom he knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic spirit; and from him he received a message assuring him of victory.*

QUESTION CLXXV.

OF RAPTURE.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine? (2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive power? (3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God? (4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses? (5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from his body? (6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL OF MAN IS CARRIED AWAY TO THINGS DIVINE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the soul of man is not carried away to things divine. For some define rapture as *an uplifting by the power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature.* Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his *Confessions: Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in Thee.* Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. viii. ix.*) that God's justice is seen in this that He treats all things according to their mode and worth. But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that he be raised above what he is

according to nature. Therefore it would seem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

Obj. 3. Further, Rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 30). Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 2): *I know a man in Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven ;* on which words a gloss says: *Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature.*

I answer that, Rapture denotes violence of a kind, as stated in the *Third Objection* ; and *the violent is that which has its principle without, and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all* (*Ethic.* iii. 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be carried to something different from that to which his inclination tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination,—for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending,—for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.

Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as regards the term of transport,—as when it is carried away to punishment, according to Ps. xlix. 22, *Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver you ;* in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally, provided this be not done intentionally, as happens in sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore it cannot be called rapture, properly speaking.

This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer abstraction from the senses through weakness; secondly, by the power of the demons, as in those who are possessed; thirdly, by the power of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. viii. 3, *The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem.*

It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.

Reply Obj. 1. It is natural to man to tend to divine things through the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. i. 20, *The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.* But this mode, whereby a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to man's mode and worth that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to God's image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God.

Reply Obj. 3. The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we consider the mode of the operation, but not if we consider its term to which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER RAPTURE PERTAINS TO THE COGNITIVE RATHER THAN TO THE APPETITIVE POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that rapture pertains to the appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.): *The Divine love causes ecstasy.* Now love pertains to the appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Dial.* ii. 3) that *he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life ; while Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself.* Now the prodigal son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Ps. xxx. i, *In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded,* says in explaining the title : * *Ἐκστασις in Greek signifies in Latin ' excessus mentis,' an aberration of the mind. This happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower world.* Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. cxv. 2, *I said in my excess : Every man is a liar,* says: *We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation.* Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also.

I answer that, We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. For it was stated in the foregoing *Article* that rapture is outside the inclination of that which

* *Unto the end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy.*

is raptured; whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in desiring something, a man is not raptured, but is moved by himself. Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover it has an effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only to the third heaven,—which pertains to the contemplation of the intellect,—but also that he was caught up into paradise, which pertains to the appetite.

Reply Obj. 1. Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper order;* while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when a man's appetite tends to something outside him, and in this sense Dionysius says that *the Divine love causes ecstasy*, inasmuch as it makes man's appetite tend to the object loved. Hence he says afterwards that *even God Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His providence for all beings*. But even if this were said expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause of rapture.

Reply Obj. 2. There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus

* Cf. I.-II., Q. XXVIII., A. 3.

Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine love* exclaimed: *I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.* In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is thus that *he who fed the swine debased himself*; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love.

It must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil. Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xiv. 7, 9).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER PAUL, WHEN IN RAPTURE, SAW THE ESSENCE OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that Paul, when in rapture, did not see the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to the third heaven, so we read of Peter (*Acts* x. 10) that *there came upon him an ecstasy of mind.* Now Peter,

in his ecstasy, saw not God's essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that neither did Paul see the essence of God.

Obj. 2. Further, The vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in rapture saw not the essence of God.

Obj. 3. Further, According to 1 Cor. xiii. 10-12, faith and hope are incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in this state had faith and hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of God.

Obj. 4. Further, As Augustine states (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 6, 7), *pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision.* Now Paul is stated (2 Cor. xii. 2, 4) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture, for instance of the third heaven and of paradise. Therefore he would seem to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to the vision of the Divine essence.

On the contrary, Augustine in his book *On Seeing God*, addressed to Paulinus (*Ep.* cxlvii. 13), concludes that *possibly God's very substance was seen by some while yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to utter.*

I answer that, Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw *not the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity.* But Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his book *On Seeing God* (*loc. cit.*), but also in *Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 28 (cf. gloss on 2 Cor. xii. 2, *Even to the third heaven*). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle indicate this, for he says that *he heard secret words, which it is not granted unto man to utter.* Such would seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state of the wayfarer, according to Isa. lxiv. 4, *Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou*

*hast prepared for them that love** (Vulg.,—*wait for*) *Thee*. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence.

Reply Obj. 1. Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through certain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Ps. cxv. 11): *I said in my excess: Every man is a liar*. Thirdly, so that he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as also of Moses, and not without reason, since as Moses was the first teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first teacher of the gentiles.†

Reply Obj. 2. The divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written (Ps. xxxv. 10): *In Thy light we shall see light*. But this light can be shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it beatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory passion, as stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 2) of the light of prophecy; and in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body, but only in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy.

Reply Obj. 3. Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he had not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.

Reply Obj. 4. In one way by the third heaven we may understand something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean,‡ which is described as the third, in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better still, in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens; and Paul is stated to be rapt to the third heaven, not as though his rapture consisted in the vision of something corporeal,

* Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 9. † Cf. P. I., Q. XII., A. 11, *ad 2*.

‡ Cf. P. I. Q. LXVIII., A. 4.

but because this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the gloss on 2 Cor. xii. quoted at the beginning of the *Article*, says that the *third heaven is a spiritual heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation of God*: and when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen for evermore.

In another way the third heaven may signify a supramundane vision. Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First, according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Dan. v. 5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 28). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself. Thirdly, the third heaven may denote the contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees belongs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy,* the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. xii. quoted at the beginning of the *Article*. And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he was not only rapt to the third heaven by reason of his contemplation, but also to paradise by reason of the consequent delight.

* Cf. P. I., Q. CVIII., A. 1.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PAUL, WHEN IN RAPTURE, WAS WITHDRAWN
FROM HIS SENSES ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Paul, when in rapture, was not withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 28): *Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to take the place of the present life?* Now in that future life after the resurrection the saints will see the divine essence without being withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a withdrawal take place in Paul.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision of the divine essence, without, however, being withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God.

Obj. 3. Further, After seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Cor. xii. 4): *I heard (Vulg.,—He . . . heard) secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter.* Now the memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher (*De Mem. et Remin.* i.). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the essence of God, was not withdrawn from his senses.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 27): *Unless a man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that he truly knows not, as the Apostle said, whether he be in the body or out of the body,* he is not rapt and caught up into that vision.*

I answer that, The divine essence cannot be seen by man through any cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect does not turn to intelligible objects

* The text of St. Augustine reads; *when he is rapt*, etc.

except by means of the phantasms* which it takes from the senses through the intelligible species; and it is in considering these phantasms that the intellect judges of and co-ordinates sensible objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is necessary for man's intellect, if it see God's essence, to be withdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence cannot be seen by means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species,† since God's essence infinitely transcends not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all intelligible creatures. Now when man's intellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that his mind's whole attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in the foregoing *Article (Obj. 2)*, after the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated in the foregoing *Article (ad 2)*, and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the divine essence much more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was *made a little lower than the angels* (Heb. ii. 9), by dispensation, and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence there is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers.

Reply Obj. 3. Paul, after ceasing to see the essence of

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXIV., A. 7.

† Cf. P. I., Q. XII., A. 2.

God, remembered what he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express in words.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER, WHILE IN THIS STATE, PAUL'S SOUL WAS WHOLLY SEPARATED FROM HIS BODY ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that, while in this state, Paul's soul was wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. v. 6, 7): *While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, and not by sight.** Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore he was not in the body.

Obj. 2. Further, A power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the soul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the intellect, which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the body.

Obj. 3. Further, The forces of the vegetative soul are more material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be rapt to the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the sensitive soul, as stated in the foregoing *Article*. Much more, therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate, the soul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would seem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be wholly separated from the body.

* *Per speciem*, i.e. by an intelligible species.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his letter to Paulinus *On Seeing God* (Ep. cxlvii. 13): *It is not incredible that this sublime revelation* (namely, that they should see God in His essence) *was vouchsafed certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as to leave nothing but a corpse for burial.* Therefore it was not necessary for Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated from his body.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), in the rapture of which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature. Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to man according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no change, as stated above (A. 5, *ad* 3). Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which transcends all phantasms, as stated in the foregoing *Article*. Therefore it was not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the perception of sensible objects.

Reply Obj. 1. In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but not as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated above (A. 3, *ad* 2, 3).

Reply Obj. 2. A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place befitting it according to its specific nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The forces of the vegetative soul do not

operate through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces, but by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellectual knowledge.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

DID PAUL KNOW WHETHER HIS SOUL WERE SEPARATED
FROM HIS BODY ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Paul was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body. For he says (2 Cor. xii. 2): *I know a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven.* Now man denotes something composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death. Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his body by death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the common opinion of the Doctors.

Obj. 2. Further, It appears from the same words of the Apostle that he knew whither he was rapt, since it was *to the third heaven.* Now this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he knew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal thing cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore it would seem that he was not wholly ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 28) that *when in rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in heaven.* Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too knew this.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. xii. 3): *Whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth.*

I answer that, The true answer to this question must be gathered from the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something, namely that he was *rapt even to the*

third heaven, and that something he knew not, namely *whether* he were *in the body or out of the body*. This may be understood in two ways. First, the words *whether in the body or out of the body* may refer not to the very being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul were in his body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (Ezech. viii. 3) to have been brought in the vision of God into Jerusalem. This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to Jerome in the prologue to his commentary on Daniel, where he says that *lastly our Apostle* (thus said the Jew) *durst not assert that he was rapt in his body, but said: 'Whether in the body or out of the body, I know not.'*

Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (*Gen. ad Lit.*, xii. 2, 3, 4, 28) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as appears in one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither, or he knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his body. Consequently we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether it were accompanied by his body or not.

Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were abstracted from the opera-

tions of the vegetative soul. But he could not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as to require him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body as its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards he questioned the point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen. But this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there distinguishes between the past and what happened subsequently, since he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt fourteen years ago, and that at the present time he knows not whether he was in the body or out of the body.

Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 5), after discussing the question at length, concludes: *Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn from his bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead.*

Reply Obj. 1. Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man, especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. Or again we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years afterwards: for he says *I know a man*, not *I know a rapt man*. For nothing hinders death brought about by God being called rapture; and thus Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 3): *If the Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about it?* Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject speak with more conjecture than certainty.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was something corporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that heaven; since this could be done by his intellect, even without his soul being separated from his body.

Reply Obj. 3. Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen; and unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing, because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 36): *Although, when the Apostle was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption.*

QUESTION CLXXVI.

OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACES WHICH PERTAIN
TO SPEECH, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF THE GRACE
OF TONGUES.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech, and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of all languages? (2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO RECEIVED THE GIFT OF TONGUES
SPOKE IN EVERY LANGUAGE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord turned the water into good wine, as stated in Jo. ii. 10. Now those who had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since a gloss on Heb. i. says that *it is not surprising that the epistle to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the other epistles, since it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than over a strange language. For the Apostle wrote the other epistles in a foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the Hebrew tongue.* Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowledge of all languages by a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 2. Further, Nature does not employ many means where one is sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than nature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all, while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts ii. 6, *Every man heard them speak in his own tongue*, says that *they spoke in every tongue, or speaking in their own* (namely the Hebrew language) *were understood by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each*. Therefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in all languages.

Obj. 3. Further, All graces flow from Christ to His body, which is the Church, according to Jo. i. 16, *Of His fulness we all have received*. Now we do not read that Christ spoke but one language, nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one tongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not receive the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts ii. 4) that *they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak*; on which passage a gloss of Gregory (*Hom. xxx. in Ev.*) says that *the Holy Ghost appeared over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the knowledge of all tongues*.

I answer that, Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His faith everywhere, according to Matth. xxviii. 19, *Going . . . teach ye all nations*. Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach others should need to be taught by others, either as to how they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who spoke to them; and all the more seeing that those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea, according to Isa. xxvii. 6, *When they shall rush out from Jacob* . . . they shall fill the face of the world with seed*. Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have

* Vulg.,—*When they shall rush in unto Jacob, etc.*

easily found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them, especially as they were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to Gen. xi., so when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might be applied by the gift of tongues.

Reply Obj. 1. As it is written (1 Cor. xii. 7), *the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit*; and consequently both Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed in the languages of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently instructed in wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith, but not as to all things known by acquired science, for instance the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.

Reply Obj. 2. Although either was possible, namely that, while speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language were intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the knowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have amounted to an illusion, since a man's words would have had a different sound in another's ears, from that with which they were uttered. Hence a gloss says on Acts ii. 6 that *it was a greater miracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues*; and Paul says (1 Cor. xiv. 18): *I thank my God I speak with all your tongues.*

Reply Obj. 3. Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one nation, namely the Jews. Consequently,

although without any doubt He possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as Augustine says (*Tract. xxxii. in Joan.*), *whereas even now the Holy Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations, because the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations: since whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GIFT OF TONGUES IS MORE EXCELLENT
THAN THE GRACE OF PROPHECY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper to better persons, according to the Philosopher (*Top. iii.*). Now the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in the sequence of Pentecost:* *On this day Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time; whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, according to Heb. i. 1, God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets.* Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.

Obj. 2. Further, That whereby we are directed to God is seemingly more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is directed to man; for it is written (*1 Cor. xiv. 2, 3*): *He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification.* Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.

Obj. 3. Further, The gift of tongues abides like a habit in the person who has it, and he can use it when he will;

* The sequence: *Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis gratia* ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author of the *Veni Sancte Spiritus*.

wherefore it is written (1 Cor. xiv. 18): *I thank my God I speak with all your tongues.* But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above (Q. CLXXI., A. 2). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more excellent than the gift of prophecy.

Obj. 4. Further, The interpretation of speeches would seem to be contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the same Spirit from whom they originated. Now the interpretation of speeches is placed after divers kinds of tongues (1 Cor. xii. 10). Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xiv. 5): *Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues.*

I answer that, The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the utterance of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and this again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary vision; wherefore Augustine compares (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii. 8) the gift of tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been stated above (Q. CLXXIII., A. 2) that the gift of prophecy consists in the mind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth. Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the imaginary vision, as stated above (Q. CLXXIV., A. 2), so also is prophecy more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself. Secondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which the gift of tongues pertains. Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable; and the Apostle proves this in three ways (1 Cor. xiv.); first, because prophecy is more profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose he that speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (*verses 4, 5*); secondly, as regards the speaker himself, for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding them, which pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would

not be edified (*verses 7-14*); thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (*verse 23*), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the latter spoke in various tongues (Acts ii. 13): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are made manifest (*verse 25*).

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CLXXIV., A. 3, *ad 1*), it belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an intelligible light, but also that he should perceive an imaginary vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost's operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New Testament, according to 1 Cor. xiv. 26, *Every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation*, i.e. a prophetic revelation.

Reply Obj. 2. By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his tongue. *He that speaketh in a tongue* is said to speak *not unto men*, i.e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's understanding and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect gift.

Reply Obj. 3. Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of all things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by way of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. On the other hand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly and by way of habit.

Reply Obj. 4. The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened

so as to understand and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan. v. 16, *I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure things, and resolve difficult things.* Hence the interpretation of speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. xiv. 5), *Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret.* Yet the interpretation of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even to the interpretation of divers kinds of tongues.

QUESTION CLXXVII.

OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. xii. 8): *To one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge.* Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words? (2) To whom is the grace becoming?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY GRATUITOUS GRACE ATTACHES TO WORDS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that a gratuitous grace does not attach to words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* iv. 12). Now this belongs to the grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of word is not a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 2. Further, All grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the Apostle says (1 Cor. iv. 20): *The kingdom of God is not in speech, but in power.* Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words.

Obj. 3. Further, No grace is given through merit, since *if by grace, it is not now of works* (Rom. xi. 6). But the word is sometimes given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (*Moral.* xi. 9) in explanation of Ps. cxviii. 43,

Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out of my mouth that the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not. Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 4. Further, It behoves man to declare in words things pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. vi. 5): *A gracious tongue in a good man shall abound* (Vulg.,—*aboundeth*). Now man's goodness is by grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.

I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of others, as stated above (I.-II., Q. CXI., AA. 1, 4). Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace of the word.

This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as to teach. Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as to please his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favour, but in order to draw them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfil it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as to sway his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory says in the homily for Pentecost (*Hom. xxx. in Ev.*): *Unless*

the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body.

Reply Obj. 1. Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which art can effect in a less efficient manner.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he says just before (*verse 19*): *I . . . will know, not the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power*: and of himself he had already said (*ii. 4*): *My speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the *Article*, the grace of the word is given to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he does not merit it by his good works, which merely remove the obstacles to grace.

Reply Obj. 4. As stated in the *Article*, the grace of the word is directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin. xiv. 1*) that *to know how faith may profit the godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by knowledge.* Hence it was not necessary for him to mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the word of knowledge and of wisdom.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GRACE OF THE WORD OF WISDOM AND
KNOWLEDGE IS BECOMING TO WOMEN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to this grace, as stated in the foregoing *Article*. Now it is becoming to a woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. iv. 3, 4): *I was an only son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me.** Therefore this grace is becoming to women.

Obj. 2. Further, The grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah (Judges iv. 4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kings xxii. 14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts xxi. 9). Moreover the Apostle says (1 Cor. xi. 5): *Every woman praying or prophesying*, etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is becoming to a woman.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (1 Pet. iv. 10): *As every man hath received grace ministering the same one to another.* Now some women receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is becoming to women.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xiv. 34): *Let women keep silence in the churches*, and (1 Tim. ii. 12): *I suffer not a woman to teach.* Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women.

I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way, publicly, addressing

* Vulg.,—*I was my father's son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. And he taught me.*

oneself to the whole church, and this is not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man, as appears from Gen. iii. 16. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by accident). Secondly, lest men's minds be enticed to lust, for it is written (Ecclus. ix. 11): *Her conversation burneth as fire*. Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teaching.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a father instructs his son.

Reply Obj. 2. The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men, according to Coloss. iii. 10, 11, *Putting on the new man, him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created him, where there is neither male nor female.** Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.

* Vulg.,—*Neither Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.* Cf. P. I., Q. XCIII., A. 6, ad 2, footnote.

QUESTION CLXXVIII.

OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles? (2) To whom is it becoming?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A GRATUITOUS GRACE OF WORKING MIRACLES?

We proceed thus to the First Article ;—

Objection 1. It seems that no gratuitous grace is directed to the working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to whom it is given.* Now the working of miracles puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles are wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings xiii. 21) that *some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood upon his feet.* Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 2. Further, The gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. xii. 4, *There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.* Now the working of miracles is effected even by the unclean spirit, according to Matth. xxiv. 24, *There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders.* Therefore it would

* Cf. I.-II., Q. CX., A. 1.

seem that the working of miracles does not belong to a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Miracles are divided into signs, wonders or portents, and virtues.* Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the working of miracles a gratuitous grace, any more than the working of signs and wonders.

Obj. 4. Further, The miraculous restoring to health is done by the power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be distinguished from the working of miracles.

Obj. 5. Further, The working of miracles results from faith,—either of the worker, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 2, *If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains,* or of other persons for whose sake miracles are wrought, according to Matth. xiii. 58, *And He wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief.* Therefore, if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. xii. 9, 10) says that among other gratuitous graces, *to another is given the grace of healing, . . . to another, the working of miracles.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXVII., A. 1), the Holy Ghost provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of miracles, according to Mark xvi. 20, *And confirming the word with signs that followed :* and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge

* Cf. 2 Thess. ii. 9, where the Douay version renders *virtus* by *power*. The use of the word *virtue* in the sense of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term *miracle* is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. xii. 10, 28; Heb. ii. 4.

of God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural effects which are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is impossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the prophet's mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts ix. 40); sometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered them to death (Acts v. 4, 9). Hence Gregory says (*Dial. ii. 30*) that *the saints work miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer*. In either case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Jos. x. 12): *Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon*, it is said afterwards (*verse 14*): *There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying the voice of a man*.

Reply Obj. 2. Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 Thess. ii. 9) that the coming of Antichrist will be *according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders*. To quote the words of Augustine (*De Civ. Dei, xx. 19*), *it is a matter of debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders, because he will deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he will seem*

to do what he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce into falsehood them that believe. They are said to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh's magicians made real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of natural causes, as stated in the First Part (Q. CXIV., A. 4); whereas the working of miracles which is ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God's power for man's profit.

Reply Obj. 3. Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature, and in this respect miracles are called *virtues*. The other thing is the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of something supernatural; and in this respect they are commonly called *signs*: but on account of some excellence they receive the name of *wonder* or *prodigy*, as showing something from afar (*procul*).

Reply Obj. 4. The grace of healing is mentioned separately, because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 5. The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith; secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be confirmed in their faith.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WICKED CAN WORK MIRACLES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the wicked cannot work miracles. For miracles are obtained through prayer, as

stated in the foregoing *Article*. Now the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to Jo. ix. 31, *We know that God doth not hear sinners*, and Prov. xxviii. 9, *He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination*. Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles.

Obj. 2. Further, Miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Matth. xvii. 19, *If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you shall say to this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove*. Now faith without works is dead, according to James ii. 20, so that, seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work miracles.

Obj. 3. Further, Miracles are divine attestations, according to Heb. ii. 4, *God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers miracles*: wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot work miracles.

Obj. 4. Further, The good are more closely united to God than the wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do the wicked.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 2): *If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing*. Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because *this gift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition*, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv. 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.

I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).

True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of

God, because God works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person's holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on Matth. vii. 22, *Have not we prophesied in Thy name?* says: *Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the invoking of Christ's name, that men may honour God, by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought.*

In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read (Acts xix. 11, 12) that *God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles and even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs . . . and the diseases departed from them.* In this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of whose holiness such things are done.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. LXXXIII., A. 16) when we were treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on God's mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says (*Tract. xliv. in Joan.*) that *the blind man spoke these words before he was anointed*, that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; *since God does hear sinners.* When it is said that the prayer of one who hears not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for the spiritual welfare of the one who prays,—as the publican was heard (Luke xviii. 14),—or for the good of others and for God's glory.

Reply Obj. 2. Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.

Reply Obj. 3. Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 79): *Magicians work miracles in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness.*

Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine says (*loc. cit.*), *our Lord warns us to understand that even wicked men can work some miracles which holy men cannot work, and as Augustine again says the reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater gifts than deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is obtained.*

QUESTION CLXXIX.

OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative? (2) Whether this is an adequate division?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIFE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its essence: since the Philosopher says (*De Anima*, ii., text. 37) that *in living things to live is to be*. Now the soul is the principle of action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Obj. 2. Further, The division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative, or speculative and practical, are differences of the intellect (*De Anima*, iii., text. 46, 49);

while *to live* comes before *to understand*, since *to live* comes first to living things through the vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (*De Anima*, ii., text. 34, 59). Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Obj. 3. Further, The word *life* implies movement, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.); whereas contemplation consists rather in rest, according to Wis. viii. 16: *When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her.* Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom.* xiv. *super Ezech.*) : *There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active life and the contemplative.*

I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined, is that which is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent, and that in which especially they wish to pass their time with their friends, as stated in *Ethic.* ix. 4, 9, 12.

Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Reply Obj. 1. Each thing's proper form that makes it actually *to be* is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence *to live* is, in living things, *to be*, because living things through having *being* from their form, act in such and such a way.

Reply Obj. 2. Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species

from having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life.

Reply Obj. 3. It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (*De Anima*, iii., text. 28) that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as the act of a perfect thing is a movement. In this way Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely *straight*, *circular*, and *oblique*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIFE IS ADEQUATELY DIVIDED INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* 1, 5) that there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of *pleasure*, the *civil* which would seem to be the same as the active, and the *contemplative* life. Therefore the division of life into active and contemplative would seem to be inadequate.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 2, 19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of *leisure* which pertains to the contemplative, the *busy* life which pertains to the active, and a third composed of both. Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative.

Obj. 3. Further, Man's life is diversified according to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.

On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the

contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (*Moral.* vi. 18; *Hom.* xiv. in *Ezech.*). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active and contemplative.

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing *Article (ad 2)*, this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellectual knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative.

Reply Obj. 1. The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher says (*ibid.*), it is the life of a beast. Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into active and contemplative.

Reply Obj. 2. A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.

Reply Obj. 3. All the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of well ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to the contemplative life.

QUESTION CLXXX.

OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections? (2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? (3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several? (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life? (5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God? (6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.). (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation. (8) Of the duration of contemplation.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE AFFECTIONS, AND PERTAINS WHOLLY TO THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (*Met.* ii., text. 3) that *the end of contemplation is truth*. Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* vi. 18; *Hom.* xiv.

in Ezech.) that *Rachel*, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle,'* signifies the contemplative life. Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that it belongs to the *contemplative life to rest from external action*. Now the affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the appetitive power.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*ibid.*; *Moral. vi. 18*) that *the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbour, and to desire nothing beside our Creator*. Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., AA. 1, 4). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXIX., A. 1) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XII., A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (I.-II., Q. IX., A. 1).

Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is written (*Matth. vi. 21*), *where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also*, sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) makes the contemplative life to consist in the charity of God, inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight,

* Or rather, *One seeing the principle* if derived from ראה and יין. Cf. Jerome, *De Nom. Hebr.*

which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense.

Reply Obj. 1. From the very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.

Reply Obj. 2. We are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator.*

Reply Obj. 3. The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practise the act of contemplation, as stated in the *Article*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES PERTAIN TO THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *the contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbour with the whole mind.* Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbour, for *love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law* (Rom. xiii. 10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life.

Obj. 2. Further, The contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *the mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator.* Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is a result of moral virtue.* For it is written (Matth. v. 8): *Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God*: and (Heb. xii. 14): *Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no*

* Cf. Q. VIII., A. 7.

man shall see God. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul*, wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (*Gen. xxix. 17*) that she was *of a beautiful countenance*. Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (*De Offic. i. 43, 45, 46*). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.

On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says (*Moral. vi. 18; Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *it belongs to the contemplative life to rest from external action*. Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life.

I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher states (*Ethic. ii. 2, x. 9*), *knowledge*, which pertains to the consideration of truth, *has little influence on the moral virtues*: wherefore he declares (*Ethic. x. 7, 8*) that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness.

On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the contemplative life.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in the foregoing *Article*, the contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbour is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that

the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.

Reply Obj. 2. Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, according to Isa. xxxii. 17, *The work of justice shall be peace*: since he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.

Reply Obj. 3. Beauty, as stated above (Q. CXLV., A. 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (Wis. viii. 2) of the contemplation of wisdom: *I became a lover of her beauty*. On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in so far as they participate the order of reason; and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (*Soliloq.* i. 10).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE VARIOUS ACTIONS PERTAINING
TO THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of S. Victor (*De Contempl.* i. 3) distinguishes between contemplation, meditation, and cogitation. Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life.

Obj. 2. Further, The Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 18): *But we . . . beholding (speculantes) the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity.** Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision (*speculatio*) belongs to the contemplative life.

Obj. 3. Further, Bernard says (*De Consid. v.*) that *the first and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty.* Now according to Damascene (*De Fide Orthodox. ii.*) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.

Obj. 4. Further, Prayer, reading, and meditation, are said to belong to the contemplative life. Again, hearing belongs to the contemplative life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is signified) *sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word* (Luke x. 39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.

On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative lives.

I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom. vii.*) between man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.

* Vulg.,—*into the same image from glory to glory.*

Reply Obj. 1. According to Richard of S. Victor (*loc. cit.*) cogitation would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations, and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* xiv. 7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. Meditation would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and consideration has the same meaning, according to Bernard (*De Consid.* ii. v.), although, according to the Philosopher (*De Anima*, iii., text. 1), every operation of the intellect may be called consideration. But contemplation regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (*De Contempl.* i. 4) that *contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is prone to wander.*

Reply Obj. 2. According to a gloss of Augustine on this passage (*De Trin.* xv. 8), *beholding (speculatio) denotes seeing in a mirror (speculo), not from a watch-tower (specula).* Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence *beholding* would seem to be reducible to meditation.

Reply Obj. 2. Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above (A. 1) that contemplation terminates in the affections.

Reply Obj. 4. Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from God, he needs prayer, according to Wis. vii. 7, *I called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came upon me*: while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs hearing, in so far

as he receives from the spoken word, and reading, in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires meditation.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE CONSISTS IN THE MERE CONTEMPLATION OF GOD, OR ALSO IN THE CONSIDERATION OF ANY TRUTH WHATEVER ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any truth. For it is written (Ps. cxxxviii. 14): *Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well.* Now the knowledge of God's works is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other.

Obj. 2. Further, Bernard says (*De Consid.* v.) that *contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises.* Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.

Obj. 3. Further, Richard of S. Victor (*De Contempl.* i. 6) distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to the imagination alone, and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The second is in the imagination guided by reason, and consists in considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is in the reason based on the imagination; when, to wit, from the consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is in the reason and conducted by the reason, when the mind is intent on things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The fifth is above the reason, but not

contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is above reason and contrary to reason; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.

Obj. 4. Further, In the contemplative life the contemplation of truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the contemplation of any truth.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* vi. 18) that *in contemplation we seek the principle which is God.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), a thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily or dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 8) that *the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys.* This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, namely *through a glass and in a dark manner* (1 Cor. xiii. 12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the Philosopher (*Ethic.* x. 7) places man's ultimate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.

Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself, according to Rom. i. 20, *The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,* it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the

contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* xxix.) that *in the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things unperishable and everlasting.*

Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2, 3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself.

Reply Obj. 1. David sought the knowledge of God's works, so that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. cxlii. 5, 6): *I meditated on all Thy works : I meditated upon the works of Thy hands : I stretched forth my hands to Thee.*

Reply Obj. 2. By considering the divine judgments man is guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be vouchsafed.

Reply Obj. 3. These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.

Reply Obj. 4. The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to the divine truth.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE PRESENT STATE OF LIFE THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE CAN REACH TO THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For, as stated in Gen. xxxii. 30, Jacob said: *I have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved.* Now the vision of God's face is the vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral. vi. 17*) that *contemplative men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that which they are.* Now man is not hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light in its essence.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Dial. ii. 35*): *All creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of God, the blessed Benedict, to wit, saw a fiery globe in the tower and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things by the light of God.* Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the essence of God.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*): *As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible light.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad Lit. xii. 27), no one seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision. This has been carefully discussed above (Q. CLXXV., AA. 4, 5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the First Part (Q. XII., A. 2), where we treated of the vision of God.

Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present life and the life to come.

Reply Obj. 1. As Dionysius says in a letter to the monk Caius, *if anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but something belonging to God.* And Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*): *By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision.* Accordingly the words of Jacob, *I saw God face to face* do not imply that he saw God's essence, but that he saw some shape,* imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him; or, *since we know a man by his face, by the face of God he signified his knowledge of Him*, according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage (*Moral. xxiv. 5*).

Reply Obj. 2. In the present state of life human contem-

* Cf. P. I., Q. XII., A. 11, ad 1.

plation is impossible without phantasms, because it is con-
 natural to man to see the intelligible species in the phantasms,
 as the Philosopher states (*De Anima*, iii.). Yet intellectual
 knowledge does not consist in the phantasms themselves,
 but in our contemplating in them the purity of the intel-
 ligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but
 also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius
 says (*Cœl. Hier.* ii.) that *the Divine glory shows us the angelic*
hierarchies under certain symbolic figures, and by its power
we are brought back to the single ray of light, i.e. to the simple
 knowledge of the intelligible truth. It is in this sense that
 we must understand the statement of Gregory that *con-*
templatives do not carry along with them the shadows of things
corporeal, since their contemplation is not fixed on them,
 but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.

Reply Obj. 3. By these words Gregory does not imply
 that the blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His
 essence, but he wishes to show that because *all creatures*
are small to him that sees God, it follows that all things can
 easily be seen through the enlightenment of the Divine
 light. Wherefore he adds: *For however little he may see of*
the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE OPERATION OF CONTEMPLATION IS FITTINGLY
 DIVIDED INTO A THREEFOLD MOVEMENT, CIRCULAR,
 STRAIGHT, AND OBLIQUE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the operation of contemplation
 is unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, *circular*,
straight, and *oblique* (*Div. Nom.* iv. 1). For contemplation
 pertains exclusively to rest, according to Wis. viii. 16,
When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her.
 Now movement is opposed to rest. Therefore the opera-
 tions of the contemplative life should not be described as
 movements.

Obj. 2. Further, The action of the contemplative life

pertains to the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For he says (*loc. cit.*) that the *circular* movement in the angel is *according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the good*. On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the soul to several things: the first of which is the *withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals*; the second is a *certain concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and of outward occupation*; and the third is *union with those things that are above it*. Again, he describes differently their respective straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight movement of the soul as being twofold: first, *its progress towards things that are near it*; secondly, *its uplifting from external things to simple contemplation*. Further, he assigns a different oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the angels to the fact that *while providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God*: whereas he assigns the oblique movement of the soul to the fact that *the soul is enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing*. Therefore it would seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned above.

Obj. 3. Further, Richard of S. Victor (*De Contempl.* i. 5) mentions many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air. *For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended; and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place*. Therefore it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius (*loc. cit.*).

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXIX., A. 1, ad 3),

the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philosopher (*De Anima*, iii. 7). Since, however, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take place without movement, the result is that even intelligible operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in *Phys.* viii. 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are described by being likened to them. These movements are of three kinds; for there is the *circular* movement, by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as centre, another is the *straight* movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third is *oblique*, being composed as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared to the oblique movement.

Reply Obj. 1. External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of contemplation.

Reply Obj. 2. Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man. Consequently these movements must be ascribed to men and angels in different ways, according as they are differently related to uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands the truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul

acquires intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of the reason. Wherefore Dionysius assigns the *circular* movement of the angels to the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same centre. But on the part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the circular movement of the soul is *the soul's withdrawal into itself from external objects*. Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated by his saying in the second place that *the soul's intellectual powers must be uniformly concentrated*, in other words that discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God alone. This he expresses by saying: *Then being thus made uniform unitedly, i.e. conformably, by the union of its powers, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful*. The straight movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says: *The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are direct, i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the*

direct order. Whereas he ascribes the *straight* movement in the soul to the soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of intelligible objects. The *oblique* movement in the angels he describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with their contemplation of God: while the *oblique* movement in the soul he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.

Reply Obj. 3. These varieties of movement that are taken from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as explained above (*ad 2*). That alone which he describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement. Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS DELIGHT IN CONTEMPLATION ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no delight in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.

Obj. 2. Further, All strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *when the soul strives to contemplate God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, because even while tasting it fails.* Therefore there is no delight in contemplation.

Obj. 3. Further, Delight is the result of a perfect operation, as stated in *Ethic. x. 4.* Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 12, *We see now through a glass in a dark manner.* Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative life.

Obj. 4. Further, A lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated (*Gen. xxxii.*) that after Jacob had said (*verse 30*) *I have seen God face to face, he halted on his foot, . . . because he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank.* Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.

On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (*Wis. viii. 16*): *Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness:* and Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable.*

I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself,* because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that *all men naturally desire to know,* so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on

* Cf. I.-II., Q. III., A. 5.

the part of its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above (AA. 1, 2, *ad* 1), it follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine love.

In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXXI., A. 5), when we were treating of the passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps. xxxiii. 9): *O taste and see that the Lord is sweet.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more.* And this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved.

Reply Obj. 2. Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (*Conf. viii. 3*) that *the more peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph.* But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our defective understanding and our cor-

ruptible body which drags us down to lower things, according to Wis. ix. 15, *The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things.* Hence it is that when man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rom. vii. 24): *Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?* Wherefore Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*): *When God is once known by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us.*

Reply Obj. 3. The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps. xxxv. 9): *Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure.* Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Part. Animal. i.*): *We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more delight than any of those things that are round about us:* and Gregory says in the same sense (*loc. cit.*): *The contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind.*

Reply Obj. 4. After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax strong in the love of God, as Gregory says (*loc. cit.*). Wherefore, as he goes on to say, *when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound.*

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE IS CONTINUOUS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the contemplative life is not continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 8, *Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed.* Therefore the contemplative life is made void.

Obj. 2. Further, A man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (*Conf. x. 40*), *Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness, . . . yet through my grievous weight I sink down again.* Again, Gregory commenting on the words of Job iv. 15, *When a spirit passed before me,* says: *The mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light.* Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is not connatural to man cannot be continuous. Now *the contemplative life*, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. x. 7*), *is better than the life which is according to man.* Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Luke x. 42): *Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her,* since as Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*), *the contemplative life begins here so as it may be perfected in our heavenly home.*

I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the

pleasure of contemplation, as stated in *Top.* i. 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous,—both because it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life,—and because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher observes (*Ethic.* x. 7).

Reply Obj. 1. The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this sense (*Hom.* xiv. in *Ezech.*): *The contemplative life begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love.*

Reply Obj. 2. No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine contemplation, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.; *Cæl. Hier.* vii.) and as we have stated above (A. 6, *ad* 2). Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be above man, because it befits us so far as there is in us something divine, namely the intellect, which is incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer.

QUESTION CLXXXI.

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the active life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life? (2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life? (3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life? (4) Of the duration of the active life.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE MORAL VIRTUES
PERTAIN TO THE ACTIVE LIFE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *the active life is to give bread to the hungry*, and after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other people he adds finally, *and to give to each and every one whatever he needs*. Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (Q. LVIII., AA. 1, 2; I-II., Q. LX., AA. 2, 3). Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*): *Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which being occupied with works, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbour both by word and example to its imitation*

it begets a numerous offspring of good deeds. Now this would seem to belong to charity, whereby we love our neighbour, rather than to the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the active life.

Obj. 3. Further, As stated above (Q. CLXXX., A. 2), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.

On the contrary, Isidore says (*De Summo Bono*, iii. 15): *In the active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light.* Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active life.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXIX., A. 1) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is external work to which the active life is directed.

Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 4) that *for virtue knowledge is of little or no avail.* Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (*Ethic.* x. 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.

Reply Obj. 1. The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher proves (*Ethic.* v. 1). Hence the active life is described with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in these things, not exclusively, but principally.

Reply Obj. 2. It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues, for one to direct one's neighbour to good by

example: and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life.

Reply Obj. 3. Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we practise the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues belong to the active life.

It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition to the contemplative life.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRUDENCE PERTAINS TO THE ACTIVE LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that the *active life being occupied with work, sees less*, wherefore it is signified by Lia who was blar-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life.

Obj. 3. Further, Prudence stands between the moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, so do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 2, 19).

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* x. 8) that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3; I.-II., Q. XVIII., A. 7), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is directed: for instance *he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer*, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is *right reason about things to be done* (*Ethic.* vi. 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.

If however we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (*De Offic.* i.) under the heading, *Of the four virtues whence all our duties originate*, says that *the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent and wise*.

Reply Obj. 1. Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XVIII., AA. 4, 6), wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active life.

Reply Obj. 2. Being occupied with external things makes a man see less in intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation

of the active life enables a man to see more clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's attention, since *brains avail when the mind is attentive* as Sallust observes (*Conjur. Catil.*).

Reply Obj. 3. Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with external things.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TEACHING IS A WORK OF THE ACTIVE OR OF
THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (*Hom. v. in Ezech.*) that *the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty.* But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.

Obj. 2. Further, Act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (*Met. i. 1*) that *to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge.* Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life.

Obj. 3. Further, Prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*): *The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom.*

I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom. xxvii.*): *Let them choose for themselves the better part, namely the contemplative life, let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge*, thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life.

The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.

Reply Obj. 1. The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and love of truth.

Reply Obj. 2. Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to bring another man to understand the truth.

Reply Obj. 3. He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACTIVE LIFE REMAINS AFTER THIS
LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (A. 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (*De Trin.* xiv. 9). Therefore seemingly the active life remains after this life.

Obj. 2. Further, Teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated in the foregoing *Article*. But in the life to come when we shall be like the angels, teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one enlightens, cleanses, and perfects another, which refers to the receiving of knowledge, according to Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this life.

Obj. 3. Further, The more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (*Hom. v. in Ezech.*) that *we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life*. Therefore the active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after this life.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*): *The active life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be perfected in our heavenly home.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the active life has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at the

end of *De Civitate Dei*, *there we shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise.* And he had said before (*ibid.*) that *there God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity.*

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXVII., A. 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above Augustine denotes by *rest*, and this rest excludes not only outward disturbance but also the inward disturbance of the passions.

Reply Obj. 2. The contemplative life, as stated above (Q. CLXXXI., A. 4), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to Matth. xviii. 10, *the little ones' angels, who belong to the lower order, always see the face of the Father;* and so, in the life to come, no man will teach another of God, but *we shall all see Him as He is* (1 Jo. iii. 2). This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremias (xxxii. 34): *They shall teach no more every man his neighbour, . . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest.* But as regards things pertaining to the dispensation of the mysteries of God, one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they are occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels ascending the ladder,—which refers to contemplation,—and descending,—which refers to action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (*Moral.* ii. 2), *they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation.* Hence in them the active life does not differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation. Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by reason

of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God.

Reply Obj. 3. That the durability of the active life in the present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (*ibid.*) that *the mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height recoils on itself.*

QUESTION CLXXXII.

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the active life in comparison with the contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Which of them is greater import or excellence? (2) Which of them has the greater merit? (3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life? (4) Of their order.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACTIVE LIFE IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE CONTEMPLATIVE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. For *that which belongs to better men would seem to be worthier and better*, as the Philosopher says (*Top.* iii. 1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are placed in a position of honour and power; wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19) that *in our actions we must not love honour or power in this life*. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.

Obj. 2. Further, In all habits and acts,* commanding belongs to the more excellent; thus the military art, being the more excellent, commands the art of the bridle-maker. Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears from the words addressed to

* *Actibus*. One would expect *artibus* (*arts*).

Moses (Exod. xix. 21), *Go down and charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the fixed limits to see the Lord.* Therefore the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.

Obj. 3. Further, No man should be taken away from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. xii. 31): *Be zealous for the better gifts.* Now some are taken away from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Luke x. 42): *Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her.* Now Mary figures the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent than the active.

I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect. Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight reasons (*Ethic.* x. 7, 8). The first is, because the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely intelligibles; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence Rachel, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is interpreted *the vision of the principle*, whereas as Gregory says (*Moral.* vi. 18) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of contemplation, as stated above (Q. CLXXX., A. 8, *ad* 2; Q. CLXXXI., A. 4, *ad* 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is described as *sitting* all the time *at the Lord's feet*. Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom.* xxvi.) that *Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted.* Fourthly,

because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Luke x. 41): *Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things*. Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps. xxvi. 4): *One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord*. Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. xlv. 11, *Be still and see that I am God*. Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas active life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom.* xxvii.): *'In the beginning was the Word: to Him was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made flesh:' Him was Martha serving*. Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps. xxxv. 8) after the words, *Men and beasts thou wilt preserve, O Lord*, that which is special to man is added (*verse 10*): *In Thy light we shall see light*.

Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke x. 42) when He says: *Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her*, which words Augustine (*De Verb. Dom., loc. cit.*) expounds thus: *Not,—Thou hast chosen badly but,—She has chosen better. Why better? Listen,—Because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal*.

Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (*Top.* iii. 2): *It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich*.

Reply Obj. 1. Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative life; hence

Gregory says (*Pastor.* ii. 1): *A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in contemplation.*

Reply Obj. 2. The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (*Hom.* iii. in *Ezech.*) that *the contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things.* And Boethius says (*De Consol.* v. 2): *The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things.* Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly command the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (*loc. cit.* in *Ezech.*) that *the active life is bondage, whereas the contemplative life is freedom.*

Reply Obj. 3. Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative life to the works of the active life on account of some necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19): *The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil, the work namely of the active life. If no one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us.* Hence it is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative to the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACTIVE LIFE IS OF GREATER MERIT
THAN THE CONTEMPLATIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies relation

to meed; and meed is due to labour, according to 1 Cor. iii. 8, *Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labour.* Now labour is ascribed to the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*): *Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from labour, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle.* Therefore the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative.

Obj. 2. Further, The contemplative life is a beginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on Jo. xxi. 22, *So I will have him to remain till I come,* says (*Tract. cxxiv. in Joan.*): *This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come.* And Gregory says (*loc. cit. in Ezech.*) that *contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home.* Now the life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the character of reward.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xii. in Ezech.*) that *no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls.* Now by the zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than the active.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral. vi.*): *Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative.*

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. CXIV., A. 4), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. 1), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbour, the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbour, as stated above (Q. XXVII., A. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbour for God's

sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19) that *the love of (the Divine) truth seeks a holy leisure*, namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (Q. CLXXXI., A. 4, *ad* 2). On the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbour, because it is *busy about much serving* (Luke x. 40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (*Hom. iii. in Ezech.*): *The contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labours under the stress of present work, by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbour, while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest, i.e. the contemplation of God.*

Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the Apostle said (Rom. ix. 3): *I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren*; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows (*De Compunct.* i. 7): *His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ.*

Reply Obj. 1. External labour conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labour borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.

Reply Obj. 2. In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in

the present life contemplation is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.

Reply Obj. 3. A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to *Ecclus. xxx. 24, Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God*; in the second place, the souls of others, according to *Apoc. xxii. 17, He that heareth, let him say: Come.* And the more closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that *no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls*, does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE IS HINDERED BY
THE ACTIVE LIFE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain stillness of mind, according to *Ps. xlv. 2, Be still, and see that I am God*; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to *Luke x. 41, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things.* Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.

Obj. 2. Further, Clearness of vision is a requisite for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear

vision; for Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*) that *Lia is blear-eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with works, sees less.* Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.

Obj. 3. Further, One contrary hinders the other. Now the active and the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another, since the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral. vi. 17*): *Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the camp of action.*

I answer that, The active life may be considered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with external action and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence Gregory says (*loc. cit.*): *Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbour, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbours do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order to explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things corporeal or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them away.* Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms

whereby contemplation is hindered. And this suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*; for these arguments consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect which is the quelling of the passions.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACTIVE LIFE PRECEDES THE CONTEMPLATIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the active life does not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbour. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbour, since we love our neighbour for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life also precedes the active life.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*): *It should be observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the active life.* Therefore the active life is not simply prior to the contemplative.

Obj. 3. Further, It would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says (*Moral. vi. 17*): *Often those who were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are killed by the sword of their inaction.*

I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to the lower reason which is assigned to action,

and the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 12).

Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above (Q. CLXXXI., A. 1, *ad* 3); and, in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and according to its nature.

Reply Obj. 1. The contemplative life is directed to the love of God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbour. Hence Gregory says (*loc. cit. in Ezech.*): *Without the contemplative life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do.*

From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect.

Reply Obj. 2. Progress from the active to the contemplative life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 1.

Reply Obj. 3. He that is prone to yield to his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* vi. 17) that *there be some so restless that when they are free from labour they labour all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear.* Others, on the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be

detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (*loc. cit.*, *Moral.* vi.) that *some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very outset.* Yet, as he adds further on, *often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed in contemplation.* Consequently those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while, none the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.

QUESTION CLXXXIII.

OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall consider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the perfect in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What constitutes a state among men? (2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties? (3) Of the diversity of duties. (4) Of the diversity of states.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NOTION OF A STATE DENOTES A CONDITION OF FREEDOM OR SERVITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the notion of a state does not denote a condition of freedom or servitude. For *state* takes its name from *standing*. Now a person is said to stand on account of his being upright; and Gregory says (*Moral. vii.*): *To fall by speaking harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness.* But a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God; wherefore a gloss on Ps. xxxii. 1, *Praise becometh the upright*, says: *The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's will.* Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments suffices alone for the notion of a state.

Obj. 2. Further, The word *state* seems to denote immobility, according to 1 Cor. xv. 58, *Be ye steadfast (stabiles) and immovable*; wherefore Gregory says (*Hom. xxi. in Ezech.*):

The stone is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall. Now it is virtue that enables us to act with immobility, according to *Ethic.* ii. 1, 2. Therefore it would seem that a state is acquired by every virtuous action.

Obj. 3. Further, The word *state* seems to indicate height of a kind; because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made higher than another by various duties; and in like manner men are raised upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a difference of states.

On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II., Q. vi., cap. 40): *Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own person;* and state here has reference to freedom or servitude. Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state, except that which refers to freedom or servitude.

I answer that, State, properly speaking, denotes a kind of position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a manner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his head should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground, and his other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and this is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when he stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but only when he is still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a matter is said to have stability (*statum*) in reference to its own disposition in the point of a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be rich or poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law (Lib. *Cassius ff. de Senatoribus*) it is said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his dignity rather than of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains to a man's state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in so far, to wit, as a man is his own master or subject to another,

not indeed from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly established; and this is something pertaining to the nature of freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in civil matters.

Reply Obj. 1. Uprightness as such does not pertain to the notion of state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the addition of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to stand without its being required that they should be upright; nor again are men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be still.

Reply Obj. 2. Immobility does not suffice for the notion of state; since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not said to stand.

Reply Obj. 3. Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote an order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility in that which regards a condition of the person himself.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENT DUTIES OR STATES IN THE CHURCH ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there should not be different duties or states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the faithful of Christ are called to unity according to Jo. xvii. 21, 22: *That they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one.* Therefore there should not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church.

Obj. 2. Further, Nature does not employ many means where one suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things pertaining to the operations of grace to be administered by the same persons, so that there would not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church.

Obj. 3. Further, The good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly in peace, according to Ps. cxlvii. 3, *Who hath placed peace in thy borders*, and 2 Cor. xiii. 11, *Have peace, and the God of peace . . . shall be with you*. Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for peace would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. xiii. 19, *Every beast loveth its like*, while the Philosopher says (*Polit.* v. 4) that *a little difference causes dissension in a state*. Therefore it would seem that there ought not to be a distinction of states and duties in the Church.

On the contrary, It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. xlv. 10) that she is *surrounded with variety*: and a gloss on these words says that *the Queen, namely the Church, is bedecked with the teaching of the apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of virgins, the sorrowings of penitents*.

I answer that, The difference of states and duties in the Church regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection, which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the fulness of grace, which is centred in Christ as head, flows forth to His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church. This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. iv. 11, 12): *He gave some apostles, and some prophets and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the saints*. Secondly, it regards the need of those actions which are necessary in the Church. For a diversity of actions requires a diversity of men appointed to them, in order that all things may be accomplished without delay or confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. xii. 4, 5), *As in one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same office, so we being many are one body in Christ*. Thirdly, this belongs to the dignity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain order; wherefore it is written (3 Kings x. 4, 5) that *when the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon . . . and the apartments of his servants, and the*

order of his ministers . . . she had no longer any spirit in her. Hence the Apostle says (2 Tim. ii. 20) that *in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth.*

Reply Obj. 1. The distinction of states and duties is not an obstacle to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of faith, charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. iv. 16): *From Whom the whole body being compacted, namely by faith, and fitly joined together, namely by charity, by what every joint supplieth, namely by one man serving another.*

Reply Obj. 2. Just as nature does not employ many means where one suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. xii. 17), *If the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing?* Hence there was need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be differentiated by various duties, states, and grades.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as in the natural body the various members are held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and are dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as stated in Jo. vi. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. iv. 3): *Careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.* Now a man departs from this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own. Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the better preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby the greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. xii. 24, 25) that *God hath tempered us (Vulg.,—the body) together that there might be no schism in the body, but the members might be mutually careful one for another.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER DUTIES DIFFER ACCORDING TO THEIR ACTIONS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that duties do not differ according to their actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties cannot be differentiated according to a difference of acts.

Obj. 2. Further, The active and the contemplative life differ according to their acts, as stated above (Q. CLXXIX., A. 1). But the distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of lives. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.

Obj. 3. Further, Even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.

On the contrary, Isidore says (*Etym.* vi.) that *officium* (*duty*) takes its name from *efficere* (*to effect*), as though it were instead of *efficiam*, by the change of one letter for the sake of the sound. But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ according to their acts.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), difference among the members of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action, and beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some persons are more perfect than others.

Another distinction regards action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A third distinction

regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and thus we distinguish various grades according as in the same state or duty one person is above another. Hence according to a variant text (Septuagint) it is written (Ps. xlvi. 3): *In her grades shall God be known.*

Reply Obj. 1. The material diversity of human acts is infinite. It is not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are not infinite.

Reply Obj. 2. Life is predicated of a thing absolutely: wherefore diversity of lives results from a diversity of acts which are becoming to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence we have the word office (as stated in the argument, *On the contrary*), denotes action tending to something else according to *Met.* ix., text. 16. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts that are referred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to have an office, and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore Isidore says (*loc. cit.*) that *to have an office is to be officious, i.e. harmful to no one, but to be useful to all.*

Reply Obj. 3. Differences of state, offices and grades are taken from different things, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3). Yet these three things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and grade and at the same time a certain state of perfection, on account of the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to various offices. For Isidore says (*Etym.* vi.): *There are various kinds of offices; but the foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine things.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DIFFERENCE OF STATES APPLIES TO THOSE WHO ARE BEGINNING, PROGRESSING, OR PERFECT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the difference of states does not apply to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect.

For diverse genera have diverse species and differences. Now this difference of beginning, progress, and perfection is applied to the degrees of charity, as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 9), where we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem that the differences of states should not be assigned in this manner.

Obj. 2. Further, As stated above (A. 1) state regards a condition of servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connexion with the aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection. Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way.

Obj. 3. Further, The distinction of beginning, progress, and perfection seems to refer to *more* and *less*, and this seemingly implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs from that of states, as we have said above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and perfection.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral. xxiv.*): *There are three states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the perfection ; and (Hom. xv. in Ezech.): Other is the beginning of virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1) state regards freedom or servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude of justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and from justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom. vi. 20, 22), *When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice ; . . . but now being made free from sin, you are . . . become servants to God.*

Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to evil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice: and in like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the inclination to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back from evil for the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his natural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom which is

united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline man to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true servitude is the servitude of sin, which is connected with freedom from justice, because man is thereby hindered from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man become the servant of justice or sin results from his efforts, as the Apostle declares (*ibid.*, verse 16): *To whom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justice.* Now in every human effort we can distinguish a beginning, a middle, and a term; and consequently the state of spiritual servitude and freedom is differentiated according to these things, namely the beginning,—to which pertains the state of beginners,—the middle, to which pertains the state of the proficient,—and the term, to which belongs the state of the perfect.

Reply Obj. 1. Freedom from sin results from charity which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us (Rom. v. 5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. iii. 17): *Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.* Wherefore the same division applies to charity as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.

Reply Obj. 2. Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and perfect (so far as these terms indicate different states), not in relation to any occupation whatever, but in relation to such occupations as pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated above in this *Article* and A. 1.

Reply Obj. 3. As already observed (A. 3, *ad* 3), nothing hinders grade and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in earthly affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different state from those who are in service, but are also of a different grade.

QUESTION CLXXXIV.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL.

(In Eight Articles.)

WE must now consider those things that pertain to the state of perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry, it comes under the consideration of Orders, of which we shall treat in the Third Part. Concerning the state of the perfect, a threefold consideration presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) things relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) things relating to the perfection of religious.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity? (2) Whether one can be perfect in this life? (3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing the counsels or the commandments? (4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection? (5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of perfection? (6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection? (7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state? (8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and archdeacons.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PERFECTION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE CONSISTS CHIEFLY IN CHARITY?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the perfection of the Christian life does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle

says (1 Cor. xiv. 20): *In malice be children, but in sense be perfect.* But charity regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem that the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in charity.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Eph. vi. 13): *Take unto you the armour of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand in all things perfect;* and the text continues (verses 14, 16) speaking of the armour of God: *Stand therefore having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in all things taking the shield of faith.* Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtues, like other habits, are specified by their acts. Now it is written (James i. 4) that *patience hath a perfect work.* Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more specially in patience.

On the contrary, It is written (Col. iii. 14): *Above all things have charity, which is the bond of perfection,* because it binds, as it were, all the other virtues together in perfect unity.

I answer that, A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now it is charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human mind, since *he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him* (1 Jo. iv. 16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity.

Reply Obj. 1. The perfection of the human senses would seem to consist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth, according to 1 Cor. i. 10, *That you be perfect in the same mind (sensu), and in the same judgment.* Now this is effected by charity which operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of the senses consists radically in the perfection of charity.

Reply Obj. 2. A man may be said to be perfect in two ways. First, simply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a thing's nature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when it lacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things as are necessary

for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected with the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or something of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in charity whereby the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1 Jo. iii. 14): *He that loveth not abideth in death.* Hence the perfection of the Christian life consists simply in charity, but in the other virtues relatively. And since that which is simply, is paramount and greatest in comparison with other things, it follows that the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to the perfection that regards the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. Patience is stated to have a perfect work in relation to charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of charity that a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. viii. 35, *Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress?* etc.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY ONE CAN BE PERFECT IN THIS LIFE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that none can be perfect in this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 10): *When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.* Now in this life that which is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope, which are in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.

Obj. 2. Further, The perfect is that which lacks nothing, according to *Phys. iii.*, text. 63. Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it is written (James iii. 2): *In many things we all offend;* and (Ps. cxxxviii. 16): *Thy eyes did see my imperfect being.* Therefore none is perfect in this life.

Obj. 3. Further, The perfection of the Christian life, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and of our neighbour. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have perfect charity in this life, since according to Gregory (*Hom. xiv. in Ezech.*)

the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more fiercely when we see Him Whom we love ; nor as to the love of our neighbour, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbours actually, even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is imperfect. Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life.

On the contrary, The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible. Yet it prescribes perfection according to Matth. v. 48, *Be you . . . perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect.* Therefore seemingly one can be perfect in this life.

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing *Article*, the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain universality, because according to *Phys.* iii., text. 63, the perfect is that which lacks nothing. Hence we may consider a threefold perfection. One is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on the part of the lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so that God be loved as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this is not possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in Whom good is wholly and essentially.

Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible so long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven. The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which sense Augustine says (*Qq.* 83, *q.* 36) that *carnal desire is the bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of charity.* Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two ways. First, by the removal from man's affections of all that is contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation. Secondly, by the removal from man's affections not only of

whatever is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind's affections from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from this perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those who are proficient.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly perfection which is not possible to those who are on the way.

Reply Obj. 2. Those who are perfect in this life are said to *offend in many things* with regard to venial sins, which result from the weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an *imperfect being* in comparison with the perfection of heaven.

Reply Obj. 3. As the state of the present life does not allow of a man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow of his always tending actually to each individual neighbour; but it suffices for him to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each individual habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind. Now in the love of our neighbour, as in the love of God, we may observe a twofold perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and consisting in one's having in one's affections nothing that is contrary to the love of one's neighbour; and another without which it is possible to have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways. First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies, for as Augustine says (*Enchir. lxxiii.*) *this is a mark of the perfect children of God.* Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which is shown by the things which man despises for his neighbour's sake, through his despising not only external goods for the sake of his neighbour, but also bodily hardships and even death, according to Jo. xv. 13, *Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.* Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a man will surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and even himself, for his neighbour's sake, according to the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. xii. 15), *But I most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your souls.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER PERFECTION CONSISTS IN THE OBSERVANCE
OF THE COMMANDMENTS OR OF THE COUNSELS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that perfection consists in the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our Lord said (Matth. xix. 21): *If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all (Vulg.,—what) thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me.* Now this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the counsels and not the precepts.

Obj. 2. Further, All are bound to the observance of the commandments, since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the perfection of the Christian life consists in observing the commandments, it follows that perfection is necessary for salvation, and that all are bound thereto; and this is evidently false.

Obj. 3. Further, The perfection of the Christian life is gauged according to charity, as stated above (A. 1). Now the perfection of charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says on the canonical epistles of Jo. (*Tract. ix.*). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the observance of the commandments, since according to Jo. xiv. 23, *If any one love Me, he will keep My word.* Therefore the perfection of life regards not the commandments but the counsels.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. vi. 5): *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,* and (Lev. xix. 18): *Thou shalt love thy neighbour (Vulg.,—friend) as thyself;* and these are the commandments of which our Lord said (Matth. xxii. 40): *On these two commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets.* Now the perfection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said to be perfect, consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and our neighbour as ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection consists in the observance of the precepts.

I answer that, Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two ways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily and accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity, principally as to the love of God, secondarily as to the love of our neighbour, both of which are the matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated above (Q. XLIV., AA. 2, 3). Now the love of God and of our neighbour is not commanded according to a measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a matter of counsel. This is evident from the very form of the commandment, pointing, as it does, to perfection,—for instance in the words, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart*: since *the whole* is the same as *the perfect*, according to the Philosopher (*Phys.* iii., text. 64),—and in the words, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*, since every one loves himself most. The reason of this is that *the end of the commandment is charity* according to the Apostle (1 Tim. i. 5); and the end is not subject to a measure, but only such things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher observes (*Polit.* i. 6); thus a physician does not measure the amount of his healing, but how much medicine or diet he shall employ for the purpose of healing. Consequently it is evident that perfection consists essentially in the observance of the commandments; wherefore Augustine says (*De Perf. Justit.* viii.): *Why then should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this life?*

Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments, other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so forth. Hence Augustine says (*Enchir.* cxxi.): *Whatever things God commands, for instance,*

'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and whatever are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for instance, 'It is good for a man not to touch a woman,' are then done aright when they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbour for God's sake, both in this world and in the world to come. Hence it is that in the Conferences of the Fathers (*Coll. i., cap. vii.*) the abbot Moses says: *Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, penury and loss of all one's wealth, these are not perfection but means to perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection find its end, but through them it achieves its end, and he had already said that we endeavour to ascend by these steps to the perfection of charity.*

Reply Obj. 1. In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as being the way to perfection by the words, *Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor;* and something else is added wherein perfection consists, when He said, *And follow Me.* Hence Jerome in his commentary on *Matth. xix. 27, Behold we have left all things,* says that since it is not enough merely to leave, Peter added that which is perfect: '*And have followed Thee*'; and Ambrose, commenting on *Luke v. 27, Follow Me,* says: *He commands him to follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion of the soul,* which is the effect of charity. Wherefore it is evident from the very way of speaking that the counsels are means of attaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed: *If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell, etc.,* as though He said: '*By so doing thou shalt accomplish this end.*'

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Perf. Justit. viii.*) *the perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know this if no commandment declares it to us?* And since that which is a matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is enough to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine love is a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even the perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as Augustine says (*loc. cit.*), and *one escapes trans-*

gressing the precept, in whatever measure one attains to the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine love is to love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally with God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise fulfils the precept. There is another degree of the Divine love, which cannot be fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a transgressor of the precept; and in like manner one does not transgress the precept, if one does not attain to the intermediate degrees of perfection, provided one attain to the lowest.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as man has a certain perfection of his nature as soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very essence of his species, while there is another perfection which he acquires by growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above all things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of God.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHOEVER IS PERFECT IS IN THE STATE
OF PERFECTION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection. For, as stated in the foregoing *Article*, (*ad 3*), just as bodily perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection, one is in the state of perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, According to *Phys. v.*, text. 19, movement from one contrary to another has the same aspect as move-

ment from less to more. Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to change his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the state of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when one progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the perfect degree, one is in the state of perfection.

Obj. 3. Further, A man acquires a state by being freed from servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity, because *charity covereth all sins* (Prov. x. 12). Now one is said to be perfect on account of charity, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore, seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has the state of perfection.

On the contrary, Some are in the state of perfection, who are wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or religious. Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have the perfection of life, who nevertheless have not the state of perfection.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXXIII., A. 1), state properly regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now spiritual freedom or servitude may be considered in man in two ways: first, with respect to his internal actions; secondly, with respect to his external actions. And since according to 1 Kings xvi. 7, *man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart*, it follows that with regard to man's internal disposition we consider his spiritual state in relation to the Divine judgment, while with regard to his external actions we consider man's spiritual state in relation to the Church. It is in this latter sense that we are now speaking of states, namely in so far as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of states.

Now it must be observed, that so far as men are concerned, in order that any one attain to a state of freedom or servitude there is required first of all an obligation or a release. For the mere fact of serving someone does not make a man a slave, since even the free serve, according to Gal. v. 13, *By charity of the spirit serve one another*: nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a man free, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly

speaking a man is a slave if he be bound to serve, and a man is free if he be released from service. Secondly, it is required that the aforesaid obligation be imposed with a certain solemnity; even as a certain solemnity is observed in other matters which among men obtain a settlement in perpetuity. Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in the state of perfection, not through having the act of perfect love, but through binding himself in perpetuity and with a certain solemnity to those things that pertain to perfection.

Moreover it happens that some persons bind themselves to that which they do not keep, and some fulfil that to which they have not bound themselves, as in the case of the two sons (Matth. xxi. 28, 30), one of whom when his father said: *Work in my vineyard*, answered: *I will not*, and afterwards . . . *he went*, while the other answering said: *I go . . . and he went not*. Wherefore nothing hinders some from being perfect without being in the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection without being perfect.

Reply Obj. 1. By bodily growth a man progresses in things pertaining to nature, wherefore he attains to the state of nature; especially since what is according to nature is, in a way, unchangeable, inasmuch as nature is determinate to one thing. In like manner by inward spiritual growth a man reaches the state of perfection in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards the distinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the state of perfection except by growth in respect of external actions.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument also regards the interior state. Yet when a man passes from sin to grace, he passes from servitude to freedom; and this does not result from a mere progress in grace, except when a man binds himself to things pertaining to grace.

Reply Obj. 3. Again this argument considers the interior state. Nevertheless, although charity causes the change of condition from spiritual servitude to spiritual freedom, an increase of charity has not the same effect.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGIOUS AND PRELATES ARE IN THE STATE OF PERFECTION ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prelates and religious are not in the state of perfection. For the state of perfection differs from the state of the beginners and the proficient. Now no class of men is specially assigned to the state of the proficient or of the beginners. Therefore it would seem that neither should any class of men be assigned to the state of perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, The outward state should answer to the inward, else one is guilty of lying, *which consists not only in false words, but also in deceitful deeds*, according to Ambrose in one of his sermons (xliv. *de Tempore*). Now there are many prelates and religious who have not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if all religious and prelates are in the state of perfection, it would follow that all of them that are not perfect are in mortal sin, as deceivers and liars.

Obj. 3. Further, As stated above (A. 1), perfection is measured according to charity. Now the most perfect charity would seem to be in the martyrs, according to Jo. xv. 13, *Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends* : and a gloss* on Heb. xii. 4, *For you have not yet resisted unto blood*, says: *In this life no love is more perfect than that to which the holy martyrs attained, who strove against sin even unto blood*. Therefore it would seem that the state of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs rather than to religious and bishops.

On the contrary, Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* v.) ascribes perfection to bishops as being perfecters, and (*ibid.* vi.) to religious (whom he calls monks or *θεράπευται*, i.e. servants of God) as being perfected.

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing *Article*, there is required for the state of perfection a perpetual obligation

* St. Augustine, *Serm.* xvii. *de verb. Apost.*

to things pertaining to perfection, together with a certain solemnity. Now both these conditions are competent to religious and bishops. For religious bind themselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might lawfully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, wherein consists the perfection of the present life. Hence Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier. vi.*), speaking of religious: *Some call them θεράπευται, i.e. servants of God, on account of their pure service and bondage, others call them μόναχοι,* on account of the indivisible and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in, i.e. contemplating indivisible things, unites them in a Godlike union and a perfection beloved of God.†* Moreover, the obligation in both cases is undertaken with a certain solemnity of profession and consecration; wherefore Dionysius adds (*ibid.*): *Hence the holy legislation in bestowing perfect grace on them accords them a hallowing invocation.*

In like manner bishops bind themselves to things pertaining to perfection when they take up the pastoral duty, to which it belongs that a shepherd *lay down his life for his sheep*, according to Jo. x. 15. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 12): *Thou . . . hast confessed a good confession before many witnesses, that is to say, when he was ordained, as a gloss says on this passage.* Again, a certain solemnity of consecration is employed together with the aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. i. 6: *Stir up the grace of God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands, which the gloss ascribes to the grace of the episcopate.* And Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier. v.*) that *when the high priest, i.e. the bishop, is ordained, he receives on his head the most holy imposition of the sacred oracles, whereby it is signified that he is a participator in the whole and entire hierarchical power, and that not only is he the enlightener of all (which pertains to his holy discourses and actions), but that he also confers this on others.*

Reply Obj. 1. Beginning and increase are sought not for

* I.e., solitaries; whence the English word *monk*.

† Cf. Q. CLXXX., A. 6.

their own sake, but for the sake of perfection; hence it is only to the state of perfection that some are admitted under certain obligations and with solemnity.

Reply Obj. 2. Those who enter the state of perfection do not profess to be perfect, but to tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. iii. 12): *Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend*: and afterwards (verse 15): *Let us therefore as many as are perfect, be thus minded*. Hence a man who takes up the state of perfection is not guilty of lying or deceit through not being perfect, but through withdrawing his mind from the intention of reaching perfection.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL ECCLESIASTICAL PRELATES ARE IN THE
STATE OF PERFECTION ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all ecclesiastical prelates are in the state of perfection. For Jerome commenting on Tit. i. 5, *Ordain . . . in every city, etc.*, says: *Formerly priest was the same as bishop*, and afterwards he adds: *Just as priests know that by the custom of the Church they are subject to the one who is placed over them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom rather than by the very ordination of our Lord, they are above the priests, and are together the rightful governors of Church*. Now bishops are in the state of perfection. Therefore those priests also are who have the cure of souls.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as bishops together with their consecration receive the cure of souls, so also do parish priests and archdeacons, of whom a gloss on Acts vi. 3, *Brethren, look ye out . . . seven men of good reputation*, says: *The apostles decided here to appoint throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of a higher degree, and as it were the supports of that which is nearest to the altar*. Therefore it would seem that these also are in the state of perfection.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as bishops are bound to *lay down their life for their sheep*, so too are parish priests and archdeacons. But this belongs to the perfection of charity, as stated above (A, 2, *ad* 3). Therefore it would seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are in the state of perfection.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier. v.*): *The order of pontiffs is consummative and perfecting, that of the priests is illuminative and light-giving, that of the ministers is cleansing and discretive.* Hence it is evident that perfection is ascribed to bishops only.

I answer that, In priests and deacons having cure of souls two things may be considered, namely their order and their cure. Their order is directed to some act in the Divine offices. Wherefore it has been stated above (Q. CLXXXIII., A. 3, *ad* 3) that the distinction of orders is comprised under the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a certain order a man receives the power of exercising certain sacred acts, but he is not bound on this account to things pertaining to perfection, except in so far as in the Western Church the receiving of a sacred order includes the taking of a vow of continence, which is one of the things pertaining to perfection, as we shall state further on (Q. CLXXXVI., A. 4). Therefore it is clear that from the fact that a man receives a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the state of perfection, although inward perfection is required in order that one exercise such acts worthily.

In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of perfection on the part of the cure which they take upon themselves. For they are not bound by this very fact under the obligation of a perpetual vow to retain the cure of souls; but they can surrender it,—either by entering religion, even without their bishop's permission (Cf. *Decret. xix., qu. 2, cap. Dux sunt*),—or again an archdeacon may with his bishop's permission resign his archdeaconry or parish, and accept a simple prebend without cure, which would be nowise lawful, if he were in the state of perfection; for *no man putting his hand to the plough and looking back*

is fit for the kingdom of God (Luke ix. 62). On the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of perfection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it belongs also to dispense from perpetual vows), and this for certain causes, as we shall state further on (Q. CLXXXV., A. 4). Wherefore it is manifest that not all prelates are in the state of perfection, but only bishops.

Reply Obj. 1. We may speak of priest and bishop in two ways. First, with regard to the name: and thus formerly bishops and priests were not distinct. For bishops are so called *because they watch over others*, as Augustine observes (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19); while the priests according to the Greek are elders.* Hence the Apostle employs the term *priests* in reference to both, when he says (1 Tim. v. 17): *Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honour*; and again he uses the term *bishops* in the same way, wherefore addressing the priests of the Church of Ephesus he says (Acts xx. 28): *Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the church of God.*

But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there was always a difference between them, even at the time of the apostles. This is clear on the authority of Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* v.), and of a gloss on Luke x. 1, *After these things the Lord appointed*, etc., which says: *Just as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two disciples were made priests of the second order.* Subsequently, however, in order to avoid schism, it became necessary to distinguish even the terms, by calling the higher ones bishops and the lower ones priests. But to assert that priests nowise differ from bishops is reckoned by Augustine among heretical doctrines (*De Hæres.* liii.), where he says that the Arians maintained that no distinction existed between a priest and a bishop.

Reply Obj. 2. Bishops have the chief cure of the sheep

* Referring to the Greek ἐπίσκοπος and πρεσβύτερος from which the English *bishop* and *priest* are derived.

of their diocese, while parish priests and archdeacons exercise an inferior ministry under the bishops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. xii. 28, *to one, helps, to another, governments*,* says: *Helps, namely assistants to those who are in authority, as Titus was to the Apostle, or as archdeacons to the bishop; governments, namely persons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to instruct the people*: and Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier. v.*) that *just as we see the whole hierarchy culminating in Jesus, so each office culminates in its respective godlike hierarch or bishop*. Also it is said (XVI., Q. I., cap. *Cunctis*): *Priests and deacons must all take care not to do anything without their bishop's permission*. Wherefore it is evident that they stand in relation to their bishop as wardens or mayors to the king; and for this reason, just as in earthly governments the king alone receives a solemn blessing, while others are appointed by simple commission, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is conferred with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon or parish priest receives his cure by simple appointment, although he is consecrated in receiving orders before having a cure.

Reply Obj. 3. As parish priests and archdeacons have not the chief cure, but a certain ministry as committed to them by the bishop, so the pastoral office does not belong to them in chief, nor are they bound to lay down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they have a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have an office pertaining to perfection rather than that they attain the state of perfection.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE RELIGIOUS STATE IS MORE PERFECT
THAN THAT OF PRELATES ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates. For our Lord said (Matth. xix. 21): *If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all* (Vulg.,—*what*)

* Vulg.,—*God hath set some in the church . . . helps, governments, etc.*

thou hast, and give to the poor; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do so; for it is said (XII., Q. I., cap. 19): Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally. Therefore religious are in a more perfect state than bishops.

Obj. 2. Further, Perfection consists more especially in the love of God than in the love of our neighbour. Now the religious state is directly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from the divine service and bondage, as Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier. vi.*);* whereas the bishop's state would seem to be ordered to the love of our neighbour, of whose cure he is the warden, and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (*De Civ. Dei, xix. 19*). Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more perfect than that of bishops.

Obj. 3. Further, The religious state is directed to the contemplative life, which is more excellent than the active life to which the episcopal state is directed. For Gregory says (*Pastor. ii. 1*) that *Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbour by means of the active life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against being sent to preach.* Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more perfect than the episcopal state.

On the contrary, It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more excellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back.† Yet a man may pass from the religious to the episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII., Q. I., cap. *Statutum*) that the holy ordination *makes a monk to be a bishop.* Therefore the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit. xii. 16*), *the agent is ever more excellent than the patient.* Now in the genus of perfection according to Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier. v., vi.*), bishops are in the position of perfecters, whereas religious are in the position of being perfected; the former

* Quoted above A. 5,

† Cf. Luke ix. 62.

of which pertains to action, and the latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection is more excellent in bishops than in religious.

Reply Obj. 1. Renunciation of one's possessions may be considered in two ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not essential, but a means, to perfection, as stated above (A. 3). Hence nothing hinders the state of perfection from being without renunciation of one's possessions, and the same applies to other outward practices. Secondly, it may be considered in relation to one's preparedness, in the sense of being prepared to renounce or give away all: and this belongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (*De Qq. Evang.* ii. 11): *Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom understand righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in abstaining, but in bearing want patiently.* Wherefore the Apostle says (*Phil.* iv. 12): *I know . . . both to abound and to suffer need.* Now bishops especially are bound to despise all things for the honour of God and the spiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do so, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering *with joy the being stripped of their own goods.**

Reply Obj. 2. That bishops are busy about things pertaining to the love of their neighbour, arises out of the abundance of their love of God. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him, and afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory says (*Pastor.* i. 5): *If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who refuses to feed God's flock, though having the means to do so, is convicted of not loving the supreme Pastor.* And it is a sign of greater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend's sake, than if he be willing only to serve his friend.

Reply Obj. 3. As Gregory says (*Pastor.* i. 1), *a prelate should be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in contemplation,* because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not only for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others. Hence Gregory applies (*Hom.* v. in

* Cf. *Heb.* x. 34.

Ezech.) the words of Ps. cxliv. 7, *They shall publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness*, to perfect men returning after their contemplation.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PARISH PRIESTS AND ARCHDEACONS ARE MORE PERFECT THAN RELIGIOUS?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that also parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious. For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue (*De Sacerdot.* xvi. 7): *Take for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may exaggerate somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, remains firm and strong.* A little further on he says: *If I were given the choice, where would I prefer to please, in the priestly office, or in the monastic solitude, without hesitation I should choose the former.* Again in the same book (ch. 5) he says: *If you compare the toils of this project, namely of the monastic life, with a well-employed priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one another as a common citizen is from a king.* Therefore it would seem that priests who have the cure of souls are more perfect than religious.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says in a letter to Valerius (*Ep.* xxi.): *Let thy religious prudence observe that in this life, and especially at these times, there is nothing so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the office of bishop, priest, or deacon; while in God's sight there is no greater blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our Commander-in-chief.* Therefore religious are not more perfect than priests or deacons.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Ep.* xl. *ad Aurel.*): *It would be most regrettable, were we to exalt monks to such a disastrous degree of pride, and deem the clergy deserving of such a grievous insult, as to assert that a bad monk is a good clerk, since sometimes even a good monk makes a bad clerk.* And a little before this he says that God's servants, i.e. monks, must not be allowed to think that they may easily

be chosen for something better, namely the clerical state, if they should become worse thereby, namely by leaving the monastic state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the clerical state are more perfect than religious.

Obj. 4. Further, It is not lawful to pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass from the monastic state to a priestly office with a cure attached, as appears (XVI., Q. I., cap. 28) from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: *If there be a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is worthy of the priesthood, and the abbot under whose authority he fights for Christ his King, ask that he be made a priest, the bishop shall take him and ordain him in such place as he shall choose fitting.* And Jerome says (*Ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. iv.*): *In the monastery so live as to deserve to be a clerk.* Therefore parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious.

Obj. 5. Further, Bishops are in a more perfect state than religious, as shown in the foregoing *Article*. But parish priests and archdeacons, through having cure of souls, are more like bishops than religious are. Therefore they are more perfect.

Obj. 6. Further, Virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good, according to *Ethic. ii. 3*. Now it is more difficult to lead a good life in the office of parish priest or archdeacon than in the religious state. Therefore parish priests and archdeacons have more perfect virtue than religious.

On the contrary, It is stated (XIX., Q. II., cap. *Duæ*): *If a man while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading a secular life is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, since he is led by a private law, there is no reason why he should be constrained by a public law.* Now a man is not led by the law of the Holy Ghost, which is here called a private law, except to something more perfect. Therefore it would seem that religious are more perfect than archdeacons or parish priests.

I answer that, When we compare things in the point of

supereminence, we look not at that in which they agree, but at that wherein they differ. Now in parish priests and archdeacons three things may be considered, their state, their order, and their office. It belongs to their state that they are seculars, to their order that they are priests or deacons, to their office that they have the cure of souls committed to them. Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a religious by state, a deacon or priest by order, having the cure of souls by office, as many monks and canons regular have, this one will excel in the first point, and in the other points he will be equal. But if the latter differ from the former in state and office, but agree in order, such as religious priests and deacons not having the cure of souls, it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the former in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order.

We must therefore consider which is the greater, pre-eminence of state or of office; and here, seemingly, we should take note of two things, goodness and difficulty. Accordingly, if we make the comparison with a view to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of parish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges his whole life to the quest of perfection, whereas the parish priest or archdeacon does not pledge his whole life to the cure of souls, as a bishop does, nor is it competent to him, as it is to a bishop, to exercise the cure of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars regarding the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated above (A. 6, *ad* 2). Wherefore the comparison of their religious state with their office is like the comparisons of the universal with the particular, and of a holocaust with a sacrifice, which is less than a holocaust according to Gregory (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*). Hence it is said (XIX., Q. I., cap. 1): *Clerics who wish to take the monastic vows through being desirous of a better life must be allowed by their bishops the free entrance into the monastery.*

This comparison, however, must be considered as regarding the genus of the deed; for as regards the charity of the doer it happens sometimes that a deed which is of less

account in its genus is of greater merit if it be done out of greater charity.

On the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of leading a good life in religion, and in the office of one having the cure of souls, in this way it is more difficult to lead a good life together with the exercise of the cure of souls, on account of outward dangers: although the religious life is more difficult as regards the genus of the deed, by reason of the strictness of religious observance. If, however, the religious is also without orders, as in the case of religious lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of order excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders a man is appointed to the most august ministry of serving Christ Himself in the sacrament of the altar. For this requires a greater inward holiness than that which is requisite for the religious state, since as Dionysius says (*Eccles. Hier. vi.*) *the monastic order must follow the priestly orders, and ascend to Divine things in imitation of them.* Hence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in holy orders sins more grievously if he do something contrary to holiness than a religious who is not in holy orders: although a religious who is not in orders is bound to regular observance to which persons in holy orders are not bound.

Reply Obj. 1. We might answer briefly these quotations from Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a priest of lesser order who has the cure of souls, but of a bishop, who is called a high-priest; and this agrees with the purpose of that book wherein he consoles himself and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We may, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the difficulty. For he had already said (cap. 6): *When the pilot is surrounded by the stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the tempest, then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a perfect pilot*; and afterwards he concludes, as quoted above in the objection, with regard to the monk, *who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people, . . . remains firm*; and he gives the reason why, because *both in the calm and in the storm he piloted himself to safety.*

This proves nothing more than that the state of one who has the cure of souls is fraught with more danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself innocent in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. On the other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man avoid dangers by entering religion; hence he does not say that he would prefer to have the priestly office to being in the monastic solitude, but that he would rather please in the former than in the latter, since this is a proof of greater virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. This passage quoted from Augustine also clearly refers to the question of difficulty which proves the greatness of virtue in those who lead a good life, as stated above (*ad 1*).

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine there compares monks with clerics as regards the pre-eminence of order, not as regards the distinction between religious and secular life.

Reply Obj. 4. Those who are taken from the religious state to receive the cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to something they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet they do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the *Decretals* (XVI., Q. I., cap. 3): *With regard to those monks who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.*

On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter religion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of perfection. This very fact shows the excellence of the religious life. When religious who are not in orders are admitted to the clerical state and to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to something better, as stated in the *Fourth Objection*: this is indicated by the very way in which Jerome expresses himself: *So live in the monastery as to deserve to be a clerk.*

Reply Obj. 5. Parish priests and archdeacons are more like bishops than religious are, in a certain respect, namely as regards the cure of souls which they have subordinately; but as regards the obligation in perpetuity, religious are

more like a bishop, as appears from what we have said above (AA. 5, 6).

Reply Obj. 6. The difficulty that arises from the arduousness of the deed adds to the perfection of virtue; but the difficulty that results from outward obstacles sometimes lessens the perfection of virtue,—for instance when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish to avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. ix. 25), *Everyone that striveth for the mastery refraineth himself from all things:*—and sometimes it is a sign of more perfect virtue,—for instance when a man forsakes not virtue, although he is hindered in the practice of virtue unawares or by some unavoidable cause. In the religious state there is greater difficulty arising from the arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any way at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting from obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has had the foresight to avoid.

QUESTION CLXXXV.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop? (2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively? (3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office? (4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state? (5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner? (6) Whether he can have anything of his own? (7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods to the poor? (8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are bound to religious observances?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO DESIRE THE OFFICE OF A BISHOP?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. iii. 1): *He that desires* (Vulg.,—*If a man desire*) *the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.* Now it is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it is even praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.

Obj. 2. Further, The episcopal state is more perfect than the religious, as we have said above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 7). But it is praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state.

Therefore it is also praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Prov. xi. 26): *He that hideth up corn shall be cursed among the people ; but a blessing upon the head of them that sell.* Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by knowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the spiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it.

Obj. 4. Further, The deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are set before us as an example, according to Rom. xv. 4, *What things soever were written, were written for our learning.* Now we read (Isa. vi. 8) that Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19): *The higher place, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled becomingly, is unbecomingly desired.*

I answer that, Three things may be considered in the episcopal office. One is principal and final, namely the bishop's work, whereby the good of our neighbour is intended, according to Jo. xxi. 17, *Feed My sheep.* Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is placed above others, according to Matth. xxiv. 45, *A faithful and a wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family.* The third is something resulting from these, namely reverence, honour, and a sufficiency of temporalities, according to 1 Tim. v. 17, *Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honour.* Accordingly, to desire the episcopal office on account of these incidental goods is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness or ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees (Matth. xxiii. 6, 7): *They love the first places at feasts, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market-place, and to be called by men, Rabbi.* As regards the second, namely the height

of degree, it is presumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our Lord reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying to them (Matth. xx. 25): *You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them.* Here Chrysostom says (*Hom. lxvi. in Matth.*) that *in these words He points out that it is heathenish to seek precedence; and thus by comparing them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous soul.*

On the other hand, to desire to do good to one's neighbour is in itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in order to do them good. Thus Gregory says (*Pastor. i. 8*) that *it was praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to bring one into graver dangers.* Wherefore it was not easy to find a person to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through the zeal of charity that one is divinely instigated to do so, according to Gregory, who says (*Pastor. i. 7*) that *Isaias being desirous of profiting his neighbour, commendably desired the office of preacher.*

Nevertheless anyone may, without presumption, desire to do suchlike works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not the precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: *It is indeed good to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honour is vanity. For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it.*

Reply Obj. 1. As Gregory says (*Pastor. i. 8*), *when the Apostle said this he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to the torments of martyrdom*, so that there was nothing to be desired in the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei, xix. 19*) that when the Apostle said, '*Whoever desireth the office of bishop, desireth a good work,*' he wished to explain that *the episcopacy signifies work and not honour. For it is a Greek*

* The quotation is from the *Opus Imperf. in Matth.* (*Hom. xxxv.*), falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

word, ἐπὶ denoting 'over' and σκόπος 'watching.' Wherefore if we like we may render ἐπισκοπεῖν by the Latin 'superintendere' (to watch over), that a man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather than to profit others. For, as he observed shortly before, in our actions we should seek, not honour nor power in this life, since all things beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that honour or power enables us to do. Nevertheless, as Gregory says (*Pastor.*, loc. cit.), the Apostle while praising the desire (namely of the good work) forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he adds: *It behoveth . . . a bishop to be blameless*, as though to say: 'I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek.'

Reply Obj. 2. There is no parity between the religious and the episcopal state, for two reasons. First because perfection of life is a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord asking Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing the pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite of the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection. Hence our Lord did not say (*Matth. xix. 21*): *If thou art perfect, go, sell all* (*Vulg.*,—*what*) *thou hast*, but *If thou wilt be perfect*. The reason for this difference is because, according to Dionysius (*Eccles. Hier. v.*), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the perfecter, but to the monk passively as one who is perfected: and one needs to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but not in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to perfection. Secondly, because he who enters the religious state subjects himself to others for the sake of a spiritual profit, and anyone may lawfully do this. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei, xix. 19*): *No man is debarred from striving for the knowledge of truth, since this pertains to a praiseworthy ease*. On the other hand, he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised thus, according to *Heb. v. 4*. *Neither doth any man take the honour to himself, but he that*

is called by God : and Chrysostom* says: *To desire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor useful. For what wise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such servitude and peril, as to have to render an account of the whole Church? None save him who fears not God's judgment, and makes a secular abuse of his ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses.*

Reply Obj. 3. The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be carried on in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the appointment and disposition of God, and in the second place according to the appointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1 Cor. iv. 1): *Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.* Wherefore a man is not deemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting others, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his office nor of his superior's command; thus alone is he deemed to hide it, when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office when it is imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19): *The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest labour. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us.*

Reply Obj. 4. As Gregory says (*Pastor.* i. 7), *Isaias, who wishing to be sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live coal taken from the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed to approach the sacred ministry. Since then it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline the office of preacher.*

* *Opus Imperf. in Matth.* (Hom. xxxv.), falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A MAN TO REFUSE ABSOLUTELY
AN APPOINTMENT TO THE EPISCOPATE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (*Pastor. i. 7*), *Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbour by means of the active life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator exclaimed against being sent to preach.* Now no man sins by being unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to things that are not so good. Since then the love of God surpasses the love of our neighbour, and the contemplative life is preferable to the active, as shown above (Q. XXV., A. 1; Q. XXVI., A. 2; Q. CLXXXII., A. 1) it would seem that a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office.

Obj. 2. Further, As Gregory says (*Pastor. i. 7*), *it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed : nor should anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry.* Therefore if a man perceives that he is not cleansed, however urgently the episcopal office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it.

Obj. 3. Further, Jerome, in the prologue to his Commentary on Mark, says that *it is related of the Blessed Mark* that after receiving the faith he cut off his thumb that he might be excluded from the priesthood.* Likewise some take a vow never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would seem that one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office absolutely.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Ep. xlvi. ad Eudox.*): *If Mother Church requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor refuse with fawning indolence ; and*

* This prologue was falsely ascribed to S. Jerome, and the passage quoted refers, not to S. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name. (Cf. Baronius, *Anno Christi*, 45, num. XLIV.)

afterwards he adds: *Nor prefer your case to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing to assist her in her labour, you would seek in vain how we could be born of her.*

I answer that, Two things have to be considered in the acceptance of the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire according to his own will; secondly, what it behoves a man to do according to the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes a man to look chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he look to the spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to the appointment of another having authority, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of his own choice incline to be appointed to the government of others, so too it indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse the aforesaid office of government in direct opposition to the appointment of his superior: and this for two reasons.

First, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbour, for whose good a man should offer himself according as place and time demand: hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19) that *the demands of charity undertake an honest labour*. Secondly, because this is contrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's commands: hence Gregory says (*Pastor*. i. 6): *In God's sight humility is true when it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is usefully prescribed.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although simply and absolutely speaking the contemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of God better than the love of our neighbour, yet, on the other hand, the good of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual. Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: *Nor prefer your own ease to the needs of the Church*, and all the more since it belongs to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of Christ's sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on Jo. xxi. 17, *Feed My sheep*, says (*Tract. cxxiii. in Joan.*): *Be it the task of love to feed the Lord's flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the Shepherd.*

Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19) that *if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must not abandon the delights of truth, which are derived from contemplation.*

Reply Obj. 2. No one is bound to obey his superior by doing what is unlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning obedience (Q. CIV., A. 5). Accordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to the office of prelate perceive something in himself on account of which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this obstacle may sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed to the pastoral cure,—for instance, if he have a purpose to sin, he may abandon it,—and for this reason he is not excused from being bound to obey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes, however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can do so,—for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a case he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has appointed him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment, he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Exod. iv. 10): *I beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day before*, the Lord answered (verse 12): *I will be in thy mouth, and I will teach thee what thou shalt speak.* At other times the impediment cannot be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one appointed,—for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be bound to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not in itself necessary for salvation to accept the episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the superior's command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things thus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it would not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus incur an

impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would not be lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed Mark did not act against a precept by cutting off his finger, although it is credible that he did this by the instigation of the Holy Ghost, without which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay hands on himself. If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop's office, and by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in obedience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not to seek the episcopal office, nor to accept it except under urgent necessity, his vow is lawful, because he vows to do what it becomes a man to do.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER HE THAT IS APPOINTED TO THE EPISCOPATE
OUGHT TO BE BETTER THAN OTHERS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one who is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about to commit the pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him more than the others. Now a man is the better through loving God the more. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to the episcopal office except he be better than others.

Obj. 2. Further, Pope Symmachus says (cap. *Vilissimus*, i., qu. 1): *A man is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels not in knowledge and holiness.* Now he who excels in knowledge and holiness is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the episcopate unless he be better than others.

Obj. 3. Further, In every genus the lesser are governed by the greater, as corporeal things are governed by things spiritual, and the lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 4). Now a bishop is appointed to govern others. Therefore he should be better than others.

On the contrary, The Decretal says (cap. *Cum dilectus*,

de electione, etc.) that *it suffices to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to choose the better man.*

I answer that, In designating a man for the episcopal office, something has to be considered on the part of the person designate, and something on the part of the designator. For on the part of the designator, whether by election or by appointment, it is required that he choose such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries faithfully. These should be dispensed for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. xiv. 12, *Seek to abound unto the edifying of the Church*; and the divine mysteries are not committed to men for their own meed, which they should await in the life to come. Consequently he who has to choose or appoint one for a bishop, is not bound to take one who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one who is best for governing the Church, one namely who is able to instruct, defend, and govern the Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting on Tit. i. 5, *Ordain . . . in every city*, says against certain persons that *some seek to erect as pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, or for whom some person in authority has spoken, and, not to say worse than this, have succeeded by means of gifts in being made clerics.*

Now this pertains to the receiving of persons, which in such matters is a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss* on James ii. 1, *Brethren, have not . . . with respect of persons*, says: *If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to ecclesiastical honours, we must not deem it a slight sin to 'have the faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.'* For who would suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church's seat of honour, in despite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?

On the part of the person appointed, it is not required that he esteem himself better than others, for this would be proud and presumptuous; but it suffices that he per-

* S. Augustine (*Ep. clxvii. ad Hieron.*).

ceive nothing in himself which would make it unlawful for him to take up the office of prelate. Hence although Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him more than the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before the others, but answered simply that he loved Christ.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord knew that, by His own bestowal, Peter was in other respects fitted to govern the Church: wherefore He questioned him about his greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise fitted for the government of the Church, we must look chiefly to his pre-eminence in the love of God.

Reply Obj. 2. This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore Gregory says (*Pastor. ii. 1*) *the occupations of a prelate ought to excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd's life excels that of his flock.* But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as worthless if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy.

Reply Obj. 3. According to 1 Cor. xii. 4 *seq.*, *there are diversities of graces, . . . and . . . of ministries . . . and . . . of operations.* Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the office of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It is otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to dispose of those that are lower.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A BISHOP MAY LAWFULLY FORSAKE THE
EPISCOPAL CURE, IN ORDER TO ENTER RELIGION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is to look back, which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Luke ix. 62), *No man putting*

his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God. Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious, as shown above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 7). Therefore just as it is unlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it unlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state.

Obj. 2. Further, The order of grace is more congruous than the order of nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in contrary directions; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it cannot naturally return upwards from below. But according to the order of grace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state. Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the episcopal to the religious state.

Obj. 3. Further, In the works of grace nothing should be inoperative. Now when once a man is consecrated bishop he retains in perpetuity the spiritual power of giving orders and doing like things that pertain to the episcopal office: and this power would seemingly remain inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore it would seem that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and enter religion.

On the contrary, No man is compelled to do what is in itself unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are compelled to resign (Extrav. *de Renunt.*, cap. *Quidam*). Therefore apparently it is not unlawful to give up the episcopal cure.

I answer that, The perfection of the episcopal state consists in this that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the salvation of his neighbour, wherefore he is bound to retain the pastoral cure so long as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare of the subjects entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not neglect,—neither for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation, since the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suffered patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation of the life to come, according to Philip. i. 22-25, *What I shall choose I know not, but I am straitened between two, having*

a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ, a thing by far better. But to abide still in the flesh is needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I shall abide;—nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of acquiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (Jo. x. 11), the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep.

At times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects. Sometimes on account of his own defect, either of conscience (for instance if he be guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for example if he be old or infirm), or of irregularity arising, for instance, from bigamy. Sometimes he is hindered through some defect in his subjects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says (*Dial. ii. 3*): *The wicked must be borne patiently, when there are some good who can be succoured, but when there is no profit at all for the good, it is sometimes useless to labour for the wicked. Wherefore the perfect when they find that they labour in vain are often minded to go elsewhere in order to labour with fruit.* Sometimes again this hindrance arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. viii. 13): *If meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh:* provided, however, the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of persons desirous of subverting the faith or the righteousness of the Church; because the pastoral cure is not to be laid aside on account of scandal of this kind, according to Matth. xv. 14, *Let them alone, those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ's teaching, they are blind, and leaders of the blind.*

Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behoves him to be subject to the latter's authority in laying aside the accepted charge for the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III. says (*Extrav. de Renunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem*): *Though thou hast wings wherewith thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly without our*

permission. For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow, by which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he took upon himself the episcopal office.

Reply Obj. 1. The perfection of religious and that of bishops are regarded from different standpoints. For it belongs to the perfection of a religious to occupy oneself in working out one's own salvation, whereas it belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself in working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as a man can be useful to the salvation of his neighbour, he would be going back, if he wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only with his own salvation, since he has bound himself to work not only for his own but also for others' salvation. Wherefore Innocent III. says in the Decretal quoted above that *it is more easily allowable for a monk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to descend to the monastic life.* If, however, he be unable to procure the salvation of others it is meet he should seek his own.

Reply Obj. 2. On account of no obstacle should a man forgo the work of his own salvation, which pertains to the religious state. But there may be an obstacle to the procuring of another's salvation; wherefore a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he is able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be hindered from procuring the salvation of others, may enter the religious life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of the scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by sufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony of which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the religious life, he can be reappointed to another bishopric. On the other hand, if a man be deposed from the episcopal office for some sin, and confined in a monastery that he may do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric. Hence it is stated (VII., Q. I., cap. *Hoc nequaquam*): The holy synod orders that *any man who has been degraded from the*

episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the episcopate.

Reply Obj. 3. Even in natural things power remains inactive on account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight ceases through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it unreasonable if, on account of a supervening impediment, the episcopal power remain without the exercise of its act.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A BISHOP ON ACCOUNT OF BODILY PERSECUTION TO ABANDON THE FLOCK COMMITTED TO HIS CARE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is unlawful for a bishop, on account of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence from the flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (Jo. x. 12) that he is a hireling and no true shepherd, who *seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth* : and Gregory says (*Hom. xiv. in Ev.*) that *the wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful and the humble*. Therefore if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he is a hireling and not a shepherd.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Prov. vi. 1) : *My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger*, and afterwards (*verse 3*) : *Run about, make haste, stir up thy friend*. Gregory expounds these words and says (*Pastor. iii. 1*) : *To be surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even to rouse his friend*. Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily presence from his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should not on account of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock.

Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's

state that he devote himself to the care of his neighbour. Now it is unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting himself to works of perfection in a monastery.

On the contrary, Our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors bishops are (Matth. x. 23): *When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another.*

I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be considered is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil the pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects. Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep.

On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be sufficiently provided for by another person in the absence of the pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence from his flock, either for the sake of some advantage to the Church, or on account of some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (*Ep. ccxxviii., ad Honorat.*): *Christ's servants may flee from one city to another, when one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in order that the Church be not abandoned by others who are not so sought for. When, however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of others must not be abandoned by those whom they need. For if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy, as Pope Nicholas I. says (Cf. VII., Q. I., cap. Sciscitaris).*

Reply Obj. 1. To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal advantage or one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's neighbour. Hence Gregory says (*loc. cit.*): *A man*

cannot endanger himself for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves. But he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without endangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling.

Reply Obj. 2. If he who is surety for another be unable to fulfil his engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another. Hence if a superior is hindered from attending personally to the care of his subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.

Reply Obj. 3. When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection; and if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to another kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state. Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of devoting himself to his neighbour's salvation, should an opportunity offer, and necessity require it of him.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A BISHOP TO HAVE
PROPERTY OF HIS OWN?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not lawful for a bishop to have property of his own. For our Lord said (Matth. xix. 21): *If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all (Vulg.,—what) thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me*; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to possess anything as their own.

Obj. 2. Further, Bishops take the place of the apostles in the Church, according to a gloss on Luke x. 1. Now our Lord commanded the apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Matth. x. 9, *Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses*; wherefore Peter said for himself

and the other apostles (Matth. xix. 27): *Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee.* Therefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep this command, and to possess nothing of their own.

Obj. 3. Further, Jerome says (*Ep. ii. ad Nepotian.*): *The Greek κληρος denotes the Latin 'sors.'* Hence clerics are so called either because they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is the estate, i.e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord, can have nothing beside God; and if he have gold and silver, possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord does not vouchsafe to be his portion also. Therefore it would seem that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their own.

On the contrary, It is stated (XII., Q. I., cap. 19): *Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally.*

I answer that, No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless he binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (*Ep. cxxvii. ad Paulin. et Arment.*): *Since you have taken the vow, you have already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit.* Now it is evident that to live without possessing anything is a work of supererogation, for it is a matter not of precept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying to the young man: *If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments,* said afterwards by way of addition: *If thou wilt be perfect go sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor* (Matth. xix. 17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind themselves at their ordination to live without possessions of their own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which they bind themselves, make it necessary for them to live without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are not bound to live without possessions of their own.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 3) the perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty there is greater

perfection; indeed the highest perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said (Gen. xvii. 1): *Walk before Me and be perfect*, is stated to have been rich (*ibid.* xiii. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. This saying of our Lord can be understood in three ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage in commenting on Matth. x. 10, *Nor two coats*. Secondly, according to Augustine's explanation (*De Consens. Ev.* ii. 30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but in permission. For He permitted them to go preaching without gold or silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: *For the workman is worthy of his meat*. And yet if anyone were to use his own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. ix. 12, 15). Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom (*Hom. ii. in Rom.* xvi. 3, *Salute Prisca*), we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to preach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His power, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having means of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or their successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. xi. 8) that he *received wages* of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians, wherefore it is clear that he possessed something sent to him by others. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them.

Reply Obj. 3. Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a man has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the world. Now neither bishops nor

clerics ought thus to possess means of their own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that concern the worship of God.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER BISHOPS SIN MORTALLY IF THEY DISTRIBUTE NOT TO THE POOR THE ECCLESIASTICAL GOODS WHICH ACCRUE TO THEM ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they acquire. For Ambrose expounding Luke xii. 16, *The land of a certain . . . man brought forth plenty of fruits*, says (*Serm. lxiv. de Temp.*): *Let no man claim as his own that which he has taken and obtained by violence from the common property in excess of his requirements ;* and afterwards he adds: *It is not less criminal to take from him who has, than, when you are able and have plenty, to refuse him who has not.* Now it is a mortal sin to take another's property by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor that which they have in excess.

Obj. 2. Further, A gloss of Jerome on Isa. iii. 14, *The spoil of the poor is in your house*, says that *ecclesiastical goods belong to the poor.* Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution. Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that they are bound to restitution.

Obj. 3. Further, Much more may one take what is necessary for oneself from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus:* *It is right that those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and relations should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those who have sufficient income*

* Cf. Can. *Clericos*, caus. i., qu. 2; Can. *Quoniam*, caus. xvi., qu. 1. *Regul. Monach.* iv. among the works of S. Jerome.

from their parents and their own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. v. 16): *If any of the faithful have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them that are widows indeed.* Much more therefore do bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical goods.

On the contrary, Many bishops, do not give their surplus to the poor, but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the revenue of the Church.

I answer that, The same is not to be said of their own goods which bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. Because they have real dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may either keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, which leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not to assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to their ownership.

On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or trustees. For Augustine says (*Ep. clxxxv. ad Bonif.*): *If we possess privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim ownership of them only by wicked theft.* Now dispensing requires good faith, according to 1 Cor. iv. 2, *Here now it is required among the dispensers that a man be found faithful.* Moreover ecclesiastical goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII., Q. II., cap. 28): *Of the Church's revenues or the offerings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of suspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the poor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according to their respective merits.* Accordingly if the goods

which are assigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part of that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for their use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution.

But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others according to the demands of charity.

On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods, their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it is written (Matth. xxiv. 48-51) that *if that evil servant shall say in his heart: My lord is long acoming*, which shows contempt of God's judgment, *and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants*, which is a sign of pride, *and shall eat and drink with drunkards*, which proceeds from lust, *the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he hopeth not . . . and shall separate him*, namely from the fellowship of good men, *and appoint his portion with hypocrites*, namely in hell.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of Ambrose refers to the administration not only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods whatever from which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide for those who are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely when this need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, as is the case in other points of detail that have to be considered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to human prudence.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in the *Article* the goods of the Church have to be employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. Hence Ambrose says (*De Offic. i. 30*): *It is a commendable liberality if you overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; yet not so as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the poor.*

Reply Obj. 3. The goods of churches should not all be given to the poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (*De Offic. ii. 28*), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship are to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to have a patrimony of his own on which to support himself.

Reply Obj. 4. The goods of the churches should be employed for the good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the surplus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by for some future use connected with the Church or the needs of the poor. But if there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by for the future is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord Who said (*Matth. vi. 34*): *Be . . . not solicitous for the morrow.*

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGIOUS WHO ARE RAISED TO THE EPISCOPATE
ARE BOUND TO RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that religious who are raised to the episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said (XVIII., Q. I., cap. *Statutum*) that *a canonical election*

loosens a monk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop. Now the regular observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who are appointed bishops are not bound to religious observances.

Obj. 2. Further, He who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower degree: thus it was stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 12, *ad 1*) that a religious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a religious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound in the state of religion.

Obj. 3. Further, Religious would seem to be bound above all to obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious who are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (*Obj. 1*) *when the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance.* Moreover they are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are they bound to other regular observances.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI., Q. I., cap. 3): *With regard to those who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 7) the religious state pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the

scholar has become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that if there be among religious observances any that instead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a religious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to observe these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.

On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, according to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors dispense themselves in such matters.

Reply Obj. 1. He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything, but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated in the *Article*.

Reply Obj. 2. The vows of those who are living in the world are compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, as stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 12, *ad 1*). But the vows of religion are compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now the particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.

Reply Obj. 3. It is accidental that religious who are bishops are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit, they have ceased to be subjects, even as those same religious superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they have any.

As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is added (*ibid.*) that *after he has been ordained bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed according to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.* Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his death, after which a testament comes into force according to the Apostle (Heb. ix. 17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his death.

QUESTION CLXXXVI.

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE
PROPERLY CONSISTS.

(*In Ten Articles.*)

WE must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly, those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the religious state.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the religious state is perfect? (2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels? (3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state? (4) Whether continency is necessary? (5) Whether obedience is necessary? (6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow? (7) Of the sufficiency of these vows. (8) Of their comparison one with another. (9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a statute of his rule? (10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGION IMPLIES A STATE OF PERFECTION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion does not imply a state of perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not seemingly pertain to perfection. But

religion is necessary for salvation, whether because *thereby we are bound (religamur) to the one almighty God*, as Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.*), or because it takes its name from *our returning (religimus) to God Whom we had lost by neglecting Him*,* according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, x.). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, Religion according to Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) is that *which offers worship and ceremony to the divine nature*. Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 2, *ad* 3; A. 4). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 3. Further, The state of perfection is distinct from the state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 4. Further, Religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is said in the Decrees (VII., Q. I., cap. *Hoc nequaquam*): *The holy synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the episcopate*. Now a place of repentance is opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* vi.) places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of perfection.

On the contrary, In the *Conferences of the Fathers* (*Collat.* i. 7) abbot Moses speaking of religious says: *We must recognize that we have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount to the perfection of charity*. Now things pertaining to human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection. Moreover Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* vi.) that *those who are called*

* Cf. Q. LXXXI., A. 1.

servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXLI., A. 2) that which is applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of fortitude is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of temperance, by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now religion as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 2) is a virtue whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God. Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust to God. Hence Gregory says (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*): *Some there are who keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess.* Now the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 2), and in this sense religion denotes the state of perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. To offer something to the worship of God is necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1, *ad 1*; A. 4, *ad 1* and 2) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the virtues which in so far as these are referred to God's service and honour become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in the state of perfection are called religious.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., AA. 4, 6) religion denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect, but that he tends to

perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Matth. xix. 21, *If thou wilt be perfect, etc.*, says (*Tract. viii. in Matth.*) that *he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will begin to lead him to all the virtues.* Thus all are not perfect in religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.

Reply Obj. 4. The religious state was instituted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII., Q. II., cap. *Admonere*) a man who had killed his wife is counselled to enter a monastery which is described as better and lighter, rather than to do public penance while remaining in the world.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY RELIGIOUS IS BOUND TO KEEP ALL
THE COUNSELS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound to observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious professes the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*) that *he who renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness.* Now it belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it belongs to them also to do all the good they can; and so it would seem that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.

Obj. 3. Further, If it is not requisite for the state of per-

fection to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil some of them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life fulfil some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence. Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and such are the counsels.

On the contrary, One is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do works of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to keep all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, others to others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.

I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First, essentially, and thus, as stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 3) the perfect observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. Secondly, a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those things that result from the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that curse you (Luke vi. 27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, which though they be binding as regards the preparedness of the mind, so that one has to fulfil them when necessity requires, yet are sometimes fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through superabundance of charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the like.

Now it has been stated (A. 1) that the perfection of charity is the end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach by various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but he is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavours to have perfect charity.

For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that result from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to fulfil them: against which intention he acts

if he contemns them, wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.

In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.

Reply Obj. 1. He who enters religion does not make profession to be perfect, but he professes to endeavour to attain perfection; even as he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, viii. 2), *Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise man, but acknowledged himself a lover of wisdom.* Hence a religious does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he despises to tend to perfection.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as, though all are bound to love God with their whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be omitted without sin, provided there be no contempt, as stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 2, *ad* 3), so too, all, both religious and seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. ix. 10): *Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly.* Yet there is a way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life: provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt sets the mind against spiritual progress.

Reply Obj. 3. There are some counsels such that if they be omitted, man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, or do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of religion themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all suchlike counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain particular better actions, which can be omitted without one's life being taken up with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for religious to be bound to fulfil all of them.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER POVERTY IS REQUIRED FOR RELIGIOUS
PERFECTION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that poverty is not required for religious perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. viii. 12) lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms, saying: *If the will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath*, i.e. 'you should keep back what you need,' and afterwards he adds (*verse 13*): *For I mean not that others should be eased, and you burthened*, i.e. *with poverty*, according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss on 1 Tim. vi. 8, *Having food, and wherewith to be covered*, says: *Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing away, we must not give up these temporal things altogether*. Therefore it seems that voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, Whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he who renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself to danger,—not only spiritual, according to Prov. xxx. 9, *Lest perhaps . . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name of my God*, and Eccles. xxvii. 1, *Through poverty many have sinned*,—but also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. vii. 13): *As wisdom is a defence, so money is a defence*, and the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 1*) that *the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of one's self, since thereby man lives*. Therefore it would seem that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfection of religious life.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue observes the mean, as stated in *Ethic. ii. 6*. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to the extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not act virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life.

Obj. 4. Further, The ultimate perfection of man consists

in happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written (Ecclus. xxxi. 8): *Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish*, and the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 5, 10) that *riches contribute instrumentally to happiness*. Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.

Obj. 5. Further, The episcopal state is more perfect than the religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above (Q. CLXXXV., A. 6). Therefore religious may also.

Obj. 6. Further, Almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and as Chrysostom says (*Hom.* ix. *in Ep. ad Hebr.*) *is a most effective remedy in repentance*. Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it would seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* viii. 15): *There are some of the righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very height of perfection, while they aim at higher objects within, abandon all things without*. Now, as stated above, (AA. 1, 2) it belongs properly to religious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the very height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), the religious state is an exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from worldly things; since Augustine says (*Conf.* x. 29), speaking to God: *Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, which he loveth not for Thee*. Wherefore he says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 36) that *charity increases with the lessening of cupidity, and is perfect when cupidity is no more*. Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind to the love of them: hence Augustine says (*Ep. ad Paulin. et Theras.* xxxi.) that *we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we have them than when we desire them:—since why did that young man go away sad, save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what one already has; the former are rejected as*

foreign to us, the latter are cut off as a limb. And Chrysostom says (*Hom. lxiv. in Matth.*) that *the possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire for them becomes stronger.*

Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (*Matth. xix. 21*), *If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all (Vulg.,—what) thou hast, and give to the poor, . . . and come, follow Me.*

Reply Obj. 1. As the gloss adds (*ibid.*), *the Apostle said 'not that we (you) should be burthened,' i.e. with poverty, not as though it were not better to give all: but he feared for the weak, whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation.* Hence in like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity. Wherefore Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*): *Our Lord does not wish, namely does not command us to pour out our wealth all at once, but to dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen, and fed the poor with that which was his own so that no household care might hold him back.*

Reply Obj. 2. He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's sake exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary; because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire of money-getting, fall into many sins, according to *1 Tim. vi. 9*, *They that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil.* This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated in the *Article*. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust themselves to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte, ii. 17*): *Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His justice are not weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary.*

Reply Obj. 3. According to the Philosopher (*Ethic. ii. 6*)

the mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against right reason to throw away all one's possessions through intemperance, or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in accordance with right reason to renounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to have done this; for Jerome says (*Ep. ad Paulin.*): *That famous Theban, Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to Athens to study philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he considered that he could not possess both gold and virtue at the same time.* Much more therefore is it according to right reason for a man to renounce all he has, in order perfectly to follow Christ. Wherefore Jerome says (*Ep. ad Rust. Monach.*): *Poor thyself, follow Christ poor.*

Reply Obj. 4. Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect, to which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect, in respect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The happiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active life, the other according to the contemplative life, as the Philosopher asserts (*Ethic. x. 7, 8*). Now wealth conduces instrumentally to the happiness of the active life which consists in external actions, because as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. i. 8*) *we do many things by friends, by riches, by political influence, as it were by instruments.* On the other hand, it does not conduce to the happiness of the contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle thereto, inasmuch as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of the soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it is that the Philosopher asserts (*Ethic. x. 8*) that *for actions many things are needed, but the contemplative man needs no such things, namely external goods, for his operation, but they are impediments to his contemplation.*

Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect charity, it follows that it is of great avail in

acquiring the happiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Matth. xix. 21): *Go, sell all (Vulg.,—what) thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven.* Now riches once they are possessed are in themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity, especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it is written (Matth. xiii. 22) that *the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choketh up the word of God*, for as Gregory says (*Hom. xv. in Ev.*) by *preventing the good desire from entering into the heart, they destroy life at its very outset.* Consequently it is difficult to safeguard charity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Matth. xix. 23) that *a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven*, which we must understand as referring to one who actually has wealth, since He says that this is impossible for him who places his affection in riches, according to the explanation of Chrysostom (*Hom. lxiv. in Matth.*), for He adds (*verse 24*): *It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven.* Hence it is not said simply that the *rich man* is blessed, but *the rich man that is found without blemish, and that hath not gone after gold*, and this because he has done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues (*verse 9*): *Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done wonderful things in his life*, namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst of them.

Reply Obj. 5. The episcopal state is not directed to the attainment of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of the perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be done by means of wealth as an instrument, as stated in the preceding *Reply*. Wherefore it is not required of bishops, who make profession of governing Christ's flock, that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is required of religious who make profession of learning to obtain perfection.

Reply Obj. 6. The renouncement of one's own wealth is compared to almsgiving as the universal to the particular,

and as the holocaust to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*) that those who assist *the needy with the things they possess, by their good deeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep back something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for themselves offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice.* Wherefore Jerome also says (*Contra Vigilant. v.*): *When you declare that those do better who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out the fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord Who answers you; If thou wilt be perfect, etc., and afterwards he goes on to say: This man whom you praise belongs to the second and third degree, and we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the first as to be preferred to the second and third.* For this reason in order to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (*De Eccl. Dogm. 71*): *It is a good thing to give away one's goods by dispensing them to the poor: it is better to give them away once for all with the intention of following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be poor with Christ.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PERPETUAL CONTINENCE IS REQUIRED FOR
RELIGIOUS PERFECTION?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that perpetual continence is not required for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life began with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we read *Matth. viii. 14*. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is not requisite for religious perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, The first example of perfection is shown to us in the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (*Gen. xvii. 1*): *Walk before Me, and be perfect.* Now the copy should not surpass the example. Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for religious perfection.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is required for religious

perfection is to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not require perpetual continence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. vii. 1): *Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God.* Now cleanness of flesh and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor. vii. 34): *The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord that she may be holy both in spirit and in body* (Vulg.,—*both in body and in spirit*). Therefore religious perfection requires continence.

I answer that, The religious state requires the removal of whatever hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (*Ethic.* iii. 12): and hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when he says (*Solil.* i. 10): *I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state.* Secondly, because it involves man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children, and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 32, 33): *He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife.*

Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was condemned for equalling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned for equalling marriage to virginity.

Reply Obj. 1. The perfection not only of poverty but also of continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Matth. xix. 12): *There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs,*

for the kingdom of heaven, and then added: *He that can take, let him take it.* And lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection, he admitted to the state of perfection those even who were married. Now the husbands could not without committing an injustice forsake their wives, whereas they all could without injustice renounce riches. Wherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not from his wife, while He withheld from marriage John who wished to marry.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* 22), *the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of which Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requisite then.* Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection of mind together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the greatness of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person should presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to perfection though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-bone of an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to observe continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe them.

Reply Obj. 3. Such ways of living as admit of the use of marriage are not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but in a restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those things that belong to the religious state.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OBEDIENCE BELONGS TO RELIGIOUS PERFECTION ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that obedience does not belong to religious perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious perfection, which are works of supererogation and are not binding upon all. But all are bound to obey their superiors, according to the saying of the Apostle

(Heb. xiii. 17), *Obey your prelates, and be subject to them.* Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to religious perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, Obedience would seem to belong properly to those who have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. v. 14) that *strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil.* Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect.

Obj. 3. Further, If obedience were requisite for religious perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious. But it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary life, and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem not to pertain to religious perfection.

Obj. 4. Further, If the vow of obedience were requisite for religion, it would follow that religious are bound to obey their superiors in all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all venery by their vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey their superiors in all things, as stated above (Q. CIV., A. 5), when we were treating of the virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is not requisite for religion.

Obj. 5. Further, Those services are most acceptable to God which are done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. ix. 7, *Not with sadness or of necessity.* Now that which is done out of obedience is done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more deserving of praise which are done of one's own accord. Therefore the vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain to that which is better.

On the contrary, Religious perfection consists chiefly in the imitation of Christ, according to Matth. xix. 21, *If thou wilt be perfect, etc. . . . follow Me.* Now in Christ obedience is commended above all according to Philip ii. 8, *He became*

(Vulg.,—*becoming*) *obedient unto death*. Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 3) the religious state is a school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are being instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must needs follow the direction of someone under whose control they are instructed or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master. Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and command of someone as regards things pertaining to the religious life; wherefore it is said (VII., Q. I., cap. *Hoc nequaquam*): *The monastic life denotes subjection and discipleship*. Now one man is subjected to another's command and instruction by obedience: and consequently obedience is requisite for religious perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. To obey one's superiors in matters that are essential to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to all: whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of perfection belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is compared to the former as the universal to the particular. For those who live in the world, keep something for themselves, and offer something to God; and in the latter respect they are under obedience to their superiors: while those who live in religion give themselves wholly and their possessions to God, as stated above (A. 3). Hence their obedience is universal.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 1, 2), by performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions. Accordingly those who have not attained to perfection, acquire perfection by obeying, while those who have already acquired perfection are most ready to obey, not as though they need to be directed to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining themselves by this means in that which belongs to perfection.

Reply Obj. 3. The subjection of religious is chiefly in reference to bishops, who are compared to them as perfectors to perfected, as Dionysius states (*Eccl. Hier.* vi.), where

he also says that the *monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment.* Hence neither hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops; and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop of the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in those which pertain specially to religious discipline.

Reply Obj. 4. The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends to the disposition of a man's whole life, and in this way it has a certain universality, although it does not extend to all individual acts. For some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of those things that concern the love of God and of our neighbour, such as rubbing one's beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth, which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.

Reply Obj. 5. The necessity of coercion makes an act involuntary and consequently deprives it of the character of praise or merit; whereas the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of obedience a man lays himself under the necessity of doing for God's sake certain things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by subjecting his will to another man's for God's sake. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (*Coll. xvii. 7*) it is stated that *the Sarabaitæ are the worst class of monks, because through providing for their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free to do as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in work than those who live in monasteries.*

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS REQUISITE FOR RELIGIOUS PERFECTION THAT
POVERTY, CONTINENCE, AND OBEDIENCE SHOULD COME
UNDER A VOW?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not requisite for religious perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in formulating perfection (Matth. xix. 21) said: *If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all (Vulg.,—what) thou hast, and give to the poor, without any mention of a vow.* Therefore it would seem that a vow is not necessary for the school of religion.

Obj. 2. Further, A vow is a promise made to God, wherefore (Eccles. v. 3) the wise man after saying: *If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it,* adds at once, *for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him.* But when a thing is being actually given there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for religious perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience without vowing them.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Adult. Conjug.* i. 14): *The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully not render them, yet do so out of love.* Now it is lawful not to render a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if we have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing to God to keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow. Therefore a vow is not requisite for religious perfection.

On the contrary, In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by vow according to Num. vi. 2, *When a man or woman shall make a vow to be sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord,* etc. Now these were a figure of those who attain the summit of perfection, as Gregory says (*Moral.* ii. 26). Therefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection.

I answer that, It belongs to religious to be in the state of

perfection, as shown above (Q. CLXXIV., A. 5). Now the state of perfection requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection: and this obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a vow. But it is evident from what has been said (AA. 3, 4, 5) that poverty, continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the Christian life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be bound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*): *When a man vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust*; and afterwards he says that this refers to those who renounce the present world.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord declared that it belongs to the perfection of life that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way as not to turn back. Wherefore He says again (Luke ix. 62): *No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.* And though some of His disciples went back, yet when our Lord asked (Jo. vi. 68, 69), *Will you also go away?* Peter answered for the others: *Lord, to whom shall we go?* Hence Augustine says (*De Consensu Ev. ii. 17*) that *as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and Andrew followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as though they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command.* Now this unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow: wherefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection.

Reply Obj. 2. As Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) religious perfection requires that a man give God whatever he has vowed. But a man cannot actually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole is not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole life to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow.

Reply Obj. 3. Among other services that we can lawfully give, is our liberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently when a man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of abstaining from things pertaining to God's service, this is most acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (*Ep. cxxvii. ad Paulin. et Arment.*): *Repent*

not of thy vow ; rejoice rather that thou canst no longer do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy own cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS RIGHT TO SAY THAT RELIGIOUS PERFECTION CONSISTS IN THESE THREE VOWS ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not right to say that religious perfection consists in these three vows. For the perfection of life consists of inward rather than of outward acts, according to Rom. xiv. 17, *The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.* Now the religious vow binds a man to things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions, such as contemplation, love of God and our neighbour, and so forth, should pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of poverty, continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions.

Obj. 2. Further, The three aforesaid come under the religious vow, in so far as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But there are many other things that religious practise, such as abstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that these three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state of perfection.

Obj. 3. Further, By the vow of obedience a man is bound to do according to his superior's command whatever pertains to the practice of perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the two other vows.

Obj. 4. Further, External goods comprise not only riches but also honours. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce earthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise worldly honours.

On the contrary, It is stated (*Extrav. de Statu Monach.*, cap. *Cum ad monasterium*) that *the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of property are affixed to the monastic rule.*

I answer that, The religious state may be considered in three ways. First, as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity: secondly, as quieting the human mind from outward solicitude, according to 1 Cor. vii. 32: *I would have you to be without solicitude*: thirdly, as a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and his possessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the religious state is constituted by these three vows.

First, as regards the practice of perfection, a man is required to remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending wholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment to external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, the concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are venereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence; thirdly, the inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by the vow of obedience.

In like manner the disquiet of worldly solicitude is aroused in man in reference especially to three things. First, as regards the dispensing of external things, and this solicitude is removed from man by the vow of poverty; secondly, as regards the control of wife and children, which is cut away by the vow of continence; thirdly, as regards the disposal of one's own actions, which is eliminated by the vow of obedience, whereby a man commits himself to the disposal of another.

Again, a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has, according to Gregory (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*). Now man has a threefold good, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. i. 8*). First, the good of external things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of voluntary poverty: secondly, the good of his own body, and this good he offers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby he renounces the greatest bodily pleasures: the third is the good of the soul, which man wholly offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby he offers God his own will by which he makes use of all the powers and habits of the soul.

Therefore the religious state is fittingly constituted by the three vows.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 1), the end whereunto the religious vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all the interior acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 4, *Charity is patient, is kind*, etc. Hence the interior acts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth, do not come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as its end.

Reply Obj. 2. All other religious observances are directed to the three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labour, questing, and so on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of which religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances whereby the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the like, are directly ordained for the observance of the vow of continence. And such religious observances as regard human actions whereby a man is directed to the end of religion, namely the love of God and his neighbour (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and the like), are comprised under the vow of obedience that applies to the will, which directs its actions to the end according to the ordering of another person. The distinction of habit belongs to all three vows, as a sign of being bound by them: wherefore the religious habit is given or blessed at the time of profession.

Reply Obj. 3. By obedience a man offers to God his will, to which though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions belong also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain the passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite, which hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for the vow of obedience.

Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3), strictly and truly speaking honour is not due save to virtue. Since,

however, external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the consequence is that a certain honour is given to their excellence especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of virtue it becomes them not to renounce the honour which is given to God and all the saints on account of virtue, according to Ps. cxxxviii. 17, *But to me thy friends, O God, are made exceedingly honourable.* On the other hand, they renounce the honour that is given to outward excellence, by the very fact that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special vow is needed for this.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VOW OF OBEDIENCE IS THE CHIEF OF THE THREE RELIGIOUS VOWS?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the vow of obedience is not the chief of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of obedience.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Ecclus. xxvi. 20) that *no price is worthy of a continent soul.* Now the vow of that which is more worthy is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more excellent than the vow of obedience.

Obj. 3. Further, The greater a vow the more indispensable it would seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence are so inseparable from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow them to be broken, according to a Decretal (*De Statu Monach.*, cap. *Cum ad monasterium*): yet he can dispense a religious from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that the vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and continence.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxv. 10): *Obedience is rightly placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but by obedience one's own will, is sacrificed.* Now the religious vows are holocausts, as stated above (AA. 1, 3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of obedience is the chief of all religious vows.

I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows, and this for three reasons.

First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his own body, which he offers God by continence, and than external things, which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is done of one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome to the monk Rusticus: *My words are intended to teach you not to rely on your own judgment*: and a little further on he says: *You may not do what you will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to you.* Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done of one's own will, according to Isa. lviii. 3, *Behold in the day of your fast your own will is found.*

Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but not *vice versa*: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe continence and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well as many other things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.

Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is.

It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to the religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience were to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he would not therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be preferred to virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (*De Virgin.*

xlvi.): *No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the monastic life.**

Reply Obj. 1. The counsel of obedience was included in the very following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another's will. Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Matth. xix. 27, *Behold we have left all things*, observes, *Peter added that which is perfect when he said: And have followed Thee.*

Reply Obj. 2. The words quoted mean that continence is to be preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity, or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight.† Or again continence is taken in a general sense for abstinence from all evil, as stated above (Q. CLV., A. 4, *ad 1*).

Reply Obj. 3. The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow of obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from subjection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from his vow of obedience.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SINS MORTALLY WHENEVER HE TRANSGRESSES THE THINGS CONTAINED IN HIS RULE ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is a sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. v. 11, 12, where the Apostle says that widows who *will marry have* (Vulg.,—*having*) *damnation, because they have made void their first faith.* But religious are

* S. Augustine wrote not *monasterio* but *martyrio*—*to martyrdom*; and S. Thomas quotes the passage correctly, above, Q. CXXIV., A. 3, and Q. CLII., A. 5.

† *Pondere*, referring to the Latin *ponderatio* in the Vulgate, which the Douay version renders *price*.

bound to a rule by the vows of their profession. Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in their rule.

Obj. 2. Further, The rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally. Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgress the things contained in his rule.

Obj. 3. Further, Contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt. Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently transgressing the things contained in his rule.

On the contrary, The religious state is safer than the secular state; wherefore Gregory (*Ep. ad Leand. Episc.*, cap. i.) compares the secular life to the stormy sea, and the religious life to the calm port. But if every transgression of the things contained in his rule were to involve a religious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught with danger on account of its multitude of observances. Therefore not every transgression of the things contained in the rule is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 7, *ad 1* and 2), a thing is contained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for instance things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the transgression of these, as regards those which come under a common precept, involves a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not included in the common obligation of a precept, the transgression thereof does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of contempt, because, as stated above (A. 2), a religious is not bound to be perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the contempt of perfection is opposed. Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which a religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and obedience,

while all others are directed to these. Consequently the transgression of these three involves a mortal sin, while the transgression of the others does not involve a mortal sin, except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since this is directly contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to live according to the rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given orally by a superior, or expressed in the rule, since this would be to act contrary to the vow of obedience.

Reply Obj. 1. He who professes a rule does not vow to observe all the things contained in the rule, but he vows the regular life which consists essentially in the three afore-said things. Hence in certain religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to live according to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one's conduct in accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside by contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious orders by professing obedience according to the rule, so that only that which is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary to the profession, while the transgression or omission of other things binds only under pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (A. 7, *ad 2*), such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXVIII., A. 3), inasmuch as it hinders those things whereby a man is disposed to keep the chief precepts of Christ's law, namely the precepts of charity.

There is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachers, where suchlike transgressions or omissions do not, by their very nature, involve sin, either mortal or venial; but they bind one to suffer the punishment affixed thereto, because it is in this way that they are bound to observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt.

Reply Obj. 2. Not all the contents of the law are set forth by way of precept; for some are expressed under the form of ordinance or statute binding under pain of a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just as in the civil law the

transgression of a legal statute does not always render a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law of the Church does every ordinance or public statute bind under mortal sin; and the same applies to the statutes of the rule.

Reply Obj. 3. An action or transgression proceeds from contempt when a man's will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or rule, and from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. On the other hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause, when he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or rule through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger, even though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or some other cause. Thus Augustine says (*De Nat. et Grat.* xxix.) that *not all sins are committed through proud contempt*. Nevertheless the frequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt, according to the words of Prov. xviii. 3, *The wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth*.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SINS MORE GRIEVOUSLY THAN A
SECULAR BY THE SAME KIND OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a religious does not sin more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written (2 Paralip. xxx. 18, 19): *The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified*. Now religious apparently follow the Lord the God of their fathers with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly give themselves and their possessions to God and reserve part for themselves, as Gregory says (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*). Therefore it would seem that it is less imputed to them if they fall short somewhat of their sanctification.

Obj. 2. Further, God is less angered at a man's sins

if he does some good deeds, according to 2 Paralip. xix. 2, 3, *Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord: but good works are found in thee.* Now religious do more good works than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry with them.

Obj. 3. Further, This present life is not carried through without sin, according to Jas. iii. 2, *In many things we all offend.* Therefore if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of seculars it would follow that religious are worse off than seculars: and consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter religion.

On the contrary, The greater the evil the more it would seem to be deplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of holiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written (Jer. xxiii. 9): *My heart is broken within me,* and afterwards (*verse 9*): *For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house I have found their wickedness.* Therefore religious and others who are in the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more grievously.

I answer that, A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways more grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be against his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of fornication or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow of continence, and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not merely against a precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out of contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful for the divine favours which have raised him to the state of perfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. x. 29) that the believer *deserveth worse punishments* who through contempt tramples under foot the Son of God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer. xi. 15): *What is the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wickedness in My house?* Thirdly, the sin of a religious may be greater on account of scandal, because many take note of his manner of life:

wherefore it is written (Jer. xxiii. 14): *I have seen the likeness of adulterers, and the way of lying in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened the hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his evil doings.*

On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of his profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it in secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a secular, because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many good works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it. First, because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be intercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former object. Hence Origen commenting on Ps. xxxvi. 24, *When he shall fall he shall not be bruised*, says (*Hom. iv. in Ps. xxxvi.*): *The wicked man, if he sin, repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the just man knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who had said: 'I know not the man,' shortly afterwards when the Lord had looked on him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the roof had seen a woman and desired her knew to say: 'I have sinned and done evil before Thee.'* Secondly, he is assisted by his fellow-religious to rise again, according to Eccles. iv. 10, *If one fall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up.*

Reply Obj. 1. The words quoted refer to things done through weakness or ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt.

Reply Obj. 2. Josaphat also, to whom these words were addressed, sinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of human affection.

Reply Obj. 3. The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt, they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of Jeremias (ii. 20) *Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and*

thou hast said : ' I will not serve.' For on every high hill, and under every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself. Hence Augustine says (Ep. lxxviii., ad Pleb. Hippon.): From the time I began to serve God, even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the monastery have fallen.

QUESTION CLXXXVII.

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO
RELIGIOUS.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like things? (2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business? (3) Whether they are bound to manual labour? (4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms? (5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest? (6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other persons?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO TEACH,
PREACH, AND THE LIKE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like. For it is said (VII., Q. I., cap. *Hoc nequaquam*) in an ordinance of a synod of Constantinople: *The monastic life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care.* And Jerome says to Riparius and Desiderius (*Contra Vigilant.* vi.): *A monk's duty is not to teach but to lament.* Again Pope Leo says (*Ep.* cxx., *ad Theodoret.* Cf. XVI., Q. I., cap. *Adjicimus*): *Let none dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or layman, and no matter what knowledge he may boast of having.* Now it is not lawful to exceed the bounds of one's office or transgress the ordinance of the Church.

Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like.

Obj. 2. Further, In an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI., Q. I., cap. *Placuit*) it is laid down as follows: *It is our absolute and peremptory command addressed to all, that monks shall not hear confessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not bury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit.* But just as the above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and teaching. Therefore since *the business of a monk differs from that of a cleric*, as Jerome says (*Ep. i., ad Heliod.*), it would seem unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and the like.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Regist. iv. 1*): *No man can fulfil ecclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic rule:* and this is quoted XVI., Q. I., cap. 2. Now monks are bound to keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem that they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching and preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them to preach, teach, and do similar things.

On the contrary, Gregory is quoted (XVI., Q. I., cap. 24) as saying: *By authority of this decree framed in virtue of our apostolic power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to monk priests who are configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from sin.*

I answer that, A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in two ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that which is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to sin, because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to God's law, to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is said to be unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things, because there is in him something incompatible with these things, either by reason of a precept,—thus those who are irregular by ordinance of the Church may not be raised to the sacred orders—or by reason of sin, according to

Ps. xlix. 16, *But to the sinner God hath said: Why dost thou declare My justice?* In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do like things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by precept of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they are not rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but on the contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon themselves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a man is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through advancing himself in holiness; and consequently it is a foolish opinion of those who declare that the religious state is an obstacle to the fulfilment of suchlike duties. The opinion of these persons is confuted by Pope Boniface IV. by the reasons given above. His words which are quoted (XVI., Q. I., cap. 25) are these: *There are some who without any dogmatic proof, and with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of bitterness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead to the world and live to God, are unworthy of the power of the priestly office, and that they cannot confer penance, nor christen, nor absolve in virtue of the power divinely bestowed on them in the priestly office. But they are altogether deceived.* He proves this first because it is not contrary to the rule; thus he continues: *For neither did the Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid this in any way, nor is it forbidden in other rules.* Secondly, he refutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks, when he adds at the end of the same chapter: *The more perfect a man is, the more effective is he in these, namely in spiritual works.*

Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on account of there being in him something contrary thereto, but because he lacks that which enables him to do it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to say mass, because he is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful for a priest to deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal authority. Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those things which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who has not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can

be deputed to those who have not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a judgment is deputed by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense it is said to be unlawful for monks and other religious to preach, teach, and so forth, because the religious state does not give them the power to do these things. They can, however, do them if they receive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters of jurisdiction be delegated to them.

Reply Obj. 1. It results from the words quoted that the fact of their being monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet it does not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of these acts.

Reply Obj. 2. Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea forbids monks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground of their being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated to them.

Reply Obj. 3. These two things are incompatible, namely, the ordinary cure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the monastic rule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other religious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties through being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure; especially members of religious orders that are especially instituted for that purpose, as we shall say further on (Q. CLXXXVIII., A. 4).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO OCCUPY
THEMSELVES WITH SECULAR BUSINESS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business. For in the afore-said decree of Pope Boniface IV. it is said (XVI., Q. I., cap. *Sunt nonnulli*) that the *Blessed Benedict bade them to be altogether free from secular business ; and this is most explicitly prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of all the Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical clergy, according to 2 Tim. ii. 4, No man being a soldier to*

God, entangleth himself with secular business. Now it is the duty of all religious to be soldiers to God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to occupy themselves with secular business.

Obj. 2. Further, The Apostle says (1 Thess. iv. 11): *That you use your endeavour to be quiet, and that you do your own business, which a gloss explains thus,—by refraining from other people's affairs, so as to be the better able to attend to the amendment of your own life.* Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the amendment of their life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves with secular business.

Obj. 3. Further, Jerome, commenting on Matth. xi. 8, *Behold they that are clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings, says: Hence we gather that an austere life and severe preaching should avoid the palaces of kings and the mansions of the voluptuous.* But the needs of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of kings. Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. xvi. 1): *I commend to you Phæbe our sister, and further on (verse 2), that you assist her in whatsoever business she shall have need of you.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXXVI., AA. 1, 7), the religious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of charity, consisting principally in the love of God and secondarily in the love of our neighbour. Consequently that which religious intend chiefly and for its own sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if their neighbour be in need, they should attend to his affairs out of charity, according to Gal. vi. 2, *Bear ye one another's burthens: and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,* since through serving their neighbour for God's sake, they are obedient to the divine love. Hence it is written (Jas. i. 27): *Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation,* which means, according to a gloss, *to assist the helpless in their time of*

need. We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for both monks and clerics to carry on secular business from motives of avarice; but from motives of charity, and with their superior's permission, they may occupy themselves with due moderation in the administration and direction of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii., cap. 1): *The holy synod decrees that henceforth no cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless, orphans, or widows, or when the bishop of the city commands him to take charge of the business connected with the Church.* And the same applies to religious as to clerics, because they are both debarred from secular business on the same grounds, as stated in the *Article*.

Reply Obj. 1. Monks are forbidden to occupy themselves with secular business from motives of avarice, but not from motives of charity.

Reply Obj. 2. To occupy oneself with secular business on account of another's need is not officiousness but charity.

Reply Obj. 3. To haunt the palaces of kings from motives of pleasure, glory, or avarice is not becoming to religious, but there is nothing unseemly in their visiting them from motives of piety. Hence it is written (4 Kings iv. 13): *Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that I speak to the king or to the general of the army?* Likewise it becomes religious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them, even as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Matth. xiv. 4.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGIOUS ARE BOUND TO MANUAL LABOUR ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that religious are bound to manual labour. For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now manual labour is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. iv. 11, *Work with your own hands as we commanded you ;* wherefore Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 30): *But who can allow these insolent men,*

namely religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, *who disregard the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely to be borne with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as though they were holier than others.* Therefore it would seem that religious are bound to manual labour.

Obj. 2. Further, A gloss* on 2 Thess. iii. 10, *If any man will not work, neither let him eat,* says: *Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual works, and not to the bodily labour of the farmer or craftsman; and further on: But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves and from others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfil, but even to understand the useful admonishments of charity; and again: He wishes God's servants to employ themselves in corporal works that they may gain a livelihood.* Now religious especially are called servants of God, because they give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius asserts (*Eccl. Hier. vi.*). Therefore it would seem that they are bound to manual labour.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach. 17*): *I would fain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work with their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms, reading, and the word of God.* Yet these things are no excuse, and he proves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place, as to prayer, he says: *One prayer of the obedient man is sooner granted than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous:* meaning that those are contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with their hands. Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: *Even while working with their hands they can easily sing hymns to God.* Thirdly, with regard to reading, he goes on to say: *Those who say they are occupied in reading, do they not find there what the Apostle commanded? What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not to obey what one reads?* Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching (*cap. 18*): *If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot spare time for manual work, can all in the monastery*

* S. Augustine (*De Oper. Monach. 21*).

do this? And since all cannot do this, why should all make this a pretext for being exempt? And even if all were able, they should do so by turns, not only so that the others may be occupied in other works, but also because it suffices that one speak while many listen. Therefore it would seem that religious should not desist from manual labour on account of suchlike spiritual works to which they devote themselves.

Obj. 4. Further, A gloss on Luke xii. 33, *Sell what you possess, says: Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you possess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for the Lord's sake, you may henceforth work with the labour of your hands, so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms.* Now it belongs properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it would seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through the labour of their hands.

Obj. 5. Further, Religious especially would seem to be bound to imitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of perfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according to 1 Cor. iv. 12: *We labour, working with our own hands.* Therefore it would seem that religious are bound to manual labour.

On the contrary, Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all are equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of manual labour is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess. iii. 6, *Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly,* etc. (for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1 Cor. vii. 12, *If any brother have a wife that believeth not*). Now it is written in the same passage (2 Thess. iii. 10): *If any man will not work, neither let him eat.* Therefore religious are not bound to manual labour any more than seculars are.

I answer that, Manual labour is directed to four things. First and principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man (Gen. iii. 19): *In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread,* and it is written (Ps. cxxxii. 2): *For thou shalt eat the labours of thy hands.* Secondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many evils; hence

it is written (Eccclus. xxxiii. 28, 29): *Send thy slave to work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil.* Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as it is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor. vi. 5, 6): *In labours, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity.* Fourthly, it is directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph. iv. 28): *He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labour, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have something to give to him that suffereth need.* Accordingly, in so far as manual labour is directed to obtaining food, it comes under a necessity of precept in so far as it is necessary for that end: since that which is directed to an end derives its necessity from that end, being, in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be obtained without it. Consequently he who has no other means of livelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his condition may be. This is signified by the words of the Apostle: *If any man will not work, neither let him eat,* as though to say: 'The necessity of manual labour is the necessity of meat.' So that if one could live without eating, one would not be bound to work with one's hands. The same applies to those who have no other lawful means of livelihood: since a man is understood to be unable to do what he cannot do lawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle prescribed manual labour merely as a remedy for the sin of those who gained their livelihood by unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labour first of all in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. iv. 28, *He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labour, working with his hands.* Secondly, to avoid the coveting of others' property, wherefore it is written (1 Thess. iv. 11): *Work with your own hands, as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are without.* Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pursuits whereby some seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess. iii. 10-12): *When we were with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work, neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among*

you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling (namely, as a gloss explains it, who make a living by meddling in unlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them . . . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread. Hence Jerome states in the preface to the second book of his commentary on the epistle to the Galatians that the Apostle said this *not so much in his capacity of teacher as on account of the faults of the people.*

It must, however, be observed that under manual labour are comprised all those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a livelihood, whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For watchmen, couriers, and such-like who live by their labour, are understood to live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is the organ of organs, handiwork denotes all kinds of work, whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood.

In so far as manual labour is directed to the removal of idleness, or the affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of precept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means besides manual labour of afflicting the body or of removing idleness: for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is removed by meditation on the holy scriptures and by the divine praises. Hence a gloss on Ps. cxviii. 82, *My eyes have failed for Thy word*, says: *He is not idle who meditates only on God's word; nor is he who works abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the study of knowing the truth.* Consequently for these reasons religious are not bound to manual labour, as neither are seculars, except when they are so bound by the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says (*Ep. iv. ad Rustic. Monach.*): *The Egyptian monasteries are wont to admit none unless they work or labour, not so much for the necessities of life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by wicked thoughts.* But in so far as manual labour is directed to almsgiving, it does not come under the necessity of precept, save perchance in some particular case, when a man is under an obligation to give alms, and has

no other means of having the wherewithal to assist the poor: for in such a case religious would be bound as well as seculars to do manual labour.

Reply Obj. 1. This command of the Apostle is of natural law: wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. iii. 6, *That you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly*, says, *otherwise than the natural order requires*, and he is speaking of those who abstained from manual labour. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of arms and clothes with which she has provided other animals, in order that with his hands he may obtain these and other necessaries. Hence it is clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the natural law, is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not everyone sins that works not with his hands, because those precepts of the natural law which regard the good of the many are not binding on each individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to this business and another to that; for instance, that some be craftsmen, others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and so forth, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. xii. 17), *If the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole were the hearing, where would be the smelling?*

Reply Obj. 2. This gloss is taken from Augustine's book, *De Operibus Monachorum*, cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who declared it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their hands, on account of our Lord's saying (Matth. vi. 25): *Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat*. Nevertheless his words do not imply that religious are bound to work with their hands, if they have other means of livelihood. This is clear from his adding: *He wishes the servants of God to work with their bodies for their livelihood*. Now this does not apply to religious any more than to seculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on account of the way in which the Apostle expresses himself, by saying: *That you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly*. For he calls all Christians brothers, since at that time religious orders were not as yet

founded. Secondly, because religious have no other obligations than what seculars have, except as required by the rule they profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing about manual labour, religious are not otherwise bound to manual labour than seculars are.

Reply Obj. 3. A man may devote himself in two ways to all the spiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one way with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his private advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly to the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labour for two reasons: first, because it behoves them to be occupied exclusively with suchlike works; secondly, because those who devote themselves to such works have a claim to be supported by those for whose advantage they work. On the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not publicly but privately as it were, ought not on that account to be exempt from manual labour, nor have they a claim to be supported by the offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is speaking. For when he says: *They can sing divine hymns even while working with their hands, like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable telling without withdrawing their hands from their work*, it is clear that he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the church, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers. Likewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the private prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not to those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public lectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: *Those who say they are occupied in teaching and instructing*, but: *Those who say they are occupied in reading*. Again he speaks of that preaching which is addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in particular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly: *If one has to speak*. For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. ii. 4, *Speech is addressed privately, preaching to many*.

Reply Obj. 4. Those who despise all for God's sake are

bound to work with their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or of almsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the *Article*. It is in this sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood.

Reply Obj. 5. That the apostles worked with their hands was sometimes a matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It was of necessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. iv. 12, *We labour, working with our own hands*, adds, *because no man giveth to us*. It was of supererogation, as appears from 1 Cor. ix. 12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power he had of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this supererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the false apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely for a temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor. xi. 12): *But what I do, that I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them*, etc. Secondly, in order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached; hence he says (2 Cor. xii. 13): *What is there that you have had less than the other churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to you?* Thirdly, in order to give an example of work to the idle; hence he says (2 Thess. iii. 8, 9): *We worked night and day . . . that we might give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us*. However, the Apostle did not do this in those places like Athens where he had facilities for preaching daily, as Augustine observes (*De Oper. Monach.* 18). Yet religious are not for this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in this matter, since they are not bound to all works of supererogation: wherefore neither did the other apostles work with their hands.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO LIVE ON ALMS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms. For the Apostle (1 Tim. v. 16) forbids those

widows who have other means of livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the Church may have *sufficient for them that are widows indeed*. And Jerome says to Pope Damasus* that *those who have sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and drink judgment to themselves*. Now religious if they be able-bodied can support themselves by the work of their hands. Therefore it would seem that they sin if they consume the alms belonging to the poor.

Obj. 2. Further, To live at the expense of the faithful is the stipend appointed to those who preach the Gospel in payment of their labour or work, according to Matth. x. 10: *The workman is worthy of his meat*. Now it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but chiefly to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore religious cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful.

Obj. 3. Further, Religious are in the state of perfection. But it is more perfect to give than to receive alms; for it is written (Acts xx. 35): *It is a more blessed thing to give, rather than to receive*. Therefore they should not live on alms, but rather should they give alms of their handiwork.

Obj. 4. Further, It belongs to religious to avoid obstacles to virtue and occasions of sin. Now the receiving of alms offers an occasion of sin, and hinders an act of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. iii. 9, *That we might give ourselves a pattern unto you*, says: *He who through idleness eats often at another's table, must needs flatter the one who feeds him*. It is also written (Exod. xxiii. 8): *Neither shalt thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just*, and (Prov. xxii. 7): *The borrower is servant to him that lendeth*. This is contrary to religion, wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. iii. 9, *That we might give ourselves a pattern*, etc., says, *Our religion calls men to liberty*. Therefore it would seem that religious should not live on alms.

Obj. 5. Further, Religious especially are bound to imitate

* Cf. Q. CLXXXV., A. 7, *Obj. 3*, footnote.

the perfection of the apostles; wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. iii. 15): *Let us . . . as many as are perfect, be thus minded.* But the Apostle was unwilling to live at the expense of the faithful, either in order to cut off the occasion from the false apostles as he himself says (2 Cor. xi. 12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak, as appears from 1 Cor. ix. 12. It would seem therefore that religious ought for the same reasons to refrain from living on alms. Hence Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 28): *Cut off the occasion of disgraceful marketing whereby you lower yourselves in the esteem of others, and give scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not an easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the narrow and strait way.*

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Dial.* ii. 1): *The Blessed Benedict after leaving his home and parents dwelt for three years in a cave, and while there lived on the food brought to him by a monk from Rome.* Nevertheless, although he was able-bodied, we do not read that he sought to live by the labour of his hands. Therefore religious may lawfully live on alms.

I answer that, A man may lawfully live on what is his or due to him. Now that which is given out of liberality becomes the property of the person to whom it is given. Wherefore religious and clerics whose monasteries or churches have received from the munificence of princes or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for their support, can lawfully live on such endowment without working with their hands, and yet without doubt they live on alms. Wherefore in like manner if religious receive movable goods from the faithful they can lawfully live on them. For it is absurd to say that a person may accept an alms of some great property but not bread or some small sum of money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem to be bestowed on religious in order that they may have more leisure for religious works, in which the donors of temporal goods wish to have a share, the use of such gifts would become unlawful for them if they abstained from religious works, because in that case, so far as they are concerned, they

would be thwarting the intention of those who bestowed those gifts.

A thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on account of necessity, which makes all things common, as Ambrose asserts (cf. *Serm. de Temp.* lxiv.). Consequently if religious be in need they can lawfully live on alms. Such necessity may occur in three ways. First, through weakness of body, the result being that they are unable to make a living by working with their hands. Secondly, because that which they gain by their handiwork is insufficient for their livelihood: wherefore Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 17) that *the good works of the faithful should not leave God's servants who work with their hands without a supply of necessaries, that when the hour comes for them to nourish their souls, so as to make it impossible for them to do these corporal works, they be not oppressed by want.* Thirdly, because of the former mode of life of those who were unwont to work with their hands: wherefore Augustine says that *if they had in the world the wherewithal easily to support this life without working, and gave it to the needy when they were converted to God, we must credit their weakness and bear with it.* For those who have thus been delicately brought up are wont to be unable to bear the toil of bodily labour.

In another way a thing becomes due to a person through his affording others something whether temporal or spiritual, according to 1 Cor. ix. 11, *If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?* And in this sense religious may live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if they preach by the authority of the prelates. Secondly, if they be ministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. ix. 13, 14, *They that serve the altar partake with the altar. So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.* Hence Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 21): *If they be gospellers, I allow, they have a claim to live at the charge of the faithful: if they be ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments, this claim is no pretence but theirs by perfect right.* The reason for this is because the sacrifice of the altar wherever it be

offered is common to all the faithful. Thirdly, if they devote themselves to the study of Holy Writ to the common profit of the whole Church. Wherefore Jerome says (*Contra Vigil.* v.): *It is still the custom in Judea, not only among us but also among the Hebrews, for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and night, and have no other share on earth but God alone, to be supported by the subscriptions of the synagogues and of the whole world.* Fourthly, if they have endowed the monastery with the goods they possessed, they may live on the alms given to the monastery. Hence Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 25) that *those who renouncing or distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount whatever, have desired with pious and salutary humility to be numbered among the poor of Christ, have a claim on the community and on brotherly love to receive a livelihood in return. They are to be commended indeed if they work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who will dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to say, to which monasteries, or in what place any one of them has bestowed his goods on his needy brethren; for all Christians belong to one commonwealth.*

On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or of their affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish to live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Hence Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 22): *Sometimes those who enter the profession of God's service come from a servile condition of life, from tilling the soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation. In their case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose of serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with a view to being fed and clothed in idleness, and furthermore to being honoured by those by whom they were wont to be despised and downtrodden. Such persons surely cannot excuse themselves from work on the score of bodily weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against them. And he adds further on (25): If they be unwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if the rich humble themselves to piety, it is not that the poor may be exalted to pride; since it is altogether unseemly that in a life wherein*

senators become labourers, labourers should become idle, and that where the lords of the manor have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs should live in comfort.

Reply Obj. 1. These authorities must be understood as referring to cases of necessity, that is to say, when there is no other means of succouring the poor: for then they would be bound not only to refrain from accepting alms, but also to give what they have for the support of the needy.

Reply Obj. 2. Prelates are competent to preach in virtue of their office, but religious may be competent to do so in virtue of delegation; and thus when they work in the field of the Lord, they may make their living thereby, according to 2 Tim. ii. 6, *The husbandman that laboureth must first partake of the fruits*, which a gloss explains thus, *that is to say, the preacher, who in the field of the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough of God's word.* Those also who minister to the preachers may live by the gospel. Hence a gloss on Rom. xv. 27, *If the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things, they ought also in carnal things to minister to them*, says, *namely, to the Jews who sent preachers from Jerusalem.* There are moreover other reasons for which a person has a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as stated in the *Article*.

Reply Obj. 3. Other things being equal, it is more perfect to give than to receive. Nevertheless to give or to give up all one's possessions for Christ's sake, and to receive a little for one's livelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part, as stated above (Q. CLXXXVI., A. 3, *ad* 6).

Reply Obj. 4. To receive gifts so as to increase one's wealth, or to accept a livelihood from another without having a claim to it, and without profit to others or being in need oneself, affords an occasion of sin. But this does not apply to religious, as stated above in the *Article*.

Reply Obj. 5. Whenever there is evident necessity for religious living on alms without doing any manual work, as well as an evident profit to be derived by others, it is not the weak who are scandalized, but those who are full of malice like the Pharisees, whose scandal our Lord teaches us to

despise (Matth. xv. 12-14). If, however, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak might possibly be scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided. Yet the same scandal might be occasioned through those who live in idleness on the common revenues.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO BEG ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems unlawful for religious to beg. For Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 28): *The most cunning foe has scattered on all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the monastic habit, who go wandering about the country, and afterwards he adds: They all ask, they all demand to be supported in their profitable penury, or to be paid for a pretended holiness.* Therefore it would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be condemned.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (1 Thess. iv. 11): *That you . . . work with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of any man's:* and a gloss on this passage says: *You must work and not be idle, because work is both honourable and a light to the unbeliever: and you must not covet that which belongs to another, and much less beg or take anything.* Again a gloss* on 2 Thess. iii. 10, *If any man will not work, etc.,* says: *He wishes the servants of God to work with the body, so as to gain a livelihood, and not be compelled by want to ask for necessaries.* Now this is to beg. Therefore it would seem unlawful to beg while omitting to work with one's hands.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is forbidden by law and contrary to justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the divine law; for it is written (Deut. xv. 4): *There shall be no poor nor beggar among you,* and (Ps. xxxvi. 25): *I have not seen the just forsaken, nor his seed seeking bread.* Moreover an able-bodied mendicant

* S. Augustine (*De Oper. Monach.* 3).

is punished by civil law, according to the law *Of able-bodied mendicants*. Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg.

Obj. 4. Further, *Shame is about an uncomely action*, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 15). Now Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 30) that *to be ashamed to ask is a sign of good birth*. Therefore it is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to religious.

Obj. 5. Further, According to our Lord's command it is especially becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above (A. 4). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a gloss on 2 Tim. ii. 6, *The husbandman, that laboureth*, etc., says: *The Apostle wishes the gospeller to understand that to accept necessities from those among whom he labours is not mendicancy but a right*. Therefore it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg.

On the contrary, It becomes religious to live in imitation of Christ. Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. xxxix. 18, *But I am a beggar and poor*; where a gloss says: *Christ said this of Himself as bearing the 'form of a servant,' and further on: A beggar is one who entreats another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for himself*. Again it is written (Ps. lxxix. 6): *I am needy and poor*; where a gloss says: *'Needy,' that is a suppliant; 'and poor,' that is, not having enough for myself, because I have no worldly wealth*. And Jerome says in a letter: *Beware lest whereas thy Lord, i.e. Christ, begged, thou amass other people's wealth*. Therefore it becomes religious to beg.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in reference to mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act itself of begging, which has a certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those would seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have to receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in other ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which they desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their example. For just as a disease that arises from excessive heat is most efficaciously healed by things that

excel in cold, so proneness to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which savour most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretal on Penance (D. II., cap. *Si quis semel*): *To condescend to the humblest duties, and to devote oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of humility; for thus one is able to heal the disease of pride and human glory.* Hence Jerome praises Fabiola (*Ep. ad Ocean.*) for that she desired to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth for Christ's sake. The Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having renounced all his possessions for Christ's sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from his own servants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the Lives of the Fathers (v. 6) that he gave thanks because he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humility like the other virtues should not be without discretion, it behoves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur the mark of covetousness or of anything else unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part of that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to have wealth or meat without working for it, and suchlike mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if a man has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish something useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a bridge, or church, or for any other work whatever that is conducive to the common good: thus scholars may seek alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wisdom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less than to seculars.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those who beg from motives of covetousness.

Reply Obj. 2. The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of covetousness, as appears from the words of the

Apostle; while the second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful purpose, beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. On the other hand, he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.

Reply Obj. 3. This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of necessity.

Reply Obj. 4. Uncomeliness is twofold; one arises from lack of honesty,* the other from an external defect: thus it is uncomely for a man to be sick or poor. Suchlike uncomeliness of mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain to humility, as stated in the *Article*.

Reply Obj. 5. Preachers have the right to be fed by those to whom they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of greater humility.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO WEAR
COARSER CLOTHES THAN OTHERS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. v. 22) we ought to *refrain from all appearance of evil*. Now coarseness of clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Matth. vii. 15): *Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep: and a gloss on Apoc. vi. 8, Behold a pale horse, says: The devil finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the guise of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red horses by corrupting the faith.* Therefore it would seem that religious should not wear coarse clothes.

Obj. 2. Further, Jerome says to Nepotian: *Avoid sombre,*

* Cf. Q. CXLV., A. 1.

i.e. black, *equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse clothes are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other vainglory.* Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the use of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should tend to perfection ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes.

Obj. 3. Further, Religious should aim especially at doing works of penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Matth. vi. 16): *When you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad, and afterwards He added: But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy face.* Augustine commenting on these words (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, ii. 12): *In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and pomp of outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God's service.* Therefore seemingly religious ought not to wear coarse clothes.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. xi. 37): *They wandered about in sheep-skins, in goat-skins, and a gloss adds,—as Elias and others.* Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI., Q. IV., cap. *Omnis jactantia*: *If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse and religious apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times all those who were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse apparel.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* iii. 12), *in all external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user that is at fault.* In order to judge of this it is necessary to observe that coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways. First, as being a sign of a man's disposition or condition, because according to Ecclus. xix. 27, *the attire . . . of the man shows what he is.* In this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of sorrow: wherefore those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear coarser clothes, just as on the other hand in times of festivity and joy they wear finer clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse apparel, for example, the king (Jonas iii. 6) who *was*

clothed with sack-cloth, and Achab (3 Kings xxi. 27) who *put hair-cloth upon his flesh*.

Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the contempt of riches and worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome says to the monk Rusticus: *Let your sombre attire indicate your purity of mind, your coarse robe prove your contempt of the world, yet so that your mind be not inflated withal, lest your speech belie your habit*. In both these ways it is becoming for religious to wear coarse attire, since religion is a state of penance and of contempt of worldly glory.

But that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three motives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind is uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence speaking of Achab who *put hair-cloth on his flesh*, the Lord said to Elias: *Hast thou seen Achab humbled before Me?* (3 Kings xxi. 29). Secondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on Matth. iii. 4 (*John*) *had his garments of camel's hair*, says: *He who preaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance*. Thirdly, on account of vainglory; thus Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, ii. 12) that *even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation*.

Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble apparel, but in the third way it is sinful.

Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful.

Reply Obj. 1. Coarseness of attire has not of itself the appearance of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely of the contempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide their wickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, ii. 24) that *the sheep should not dislike their clothing for the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it*.

Reply Obj. 2. Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire that is worn on account of human glory.

Reply Obj. 3. According to our Lord's teaching men should do no deeds of holiness for the sake of show: and this

is especially the case when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom* says: *While praying a man should do nothing strange, so as to draw the gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his breast, or casting up his hands, because the very strangeness draws people's attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to all strange behaviour that draws people's attention, for it may be done well or ill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte, ii. 12) that in the practice of the Christian religion when a man draws attention to himself by unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus voluntarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other deeds whether his behaviour is motivated by contempt of excessive dress or by affectation. Religious, however, would especially seem not to act thus from affectation, since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of their profession whereby they profess contempt of the world.*

* *Hom. xiii. in Matth.*, in the *Opus Imperfectum*, falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

QUESTION CLXXXVIII.

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one? (2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the active life? (3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering? (4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and the exercise of like works? (5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of science? (6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life? (7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common? (8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to the religious life of those who live in community?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE RELIGIOUS ORDER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one religious order. For there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated in the First Part (Q. VI., AA. 2, 3, 4). Now as Gregory says (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*), *when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust, without which there is no religious life.* Therefore it would seem that there are not many religious orders but only one.

Obj. 2. Further, Things which agree in essentials differ only accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three essential vows of religion, as stated above (Q. CLXXXVI., AA. 6, 7). Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not specifically, but only accidentally.

Obj. 3. Further, The state of perfection is competent both to religious and to bishops, as stated above (Q. CLXXXV., AA. 5, 7). Now the episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it may be; wherefore Jerome says to Bishop Evagrius: *Wherever a bishop is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio, he has the same excellence, the same priesthood.* Therefore in like manner there is but one religious order.

Obj. 4. Further, Anything that may lead to confusion should be removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as a Decretal states (Cap. *Ne Nimia* : de Relig. Dom.). Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious orders.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xliv. 10) that it pertains to the adornment of the queen that she is *surrounded with variety.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXXVI., A. 7; Q. CLXXXVII., A. 2), the religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two ways. First, according to the different things to which they may be directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, another to visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be various religious orders according to the diversity of practices; thus in one religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in food, in another by the practice of manual labour, scantiness of clothes, or the like.

Since, however, the end imports most in every matter,

religious orders differ more especially according to their various ends than according to their various practices.

Reply Obj. 1. The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God's service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things wherein one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to the service of God.

Reply Obj. 2. The three essential vows of religion pertain to the practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are reduced, as stated above (Q. CLXXXVI., A. 7). But there are various ways of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by solitude of place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many like means. Accordingly it is evident that the community of the essential vows is compatible with diversity of religious life, both on account of the different dispositions and on account of the different ends, as explained above in this *Article* and Q. CLXXXVI., A. 7, *ad 2.*

Reply Obj. 3. In matters relating to perfection, the bishop stands in the position of agent, and the religious as passive, as stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 7). Now the agent, even in natural things, the higher it is, is so much the more one, whereas the things that are passive are various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one, while religious orders are many.

Reply Obj. 4. Confusion is opposed to distinction and order. Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to confusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same end and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED
FOR THE WORKS OF THE ACTIVE LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no religious order should be established for the works of the active life. For every religious order belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 5). Now the perfection of the religious state consists in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says (*Eccles. Hier.* vi.) that they are called servants of God by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy reflections, i.e. contemplations, on invisible things, to the Godlike unity and the perfection beloved of God. Therefore seemingly no religious order should be established for the works of the active life.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly the same judgment applies to canons regular as to monks, according to Extrav. *De Postul.*, cap. *Ex parte*, and *De Statu monach.*, cap. *Quod Dei timorem*: for it is stated that they are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks: and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now the monastic rule was established for the purpose of the contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says to Paulinus (*Ep.* xiii.): *If you wish to be what you are called, a monk, i.e. a solitary, what business have you in a city?* The same is found stated in Extrav. *De Renuntiatione*, cap. *Nisi cum pridem*, and *De Regular.*, cap. *Licet quibusdam*. Therefore it would seem that every religious order is directed to the contemplative life, and none to the active life.

Obj. 3. Further, The active life is concerned with the present world. Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore Gregory says (*Hom.* xx. *in Ezech.*): *He who renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the*

wilderness. Therefore it would seem that no religious order can be directed to the active life.

On the contrary, It is written (James i. 27): *Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation.* Now this belongs to the active life. Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the active life.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the religious state is directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of God and of our neighbour. Now the contemplative life which seeks to devote itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while the active life, which ministers to our neighbour's needs, belongs directly to the love of one's neighbour. And just as out of charity we love our neighbour for God's sake, so the services we render our neighbour redound to God, according to Matth. xxv. 40, *What you have done (Vulg.,—As long as you did it) to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me.* Consequently those services which we render our neighbour, in so far as we refer them to God, are described as sacrifices, according to Heb. xiii. 16, *Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favour is obtained.* And since it belongs properly to religion to offer sacrifice to God, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1, *ad* 1; A. 4, *ad* 1), it follows that certain religious orders are fittingly directed to the works of the active life. Wherefore in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. xiv. 4) the Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious orders says: *Some direct their intention exclusively to the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied with the instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries; while others delight in the service of the guest-house, i.e. in hospitality.*

Reply Obj. 1. Service and subjection rendered to God are not precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his neighbour for God's sake, as stated in the *Article.* Nor do these works preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man's living apart from his fellowmen, but in the sense that each man individually devotes

himself to things pertaining to the service of God; and since religious occupy themselves with the works of the active life for God's sake, it follows that their action results from their contemplation of divine things. Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the contemplative life.

Reply Obj. 2. The same judgment applies to monks and to all other religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and their refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that this likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life. Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, *De Postulando*, it is not simply stated that the same judgment applies to canons regular as to monks, but that it applies in matters already mentioned, namely that *they are not to act as advocates in lawsuits*. Again the Decretal quoted, referring to the monastic state, after the statement that *canons regular are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks*, goes on to say: *Nevertheless they obey an easier rule*. Hence it is evident that they are not bound to all that monks are bound.

Reply Obj. 3. A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way by his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. xv. 19): *I have chosen you out of the world*, and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (*ibid.* xvii. 11): *These are in the world, and I come to Thee*. Although, then, religious who are occupied with the works of the active life are in the world as to the presence of the body, they are not in the world as regards their bent of mind, because they are occupied with external things, not as seeking anything of the world, but merely for the sake of serving God: for *they . . . use this world, as if they used it not*, to quote 1 Cor. vii. 31. Hence (James i. 27) after it is stated that *religion clean and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the*

fatherless and widows in their tribulation, it is added, and to keep one's self unspotted from this world, namely to avoid being attached to worldly things.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER CAN BE DIRECTED TO
SOLDIERING ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no religious order can be directed to soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of perfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of Christian life (Matth. v. 39): *I say to you not to resist evil ; but if one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other*, which is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order can be established for soldiering.

Obj. 2. Further, The bodily encounter of the battlefield is more grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from the Decretal *De Postulando* quoted above (A. 2, *Obj. 2*). Therefore it is much less seemly for a religious order to be established for soldiering.

Obj. 3. Further, The religious state is a state of penance, as we have said above (Q. CLXXXVII., A. 6). Now according to the code of laws soldiering is forbidden to penitents; for it is said in the Decretal *De Pœnit.*, Dist. v., cap. 3: *It is altogether opposed to the rules of the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance.* Therefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established for soldiering.

Obj. 4. Further, No religious order may be established for an unjust object. But as Isidore says (*Etym.* xviii.), *A just war is one that is waged by order of the emperor.* Since then religious are private individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.

On the contrary, Augustine says to Boniface (Ep. clxxxix.):

Beware of thinking that none of those can please God who handle warlike weapons. Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony. Now religious orders are established in order that men may please God. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering.

*I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), a religious order may be established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but also for the works of the active life, in so far as they are concerned in helping our neighbour and in the service of God, but not in so far as they are directed to a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering may be directed to the assistance of our neighbour, not only as regards private individuals, but also as regards the defence of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas Machabeus (1 Mach. iii. 2, 3) that *he* (Vulg.—*they*) *fought with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his people great honour.* It can also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship, wherefore (*ibid.* 21) Judas is stated to have said: *We will fight for our lives and our laws,* and further on (xiii. 3) Simon said: *You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the house of my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary.**

Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering, not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defence of divine worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed, according to Ps. lxxxi. 4: *Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner.*

Reply Obj. 1. Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus it may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for the spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i. 27): *The courage whereby a man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against robbers is*

full of justice : even as our Lord says in the passage quoted,* . . . *thy goods, ask them not again*. If, however, a man were not to demand the return of that which belongs to another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not another's property. And much less should the things of God be neglected, for as Chrysostom† says, *it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done to God*.

Reply Obj. 2. It is inconsistent with any religious order to act as counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent to do so at the orders of one's superior and in favour of one's monastery, as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defence of the poor and widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii., cap. 1): *The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless . . . and widows*. Likewise to be a soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for the sake of God's service.

Reply Obj. 3. Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is enjoined to take arms in defence of the Holy Land.

Reply Obj. 4. The establishment of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the sovereign or of the Church.

* Luke vi. 30: *Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again*. Cf. Matth. v. 40.

† *Hom. v. in Matth.* in the *Opus Imperfectum*, falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER CAN BE ESTABLISHED FOR
PREACHING OR HEARING CONFESSIONS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that no religious order may be established for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII., Q. I., cap. *Hoc nequaquam*): *The monastic life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care*, and the same apparently applies to religious. Now preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for this purpose.

Obj. 2. Further, The purpose for which a religious order is established would seem to be something most proper to the religious life, as stated above (AA. 2, 3). Now the aforesaid actions are not proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the purpose of such actions.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems unfitting that the authority to preach and hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men; and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a religious order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to be established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.

Obj. 4. Further, Preachers have a right to receive their livelihood from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. ix. If then the office of preaching be committed to a religious order established for that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the exercise of these actions.

Obj. 5. Further, The organization of the Church should be in accordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the twelve apostles to preach, as related in Luke ix., and afterwards He sent the seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke x. Moreover, according to the gloss of

Bede on *And after these things* (Luke x. 1), *the apostles are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two disciples by the lesser priests, i.e. the parish priests.* Therefore in addition to bishops and parish priests, no religious order should be established for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions.

On the contrary, In the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. xiv., 4) Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders, says: *Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves to the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves to teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly esteemed on account of their devotion and piety.* Therefore just as a religious order may be established for the care of the sick, so also may one be established for teaching the people by preaching and like works.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), it is fitting for a religious order to be established for the works of the active life, in so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbour, the service of God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our neighbour is advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of the soul rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily needs, in proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal things. Hence it was stated above (Q. XXXII., A. 3) that spiritual works of mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more pertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more acceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says (*Hom. xii. in Ezech.*). Furthermore, it is a greater thing to employ spiritual arms in defending the faithful against the errors of heretics and the temptations of the devil, than to protect the faithful by means of bodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a religious order to be established for preaching and similar works pertaining to the salvation of souls.

Reply Obj. 1. He who works by virtue of another, acts as an instrument. And a minister is like an *animated instrument*, as the Philosopher says (*Polit. i. 3; Ethic. viii. 11*).

Hence if a man preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors, he does not rise above the degree of discipleship or subjection, which is competent to religious.

Reply Obj. 2. Some religious orders are established for soldiering, to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that of the sovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by virtue of their office, as stated above (A. 3, *ad* 4). In the same way certain religious orders are established for preaching and hearing confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority of the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by virtue of their office. Consequently to be subject to one's superiors in such a ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind.

Reply Obj. 3. Bishops do not allow these religious severally and indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to the discretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own appointment.

Reply Obj. 4. The faithful are not bound by law to contribute to the support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the tithes and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to the faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and without demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened thereby because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid by those men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by charity, and yet not so that they be burdened thereby and others eased, as stated in 2 Cor. viii. 13. If, however, none be found to devote themselves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary prelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek other suitable persons and support them himself.

Reply Obj. 5. The seventy-two disciples are represented not only by the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any way assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our Lord appointed the seventy-

two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but that *He sent them two and two before His face into every city and place whither He Himself was to come*. It was fitting, however, that in addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for these duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed to each locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious orders for military service, on account of the secular princes being unable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED
FOR THE PURPOSE OF STUDY ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that a religious order should not be established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. lxx. 15, 16): *Because I have not known letters (Douay,—learning), I will enter into the powers of the Lord, i.e. Christian virtue*, according to a gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue, seemingly, pertains especially to religious. Therefore it is not for them to apply themselves to the study of letters.

Obj. 2. Further, That which is a source of dissent is unbecoming to religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now study leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose among the philosophers. Hence Jerome in his commentary on the epistle to Titus i. 5, *and shouldst ordain . . . in every city*, says: *Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephass*, etc. Therefore it would seem that no religious order should be established for the purpose of study.

Obj. 3. Further, Those who profess the Christian religion should profess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles were some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons are known as professors

of certain sciences. Therefore the study of letters does not become religious.

On the contrary, Jerome in his letter to Paulinus urges him to acquire learning in the monastic state, saying: *Let us learn on earth those things the knowledge of which will remain in heaven*, and further on: *Whatever you seek to know, I will endeavour to know with you.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), religion may be ordained to the active and to the contemplative life. Now chief among the works of the active life are those which are directly ordained to the salvation of souls, such as preaching and the like. Accordingly the study of letters is becoming to religious in three ways. First, as regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to which the study of learning helps in a twofold manner. In one way by helping directly to contemplate, namely by enlightening the intellect. For the contemplative life of which we are now speaking is directed chiefly to the consideration of divine things, as stated above (Q. CLXXX., A. 4), to which consideration man is directed by study; for which reason it is said in praise of the righteous (Ps. i. 2) that *he shall meditate day and night on the law of the Lord*, and (Ecclus. xxxix. 1): *The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets.* In another way the study of letters is a help to the contemplative life indirectly, by removing the obstacles to contemplation, namely the errors which in the contemplation of divine things frequently beset those who are ignorant of the scriptures. Thus we read in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. x. 3) that the Abbot Serapion through simplicity fell into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who thought that God had a human shape. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* vi.) that *some through seeking in contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away into perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble disciples of truth become the masters of error.* Hence it is written (Eccles. ii. 3): *I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly.*

Secondly, the study of letters is necessary to religious institutions for preaching and other like works; wherefore the Apostle (Tit. i. 9), speaking of bishops to whose office these acts belong, says: *Embracing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.* Nor does it matter that the apostles were sent to preach without having studied letters, because, as Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus, *whatever others acquire by exercise and daily meditation in God's law, was taught them by the Holy Ghost.*

Thirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as regards that which is common to all religious orders. For it helps us to avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says to the monk Rusticus: *Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt have no love for carnal vice.* For it turns the mind away from lustful thoughts, and tames the flesh on account of the toil that study entails according to Ecclus. xxxi. 1, *Watching for riches* consumeth the flesh.* It also helps to remove the desire of riches, wherefore it is written (Wis. vii. 8): *I . . . esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her,* and (1 Mach. xii. 9): *We needed none of these things, namely assistance from without, having for our comfort the holy books that are in our hands.* It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 7): *What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read, but not to obey what one reads?* Hence it is clearly fitting that a religious order be established for the study of letters.

Reply Obj. 1. This commentary of the gloss is an exposition of the Old Law of which the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 6): *The letter killeth.* Hence not to know letters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the *letter* and other carnal observances.

Reply Obj. 2. Study is directed to knowledge which, without charity, *puffeth up*, and consequently leads to dissent, according to Prov. xiii. 10, *Among the proud there are always dissensions:* whereas, with charity, it *edifieth*

* *Vigilia honestatis.* S. Thomas would seem to have taken *honestas* in the sense of virtue.

and begets concord. Hence the Apostle after saying (1 Cor. i. 5): *You are made rich . . . in all utterance and in all knowledge*, adds (verse 10): *That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you*. But Jerome is not speaking here of the study of letters, but of the study of dissensions which heretics and schismatics have brought into the Christian religion.

Reply Obj. 3. The philosophers professed the study of letters in the matter of secular learning: whereas it becomes religious to devote themselves chiefly to the study of letters in reference to the doctrine that is *according to godliness* (Tit. i. 1). It becomes not religious, whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek for other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the sacred doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of his work *On Music*: *Whilst we think that we should not overlook those whom heretics delude by the deceitful assurance of reason and knowledge, we are slow to advance in the consideration of their methods. Yet we should not be praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of their most loving mother the Catholic Church had done the same under the necessity of confounding heretics.*

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER THAT IS DEVOTED TO THE
CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN ONE
THAT IS GIVEN TO THE ACTIVE LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a religious order which is devoted to the contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given to the active life. For it is said (Extrav. de Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III.: *Even as a greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit takes precedence of private profit ; and in this case teaching is rightly preferred to silence, responsibility to contemplation, work to rest.* Now the religious order which is directed to the greater good is better. Therefore it would seem that those religious orders that

are directed to the active life are more excellent than those which are directed to the contemplative life.

Obj. 2. Further, Every religious order is directed to the perfection of charity, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Now a gloss* on Heb. xii. 4, *For you have not yet resisted unto blood*, says: *In this life there is no more perfect love than that to which the holy martyrs attained, who fought against sin unto blood.* Now to fight unto blood is becoming those religious who are directed to military service, and yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it would seem that religious orders of this kind are the most excellent.

Obj. 3. Further, Seemingly the stricter a religious order is, the more excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious orders directed to the active life should not be of stricter observance than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore they are more excellent.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Luke x. 42) that the *best part* was Mary's, by whom the contemplative life is signified.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the difference between one religious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and secondarily on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be more excellent than another save in respect of that in which it differs therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious order over another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on their respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is considered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the end is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas the comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise is sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good or because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the same, the excellence of one religious order over another depends secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on

* S. Augustine (*Serm. xvii. de Verb. Apost.*).

the proportion of the exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. ii. 2) Blessed Antony is quoted as preferring discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, to fastings, watchings, and all such observances.

Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold. One proceeds from the fulness of contemplation, such as teaching and preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (*Hom. v. in Ezech.*) that the words of Ps. cxliv. 7, *They shall publish the memory of . . . Thy sweetness, refer to perfect men returning from their contemplation.* And this work is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to others the fruits of one's contemplation than merely to contemplate. The other work of the active life consists entirely in outward occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like, which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in cases of necessity, as stated above (Q. CLXXXII., A. 1). Accordingly the highest place in religious orders is held by those which are directed to teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the episcopal perfection, even as in other things *the end of that which is first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is second*, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom. vii.*). The second place belongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and the third to those which are occupied with external actions.

Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious order excels another through being directed to a higher action in the same genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to ransom captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the contemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel another if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or if it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view.

Reply Obj. 1. This Decretal refers to the active life as directed to the salvation of souls.

Reply Obj. 2. Those religious orders that are established for the purpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the enemy's blood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more properly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious of this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in certain cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious; even as in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of contemplation.

Reply Obj. 3. Strictness of observances, as the Blessed Antony remarks in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. ii. 2, 3, 4) is not the chief object of commendation in a religious order; and it is written (Isa. lviii. 5): *Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict his soul for a day?* Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as being necessary for taming the flesh, *which if done without discretion, is liable to make us fail altogether*, as the Blessed Antony observes. Wherefore a religious order is not more excellent through having stricter observances, but because its observances are directed by greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the taming of the flesh is more efficaciously directed to continence by means of abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and nakedness, or by bodily labour.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGIOUS PERFECTION IS DIMINISHED BY
POSSESSING SOMETHING IN COMMON?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common. For our Lord said (Matth. xix. 21): *If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all* (Vulg.,—*what*) *thou hast and give to the poor.* Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs to the perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something in common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that

they do not quite reach to the perfection of Christian life.

Obj. 2. Further, The perfection of the counsels requires that one should be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving the counsel of virginity said (I Cor. vii. 32): *I would have you to be without solicitude.* Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present life that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow; and this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Matth. vi. 34) saying: *Be not . . . solicitous for to-morrow.* Therefore it would seem that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by having something in common.

Obj. 3. Further, Possessions held in common belong in some way to each member of the community; wherefore Jerome (*Ep. iii., ad Heliod.*) says in reference to certain people: *They are richer in the monastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor Christ they have wealth, which they had not while serving the rich devil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the world were beggars.* But it is derogatory to religious perfection that one should possess wealth of one's own. Therefore it is also derogatory to religious perfection to possess anything in common.

Obj. 4. Further, Gregory (*Dial. iii. 9*) relates of a very holy man named Isaac, that *when his disciples humbly signified that he should accept the possessions offered to him for the use of the monastery, he being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly to his opinion, saying; A monk who seeks earthly possessions is no monk at all:* and this refers to possessions held in common, and which were offered him for the common use of the monastery. Therefore it would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess anything in common.

Obj. 5. Further, Our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to His disciples, said (Matth. x. 9, 10): *Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses, nor scrip for your journey.* By these words, as Jerome says in his commentary, *He reproveth those philosophers who are commonly*

called *Bactroperatæ** who as despising the world and valuing all things at naught carried their pantry about with them. Therefore it would seem derogatory to religious perfection that one should keep something whether for oneself or for the common use.

On the contrary, Prosper says (*De Vita Contempl.* ix.): *It is sufficiently clear both that for the sake of perfection one should renounce having anything of one's own, and that the possession of revenues, which are of course common property, is no hindrance to the perfection of the Church.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 3; Q. CLXXXV., A. 6, *ad* 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (in his commentary on Matth. xix. 27, and *have followed Thee*): *Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which is perfect, namely, 'We have followed Thee.'* Poverty, however, is like an instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. i. 7) the abbot Moses says: *Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and privation of all one's possessions are not perfection, but means of perfection.* Now the privation of one's possessions, or poverty, is a means of perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the cares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Matth. xiii. 22): *That which was sown (Vulg.,—He that received the seed) among thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word.* The second is the love of riches, which increases with the possession of wealth; wherefore Jerome says (in his commentary on Matth. xix. 24, *It is easier for a camel*) that *since it is difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not say: It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven, but: It is difficult.* The third is vainglory or elation which results from riches, according to Ps. xlvi. 7, *They that trust in their own strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches.*

* I.e., staff and scrip bearers.

Accordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated from riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain amount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long as external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity, and as much as is required for a mere livelihood, suchlike care does not hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the perfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care, but only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine, commenting on Matth. vi. 25, *Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat*, says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, ii. 16):* *In saying this He does not forbid them to procure these things in so far as they needed them, but to be intent on them, and for their sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in preaching the Gospel.* Yet the possession of much wealth increases the weight of care, which is a great distraction to man's mind and hinders him from giving himself wholly to God's service. The other two, however, namely the love of riches and taking pride or glorying in riches, result only from an abundance of wealth.

Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the care that one takes of one's own wealth, pertains to love of self, whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care that is given to things held in common pertains to the love of charity which *seeketh not her own*, but looks to the common good. And since religion is directed to the perfection of charity, and charity is perfected in *the love of God extending to contempt of self*, it is contrary to religious perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that is given to common goods may pertain to charity, although it may prove an obstacle to some higher act of charity, such as divine contemplation or the instructing of one's neighbour. Hence it is evident that to have excessive riches in common, whether in movable or in immovable property, is an obstacle

* The words quoted are from *De Operibus Monach.* 26.

to perfection, though not absolutely incompatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious perfection to have enough external things, whether movables or immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we consider poverty in relation to the common end of religious orders, which is to devote oneself to the service of God. But if we consider poverty in relation to the special end of any religious order, then this end being presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that religious order; and each religious order will be the more perfect in respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty more adapted to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the outward and bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance of outward things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. x. 8*) that *many things are needed for action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to his contemplation.* Accordingly it is clear that a religious order directed to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering or the lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common riches; whereas those religious orders which are directed to the contemplative life are the more perfect, according as the poverty they profess burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the care of temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious life as the religious life requires a greater care of spiritual things.

Now it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose of contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one's contemplation by teaching and preaching, requires greater care of spiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only. Wherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a poverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one's necessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a threefold degree of poverty corresponds to

the three aforesaid degrees of religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order which is directed to the bodily actions of the active life should have an abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of a religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate, unless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through others, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who aim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have their life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished by their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting time. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example. For He had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were kept the things that were offered to Him, as related in Jo. xii. 6.

Nor should it be argued that Jerome (*Comment. in Matth. xvii.*) says: *If anyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that He deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own uses, namely by paying the tax, because among those poor His disciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ's purse was spent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated (Jo. iv. 8) that His disciples were gone into the city to buy meats, and (Jo. xiii. 29) that the disciples thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus had said to him: Buy those things which we have need of for the festival day, or that he should give something to the poor.* From this it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common property for the support of religious of the same order, or of any other poor, is in accordance with the perfection which Christ taught by His example. Moreover, after the resurrection, the disciples from whom all religious orders took their origin kept the price of the lands, and distributed it according as each one had need (Acts iv. 34, 35).

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 3), this saying of our Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but that it is the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above (Q. CLXXXVI., A. 8), it is the least of the

three chief means of perfection; since the vow of continence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience excels them both. Since, however, the means are sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is better, not for being a greater instrument, but for being more adapted to the end. Thus a physician does not heal the more, the more medicine he gives, but the more the medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does not follow that a religious order is the more perfect, according as the poverty it professes is more perfect, but according as its poverty is more adapted to the end both common and special. Granted even that the religious order which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect in so far as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect simply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass it in matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be more perfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better simply.

Reply Obj. 2. Our Lord's words (Matth. vi. 34), *Be not solicitous for to-morrow*, do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow; for the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. ii. 2), where he says: *It has been our experience that those who have attempted to practise the privation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the wherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have been deceived so unawares that they were unable to finish properly the work they had undertaken.* And, as Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 23), *if this saying of our Lord, 'Be not solicitous for to-morrow,' means that we are to lay nothing by for the morrow, those who shut themselves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to provide themselves with these things.* Again he adds afterwards: *Are we to suppose that the more holy they are, the less do they resemble the birds?* And further on: *For if it be argued from the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly: Why then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that was collected? Why, in days long gone*

by, when famine was imminent, was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus provide for the needs of the saints? Accordingly the saying: *Be not solicitous for to-morrow*, according to Jerome in his commentary on this passage, is to be rendered thus: *It is enough that we think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it to God*:—according to Chrysostom,* *It is enough to endure the toil for necessary things, labour not in excess for unnecessary things*:—according to Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, ii. 17): *When we do any good action, we should bear in mind not temporal things which are denoted by the morrow, but eternal things*.

Reply Obj. 3. The saying of Jerome applies where there are excessive riches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of which even the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton. But they do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use, merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For it amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining to the necessities of life, and that these things be set by for the common use.

Reply Obj. 4. Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions, because he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth, the abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection. Hence Gregory adds (*ibid.*): *He was as afraid of forfeiting the security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his perishable wealth*. It is not, however, related that he refused to accept such things as were necessary for the upkeep of community life.

Reply Obj. 5. The Philosopher says (*Polit.* i. 5, 6) that bread, wine, and the like are natural riches, while money is artificial riches. Hence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of money, and employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that it comes to the same to have money and to possess other things

* *Hom.* xvi. in the *Opus Imperfectum*, falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

necessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent to preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid them to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be understood has been shown above (Q. CLXXXV., A. 6, *ad* 2; I.-II., Q. CVIII., A. 2, *ad* 3).

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THOSE WHO LIVE IN COMMUNITY IS MORE PERFECT THAN THAT OF THOSE WHO LEAD A SOLITARY LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life. For it is written (Eccles. iv. 9): *It is better . . . that two should be together, than one ; for they have the advantage of their society.* Therefore the religious life of those who live in community would seem to be more perfect.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Matth. xviii. 20): *Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.* But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it would seem better to live in community than in solitude.

Obj. 3. Further, The vow of obedience is more excellent than the other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now obedience and humility are better observed in company than in solitude; for Jerome says to the monk Rusticus (*Ep.* iv.): *In solitude pride quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he does what he likes ;* while he says when instructing one who lives in community, these words: *You may not do what you will, you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you must obey one you prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your brethren, you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love him as a father.* Therefore it would seem that the religious life of those who live in

community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life.

Obj. 4. Further, Our Lord said (Luke xi. 33): *No man lighteth a candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel.* Now those who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their religious life is not more perfect.

Obj. 5. Further, That which is in accord with man's nature is apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (*Polit.* i. 2). Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more perfect than to lead a community life.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Oper. Monach.* 23) that *those are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all, and give their whole mind to a life of prayer.*

I answer that, Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (*Coll.* i. 7) the Abbot Moses says that *solitude, even as fasting and other like things, is a sure means of acquiring purity of heart.* Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to action but to contemplation, according to Osee ii. 14, *I . . . will lead her into solitude* (Douay,—*the wilderness*); *and I will speak to her heart.* Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders that are directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the active life; except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ, Who as Luke relates (vi. 12), *went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God.*

On the other hand, it is suitable to those religious orders that are directed to contemplation. It must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one that lacks nothing, and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing. Wherefore solitude befits the contemplative who has already attained to perfection. This happens in two ways:—in one way by

the gift only of God, as in the case of John the Baptist, who was *filled with the Holy Ghost even from his mother's womb* (Luke i. 11), so that he was in the desert even as a boy; in another way by the practice of virtuous action, according to Heb. v. 14: *Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil.*

Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in two ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being instructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says to the monk Rusticus (*loc. cit.*): *It pleases me that you have the fellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself.* Secondly, as regards the affections, seeing that man's noisome affections are restrained by the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as Gregory says (*Moral. xxx. 12*), commenting on the words, *To whom I have given a house in the wilderness* (Job xxxix. 6), *What profits solitude of the body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?* Hence a social life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude befits those who are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says to the monk Rusticus (*loc. cit.*): *Do we condemn the solitary life? Not at all; indeed we have often commended it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from the monastic school to be such as not to be deterred by the hard noviciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their conduct for a considerable time.*

Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect surpasses that which is being schooled in perfection, so the life of the solitaries, if duly practised, surpasses the community life. But if it be undertaken without the aforesaid practice, it is fraught with very great danger, unless the grace of God supply that which others acquire by practice, as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the Blessed Benedict.

Reply Obj. 1. Solomon shows that two are better than one, on account of the help which one affords the other either in lifting him up, or in warning him, or giving him spiritual heat (Eccles. iv. 10, 11). But those who have already attained to perfection do not require this help.

Reply Obj. 2. According to 1 Jo. iv. 16, *He that abideth in charity abideth in God and God in him.* Wherefore just as Christ is in the midst of those who are united together in the fellowship of brotherly love, so does He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes himself to divine contemplation through love of God.

Reply Obj. 3. Actual obedience is required of those who need to be schooled according to the direction of others in the attainment of perfection; but those who are already perfect are sufficiently *led by the spirit of God* so that they need not to obey others actually. Nevertheless they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind.

Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xix. 19), *no one is forbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this pertains to a praiseworthy leisure.* That a man be placed on a candlestick, does not concern him but his superiors, and if this burden is not placed on us, as Augustine goes on to say (*ibid.*), *we must devote ourselves to the contemplation of truth, for which purpose solitude is most helpful.* Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary life are most useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* xxxi.): *They dwell in the most lonely places, content to live on water and the bread that is brought to them from time to time, enjoying colloquy with God to whom they have adhered with a pure mind. To some they seem to have renounced human intercourse more than is right: but these understand not how much such men profit us by the spirit of their prayers, what an example to us is the life of those whom we are forbidden to see in the body.*

Reply Obj. 5. A man may lead a solitary life for two motives. One is because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (*Polit.* i. 2) that *he who associates not with others is either a beast or a god, i.e. a godly man.*

QUESTION CLXXXIX.

OF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE.

(*In Ten Articles.*)

WE must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether those who are not practised in the observance of the commandments should enter religion? (2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter religion? (3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to fulfil their vow? (4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there in perpetuity? (5) Whether children should be received into religion? (6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through deference to one's parents? (7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion? (8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another? (9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion? (10) Whether serious deliberation with one's relations and friends is requisite for entrance into religion?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE NOT PRACTISED IN KEEPING
THE COMMANDMENTS SHOULD ENTER RELIGION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that none should enter religion but those who are practised in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord gave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had kept the commandments from his youth. Now all religious orders originate from

Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be allowed to enter religion but those who are practised in the observance of the commandments.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Hom. xv. in Ezech., and Moral. xxii.*): *No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a beginning of a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish great things.* Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to the perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the counsels, unless one be already practised in the observance of the precepts.

Obj. 3. Further, The religious state, like the holy orders, has a place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to Syagrius a bishop of Gaul (*Regist. ix. Ep. cvi.*), *order should be observed in ascending to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the summit by overpassing the steps. And we are well aware that walls when built receive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight before they are seasoned they bring down the whole building.* Therefore it would seem that one should not enter religion unless one be practised in the observance of the precepts.

Obj. 4. Further, A gloss on Ps. cxxx. 2, *As a child that is weaned is towards his mother,* says: *First we are conceived in the womb of Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's milk for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine, by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the beginning with God.* Afterwards he goes on to say: *For those who are just baptized on Holy Saturday are*

borne in the hands of the Church as it were and fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Afterwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other difficult observances. Many, like the heretics and schismatics, have perverted this order by being weaned before the time. Hence they have come to naught. Now this order is apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or induce others to enter religion, before they are practised in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore they would seem to be heretics or schismatics.

Obj. 5. Further, One should proceed from that which precedes to that which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels, because they are more universal, for the implication of the one by the other is not convertible, since whoever keeps the counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold. Seeing then that the right order requires one to pass from that which comes first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not to pass to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being first of all practised in the observance of the commandments.

On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was not practised in the observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the observance of the counsels. For it is stated (Luke v. 28) that *leaving all things he . . . followed Him*. Therefore it is not necessary for a person to be practised in the observance of the commandments before passing to the perfection of the counsels.

I answer that, As shown above (Q. CLXXXVIII., A. 1), the religious state is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are those things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the loss of charity, when through turning inordinately

to temporal goods man turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it is evident that the observances of the religious state, while removing the obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all other manner of sins.

Consequently it is right that not only those who are practised in the observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to attain to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not practised, in order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. Jerome commenting on Matth. xix. 20, *All these have I kept*, says: *The young man lies when he says: All these have I kept from my youth. For if he had fulfilled this one of the commandments: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor?* But this means that he lied as to the perfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (*Tract. viii. super Matth.*) that *it is written in the Gospel according to the Hebrews that when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,' the rich man began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, seeing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are clothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all manner of good things, and nothing whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For it is impossible to fulfil the commandment which says, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, and to be rich, especially to have such great wealth.* This also refers to the perfect fulfilment of this precept. On the other hand, it is true that he kept the commandments imperfectly and in a general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the observance of the precepts of charity, as stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 3). Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the counsels is useful both to the

innocent and to sinners, our Lord called not only the innocent youth but also the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the religious life more easily than those who presume on their innocency. It is to the former that our Lord says (Matth. xxi. 31): *The publicans and the harlots shall go into the kingdom of God before you.*

Reply Obj. 2. The highest and the lowest place can be taken in three ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of his life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state need not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be a cleric he need not first of all be practised in the life of a layman. Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this way it is clear that one man begins straightway not only from a higher state, but even from a higher degree of holiness, than the highest degree to which another man attains throughout his whole life. Hence Gregory says (*Dial. ii. 1*): *All are agreed that the boy Benedict began at a high degree of grace and perfection in his daily life.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CLXXXIV., A. 6) the holy orders prerequisite holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for the attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid on the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the burden of religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the damp of vice.

Reply Obj. 4. It is manifest from the words of this gloss that it is chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has to pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is clear from what follows that the statement that certain *heretics* and *schismatics* have perverted this order refers to the order of doctrine. For it continues thus: *But he says that he has kept these things, namely the aforesaid order,*

binding himself by an oath. Thus I was humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was humbly minded' ; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is the Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of angels, namely the Word that is in the beginning with God. The example which is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being commanded to fast until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on them as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires them inwardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their own choice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the Church observes a fast. Now the Holy Ghost (according to Ambrose in his commentary on Luke i. 15, *He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost*) is not confined to any particular age ; He ceases not when men die, He is not excluded from the maternal womb. Gregory also in a homily for Pentecost (xxx. in Ev.) says: *He fills the boy harpist and makes him a psalmist : He fills the boy abstainer and makes him a wise judge,†* and afterwards he adds: *No time is needed to learn whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind by the merest touch.* Again it is written (Eccles. viii. 8), *It is not in man's power to stop the Spirit,* and the Apostle admonishes us (1 Thess. v. 19): *Extinguish not the Spirit,* and (Acts vii. 51) it is said against certain persons: *You always resist the Holy Ghost.**

Reply Obj. 5. There are certain chief precepts which are the ends, so to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the precepts of charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that these precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but that the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of the precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity precedes the

* Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking *retributio*, which Douay renders *reward*, as meaning *punishment*.

† Cf. Daniel i. 8-17.

counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of time, for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the species. But the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels is directed to the observance of the precepts together with the counsels; as an imperfect to a perfect species, even as the irrational to the rational animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, since *nature* as Boethius says (*De Consol.* iii. 10) *begins with perfect things*. And yet it is not necessary for the precepts first of all to be observed without the counsels, and afterwards with the counsels, just as it is not necessary for one to be an ass before being a man, or married before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary for a person first of all to keep the commandments in the world before entering religion; especially as the worldly life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is more an obstacle thereto.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO BE BOUND BY VOW TO ENTER
RELIGION ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one ought not to be bound by vow to enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed, according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (cap. 58), and according to the decree of Innocent III. (cap. *Nullus, de Regular. et Transeunt.* etc.), who moreover forbade anyone to be bound to the religious life by profession before completing the year of probation.

Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone while yet in the world to be bound by vow to enter religion.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Regist. xi. Ep. 15*): that *Jews should be persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free will.* Now one is compelled to fulfil what one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter religion.

Obj. 3. Further, No one should give another an occasion of falling; wherefore it is written (*Exod. xxi. 33, 34*): *If a man open a pit . . . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay the price of the beasts.* Now through being bound by vow to enter religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to enter religion.

On the contrary, It is written (*Ps. lxxv. 12*): *Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God ;* and a gloss of Augustine says that *some vows concern the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the like.* Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. But Holy Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore it is better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 6), when we were treating of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is more praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to vow is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will obstinate in evil, so a good work is more praiseworthy through proceeding from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore it is in itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.

Reply Obj. 1. The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious order. This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded by a year's probation, as the *Objection* proves. The other is the simple vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds him to enter

religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a year's probation.

Reply Obj. 2. The words quoted from Gregory must be understood as referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end, because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be avoided; indeed, as Augustine says to Armentarius and Paulina (*Ep. cxxvii.*), *happy is the necessity that compels us to better things.*

Reply Obj. 3. The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of the will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself, instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from it. But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate from the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after being baptized.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE WHO IS BOUND BY A VOW TO ENTER RELIGION IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION OF ENTERING RELIGION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is said in the Decretals (XVII., Q. II., cap. 1): *Gonsaldus, a priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health he refused to become a monk. And afterwards it is added: We adjudge and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to retain them in peace.* Now this would not be if he were bound to enter religion. Therefore

it would seem that one is not bound to keep one's vow of entering religion.

Obj. 2. Further, No one is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself to enter religion.

Obj. 3. Further, A less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one. Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defence of the Holy Land; and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not necessarily to be fulfilled.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. v. 3): *If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him;* and a gloss on Ps. lxxv. 12, *Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God,* says: *To vow depends on the will: but after the vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1), when we were treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning God. Now, as Gregory says in his letter to Boniface:* *If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given to God be deserving of punishment!* Therefore a man is under an obligation to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something pertaining to God.

Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine service, as stated above (Q. CLXXXVI., A. 1). Hence it follows that he who binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter religion according as

* Innoc. I., *Ep. ii. Victricio Epo. Rotomag.* cap. 14. Cf. *Can. Viduas*: caus. xxviii., qu. 1.

he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas if he intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a certain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time comes or the condition is fulfilled.

Reply Obj. 1. This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple vow. Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to dwell in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter religion. Hence (Extrav., *De Voto et Voti Redemptione*, cap. *Per tuas*) the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing to enter religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counselled that if *he wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the government of his see and pay his vows to the Most High.*

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 3, *ad 2*), when we were treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a certain religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to be received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the obligation to which he has engaged himself.

Reply Obj. 3. The vow to enter religion being perpetual is greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a temporal vow; and as Alexander III. says,* *he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpetual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his vow.* Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan. iv. 24, *Redeem thou thy sins with alms*, much more does it suffice to satisfy for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfaction, even that

* Cf. Extrav. *de Voto et Voti Redemptione*, cap. *Scripturæ*.

of public penance, according to the Decretals (XXXIII., Q. I., cap. *Admonere*) just as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory declares (*Hom. xx. in Ezech.*). Hence we read in the *Lives of the Fathers* (VI., 1, No. 9) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as by being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless the entrance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which, as regards the advancement in good, is preferable to absolution from punishment.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HE WHO HAS VOWED TO ENTER RELIGION IS
BOUND TO REMAIN IN RELIGION IN PERPETUITY ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion, is bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet. ii. 21, *It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it to turn back*, and Luke ix. 62, *No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God*. But he who bound himself by the vow to enter religion, is under the obligation to enter, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore he is also bound to remain for always.

Obj. 2. Further, Everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise to scandal, and is a bad example to others. Now by leaving after entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain evermore.

Obj. 3. Further, The vow to enter religion is accounted a perpetual vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated above (A. 3, *ad 3*; Q. LXXXVIII., A. 12, *ad 1*). But this would not be so if a person after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the intention of leaving. It

seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is bound also to remain in perpetuity.

On the contrary, The vow of profession, for the reason that it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, prerequisites a year of probation; whereas this is not required previously to the simple vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. Therefore it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that reason bound to remain there in perpetuity.

I answer that, The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will: because *to vow is an act of the will* according to Augustine (*super Ps. lxxv.*). Consequently the obligation of a vow extends as far as the will and intention of the person who takes the vow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to enter religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to remain in perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind himself to enter religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining the freedom to remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound to remain. If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering religion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in perpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to enter religion according to the form prescribed by common law, which is that those who enter should be given a year's probation. Wherefore he is not bound to remain for ever.

Reply Obj. 1. It is better to enter religion with the purpose of making a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn or to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to do: else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false.

Reply Obj. 2. A man who has entered religion gives neither scandal nor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a reasonable motive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive scandal on their part, and not active scandal on the part of the person leaving, since in doing so,

he has done what was lawful, and expedient on account of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and the like.

Reply Obj. 3. He who enters with the purpose of leaving forthwith, does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his intention in vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as to wish to try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not bound to remain for evermore.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHILDREN SHOULD BE RECEIVED IN RELIGION?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that children ought not to be received in religion. Because it is said (Extrav., *De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig.*, cap. 1): *No one should be tonsured unless he be of legal age and willing.* But children, seemingly, are not of legal age, nor have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in religion.

Obj. 2. Further, The state of religion would seem to be a state of repentance; wherefore religion is derived* from *religare* (to bind) or from *re-eligere* (to choose again), as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, x. 4; *De Vera Relig.*). But repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they should not enter religion.

Obj. 3. Further, The obligation of a vow is like that of an oath. But children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath (*Decret. XXII.*, Q. V., cap. *Pueri* and cap. *Honestum.*). Therefore it would seem that neither should they be bound by vow.

Obj. 4. Further, It is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an obligation that can be justly cancelled. Now if any persons of unripe age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their parents or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX., Q. II., cap. 2) that *if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred veil of her own*

* Cf. Q. LXXXI., A. 1.

accord, her parents or guardians, if they choose, can at once declare the deed null and void. It is therefore unlawful for children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or bound to religion.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matth. xix. 14): *Suffer the little children, and forbid them not to come to Me.* Expounding these words Origen says (*Tract. vii. in Matth.*) that *the disciples of Jesus before they have been taught the conditions of righteousness,* rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ: but our Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children. We must therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in wisdom we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2, ad 6), the religious vow is twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such a vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding, as stated in *Extrav., De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor.* The same applies to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called the age of puberty, although in some it comes earlier and in others it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of nature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not his own master; for instance, if a slave, though having the use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even is ordained, without the knowledge of his master: for his master can annul this, as stated in the *Decretals (Dist. LIV., cap. Si servus)*. And since boys and girls under the age of puberty are naturally in their father's power as regards the disposal of their manner of life, their father may either

* Cf. Matth. xix. 16-30.

cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num. xxx. 4).

Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching the age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet this obligation may be removed by his father's authority, under whose control he still remains, because the ordinance of the law whereby one man is subject to another considers what happens in the majority of cases. If, however, the child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the authority of his parents; though if he has not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in the sight of God.

The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious. Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of the solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what happens in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of puberty, however much the person who makes profession may have the use of reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to make him a religious. Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received into religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the Baptist (Luke i. 80) that *the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was in the deserts*. Hence, as Gregory states (*Dial. ii. 3*), *the Roman nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Benedict to be nurtured for Almighty God*; and this is most fitting, according to Lament. iii. 27, *It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth*. It is for this reason that by common custom children are made to apply themselves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass their lives.

Reply Obj. 1. The legal age for receiving the tonsure and taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is able to make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be educated in a religious house.

Reply Obj. 2. The religious state is chiefly directed to the attainment of perfection, as stated above (Q. CLXXXVI., A. 1, *ad* 4); and accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it. But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above (Q. CLXXXVII., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 3. Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as the canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however, they bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in God's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.

Reply Obj. 4. A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is not rebuked (Num. xxx. 4) for taking a vow without the consent of her parents. Hence it is evident that she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she binds herself by vow, so far as she is concerned, without prejudice to her parents' authority.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM ENTERING RELIGION THROUGH DEFERENCE TO ONE'S PARENTS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not lawful to omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which is optional. Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation of the precept concerning the honouring of our parents (Exod. xx. 12); wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. v. 4): *If any widow have children or grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to make a return of duty to her parents.* But the entrance to religion is optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit deference to one's parents for the sake of entering religion.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly the subjection of a son to his father is greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is natural, while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from Gen. ix. 25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in order to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV., cap. *Si servus*). Much less therefore can a son set aside the deference due to his father in order to enter religion.

Obj. 3. Further, A man is more indebted to his parents than to those to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot enter religion. For Gregory says (*Regist. vii., Indict. i., Ep. 11*) that *those who are engaged in public business must by no means be admitted into a monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of all they withdraw from public traffic.* Therefore seemingly much less may children enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents.

On the contrary, It is related (Matth. iv. 22) that James and John *left their nets and father, and followed our Lord.* By this, says Hilary (*Can. iii. in Matth.*) *we learn that we who intend to follow Christ are not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the ties of home.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CI., A. 2, *ad 2*) when we were treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle, wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children, namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1 Tim. v. 8) that *if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.*

Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted by their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a condition of necessity. Consequently we must say that when their parents are in such need that they cannot fittingly be supported otherwise than by the help of their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the

parents' necessity be not such as to stand in great need of their children's assistance, the latter may, in despite of the duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against their parents' command, because after the age of puberty every freeman enjoys freedom in things concerning the ordering of his state of life, especially in such as belong to the service of God, and *we should more obey the Father of spirits that we may live,** as says the Apostle (Heb. xii. 9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Matth. viii. 22; Luke ix. 62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was unwilling to follow him forthwith on account of his father's burial: for there were others who could see to this, as Chrysostom remarks (*Hom. xxviii. in Matth.*).

Reply Obj. 1. The commandment of honouring our parents extends not only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the commandment of honouring their parents, by praying for them and by revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those who live in the world honour their parents in different ways as befits their condition.

Reply Obj. 2. Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin, it follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person, for a slave, as regards what he is, belongs to his master. On the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is not hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring himself to the service of God; which is most conducive to man's good.

Reply Obj. 3. He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore if a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or to pay a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation in order to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can,

* *Shall we not much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?*

namely by surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law (*Lib. Ob Æs; cap. De Act. et Obl.* in Syntag. Juris, lib. xiv., cap. iii., No. 12) money lays an obligation not on the person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person of a freeman is above all valuation in money. Hence, after surrendering his property, he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt.

On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PARISH PRIESTS MAY LAWFULLY ENTER RELIGION ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion. For Gregory says (*Past.* iii. 1) that *he who undertakes the cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words : ' My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger ' (Prov. vi. 1);* and he goes on to say, *because to be surety for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety of one's own behaviour.* Now he who is under an obligation to a man for a debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he can. Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to which obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for him to lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.

Obj. 2. Further, What is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all. But if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the people would be left without a pastor's care, which would be unfitting. Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion.

Obj. 3. Further, Chief among the acts to which religious orders are directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his contemplation. Now such acts are com-

petent to parish priests and archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish priest or archdeacon to pass over to religion.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XIX., Q. II., cap. *Duæ sunt leges.*): *If a man, while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we authorize him to go freely.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3, *ad* 3; Q. LXXXVII., A. 12, *ad* 1), the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other obligation. Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be bound by perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service; while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as bishops are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure of souls. Wherefore bishops cannot lay aside their bishopric for any pretext whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff (Extrav., *De Regular. et Transeunt., ad Relig., cap. Licet.*): whereas archdeacons and parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of the bishop the cure entrusted to them, without the Pope's special permission, who alone can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it is evident that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter religion.

Reply Obj. 1. Parish priests and archdeacons have bound themselves to the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their archdeaconry or parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain their archdeaconry or parish for ever.

Reply Obj. 2. As Jerome says (*Contra Vigil. vi., Multa in Orbe*): *Although they, namely religious, are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom you argue, saying: 'If all shut themselves up and live in solitude, who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will be able to urge sinners to virtue?' If this holds true, if all are fools with thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable, for if all be virgins, and none marry, the human race*

will perish. Virtue is rare, and is not desired by many. It is therefore evident that this is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the river run dry.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO PASS FROM ONE RELIGIOUS ORDER TO ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. x. 25): *Not forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed ; and a gloss observes: Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who presuming on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of the imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous.* Now those who pass from one religious order to another more perfect one would seem to do this. Therefore this is seemingly unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, The profession of monks is stricter than that of canons regular (Extrav., *De Statu Monach.* and Canon Reg., cap. *Quod Dei timorem*). But it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of canon regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Decretals (XIX., Q. III., 2): *We ordain and without any exception forbid any professed canon regular to become a monk, unless (which God forbid) he have fallen into public sin.* Therefore it would seem unlawful for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of higher rank.

Obj. 3. Further, A person is bound to fulfil what he has vowed, as long as he is able lawfully to fulfil it; thus if a man has vowed to observe continence, he is bound, even after contracting marriage by words in the present tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage is not consummated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering religion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one religious order to another, he will be bound to do so if he vowed it previously while in the world. But this would seem objectionable, since in many cases it might give rise to scandal. Therefore

a religious may not pass from one religious order to another stricter one.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XX., Q. IV., 1): *If sacred virgins design for the good of their soul to pass to another monastery on account of a stricter life, and decide to remain there, the holy synod allows them to do so: and the same would seem to apply to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass from one religious order to another.*

I answer that, It is not commendable to pass from one religious order to another: both because this frequently gives scandal to those who remain; and because, other things being equal, it is easier to make progress in a religious order to which one is accustomed than in one to which one is not habituated. Hence in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. xiv. 5) Abbot Nesteros says: *It is best for each one that he should, according to the resolve he has made, hasten with the greatest zeal and care to reach the perfection of the work he has undertaken, and nowise forsake the profession he has chosen.* And further on he adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: *For it is impossible that one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at once, since if he endeavour to practise them equally, he will of necessity, while trying to attain them all, end in acquiring none of them perfectly:* because the various religious orders excel in respect of various works of virtue.

Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one religious order to another for three reasons. First, through zeal for a more perfect religious life, which excellence depends, as stated above (Q. CLXXXVIII., A. 6), not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to which a religious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion whereby the observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly, on account of a religious order falling away from the perfection it ought to have: for instance, if in a more severe religious order, the religious begin to live less strictly, it is commendable for one to pass even to a less severe religious order if the observance is better. Hence in the *Conferences of the Fathers* (Coll. xix. 3, 5, 6) Abbot John says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life, in which he was pro-

fessed, to a less severe life, namely of those who lived in community, because the hermitical life had fallen into decline and laxity. Thirdly, on account of sickness or weakness, the result of which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the ordinances of a more severe religious order, though able to observe those of a less strict religion.

There may be, however, a difference in these three cases. For in the first case one ought, on account of humility, to seek permission: yet this cannot be denied, provided it be certain that this other religion is more severe. And if there be a doubt about this, one should ask one's superior to decide (*Extrav., De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig. cap. Licet*). In like manner the superior's decision should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is also necessary to have a dispensation.

Reply Obj. 1. Those who pass to a stricter religious order, do so not out of presumption that they may appear righteous, but out of devotion, that they may become more righteous.

Reply Obj. 2. Religious orders whether of monks or of canons regular are destined to the works of the contemplative life. Chief among these are those which are performed in the divine mysteries, and these are the direct object of the orders of canons regular, the members of which are essentially religious clerics. On the other hand, monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according to the Decretals (*Causa XVIII., Q. I., cap. Nemo potest* and *cap. Alia causa*). Hence although monastic orders are more severe, it would be lawful, supposing the members to be lay monks, to pass from the monastic order to an order of canons regular, according to the statement of Jerome to the monk Rusticus (*Ep. iv.*): *So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a cleric*; but not conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted (*XVI., Q. I.*). If, however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves to the sacred ministry, they have this in common with canons regular coupled with greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to pass from an order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided withal that

one seek the superior's permission (XIX., Q. III., cap. *Statuimus* ii.).

Reply Obj. 3. The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a less strict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person is bound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person were to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has taken on entering a more severe order.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO INDUCE OTHERS TO ENTER
RELIGION ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no one ought to induce others to enter religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule (cap. 58) that *those who seek to enter religion must not easily be admitted, but spirits must be tested whether they be of God* ; and Cassian has the same instruction (*De Inst. Cœnob.* iv. 3). Much less therefore is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.

Obj. 2. Further, Our Lord said (Matth. xxiii. 15): *Woe to you . . . because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves.* Now thus would seem to do those who induce persons to enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.

Obj. 3. Further, No one should induce another to do what is to his prejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes take harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter a stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to induce others to enter religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xxvi. 3 *seqq.**) : *Let one curtain draw the other.* Therefore one man should draw another to God's service.

* S. Thomas quotes the sense, not the words.

I answer that, Those who induce others to enter religion not only do not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James v. 20): *He who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way, shall save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins*; and (Dan. xii. 3): *They that instruct many to justice shall be as stars for all eternity*.

Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to enter religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX., Q. III., cap. *Præsens*). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally to enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in the same Decretal (Q. II., cap. *Quam pios*). But this does not apply to the case where one provides a poor person with necessities by educating him in the world for the religious life; or when without any compact one gives a person little presents for the sake of good fellowship. Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is to be feared that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding himself deceived, and thus *the last state of that man may become worse than the first* (Luke xi. 26).

Reply Obj. 1. Those who are induced to enter religion have still a time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life.

Reply Obj. 2. According to Hilary (*Can. xxiv. in Matth.*) this saying of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavours of the Jews, after the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of hell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which they committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they incurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these words have nothing to do with the case in point. According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was yet lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they converted to

Judaism from paganism, was merely misled; but when he saw the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and becoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery. Hence it is manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the service of God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a bad example to the person converted, whence he becomes worse.

Reply Obj. 3. The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore a person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be lawfully induced to enter a greater one; unless there be some special obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress in the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or oath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a lesser order, except for some special and evident motive, and then with the superior's dispensation.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS PRAISEWORTHY TO ENTER RELIGION WITHOUT TAKING COUNSEL OF MANY, AND PREVIOUSLY DELIBERATING FOR A LONG TIME?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time. For it is written (1 Jo. iv. 1): *Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God.* Now sometimes a man's purpose of entering religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught through his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts v. 39): *If this counsel be of God, you cannot overthrow it.* Therefore it would seem that one ought to make a searching inquiry before entering religion.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Prov. xxv. 9): *Treat thy cause with thy friend.* Now a man's cause would seem to be especially one that concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one's friends.

Obj. 3. Further, Our Lord (Luke xiv. 28) in making a comparison with a man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth *first sit down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have wherewithal to finish it*, lest he become an object of mockery, for that *this man began to build and was not able to finish*. Now the wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (*Ep. ad Lætum*, ccxliii.), is nothing less than that *each one should renounce all his possessions*. Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is stated (1 Kings xvii. 39) that David could not walk in Saul's armour, for he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking counsel of many.

On the contrary, It is stated (Matth. iv. 20) that upon our Lord's calling them, Peter and Andrew *immediately leaving their nets, followed Him*. Here Chrysostom says (*Hom. xiv. in Matth.*): *Such obedience as this does Christ require of us, that we delay not even for a moment*.

I answer that, Long deliberation and the advice of many are required in great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iii. 3*); while advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and fixed. Now with regard to entering religion three points may be considered. First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by itself; and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a greater good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who gave this counsel. Hence Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom. vii. 2*): *The East, that is Christ, calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West, namely mortal and fallible man*. Secondly, the entrance into religion may be considered in relation to the strength of the person who intends to enter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the entrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust not to be able to stay by their own power, but by the assistance of the divine power, according to Isa. xl. 31, *They that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles, they shall run and*

not be weary, they shall walk and not faint. Yet if there be some special obstacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or the like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take counsel with such as are likely to help and not hinder him. Hence it is written (Ecclus. xxxvii. 12): *Treat with a man without religion concerning holiness,* with an unjust man concerning justice,* meaning that one should not do so, wherefore the text goes on (verses 14, 15), *Give no heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be continually with a holy man.* In these matters, however, one should not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (*Ep. ad Paulin. ciii.*): *Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than loosen the rope that holds the boat to the shore.* Thirdly, we may consider the way of entering religion, and which order one ought to enter, and about such matters also one may take counsel of those who will not stand in one's way.

Reply Obj. 1. The saying: *Try the spirits, if they be of God,* applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God; thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who offers himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved by hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion there can be no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to which his heart has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit that leads man into the land of uprightness (Ps. cxlii. 10). Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since not all that is of God is incorruptible; else corruptible creatures would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God's counsel whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is imperishable according to Isa. xlvi. 10, *My counsel shall stand and all My will shall be done.* Hence the purpose of entering religion needs not to be tried whether

* The Douay version supplies the negative: *Treat not . . . nor with . . .*

it be of God, because it requires no further demonstration, as a gloss says on 1 Thess. v. 21, *Prove all things.*

Reply Obj. 2. Even as *the flesh lusteth against the spirit* (Gal. v. 17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress, according to Mich. vii. 6, *A man's enemies are they of his own household.* Wherefore Cyril expounding Luke ix. 61, *Let me first take my leave of them that are at my house,* says:* *By asking first to take his leave of them that were at his house, he shows he was somewhat of two minds. For to communicate with his neighbours, and consult those who are unwilling to relish righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning back. Hence he hears our Lord say: 'No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God,' because he looks back who seeks delay in order to go home and confer with his kinsfolk.*

Reply Obj. 3. The building of the tower signifies the perfection of Christian life; and the renunciation of one's possessions is the wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or deliberates about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it is not necessarily a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that one has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to perfection; whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which he is doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as the text goes on to state, be Christ's disciple, and this is to build the tower. The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples to be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (*Conf. viii. 11*): *On that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency, . . . honestly alluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples.*

* Cf. S. Thomas's *Catena Aurea.*

There were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age, grave widows and aged virgins. . . . And she smiled at me with a persuasive mockery as though to say : ' Canst not thou what these youths and these maidens can ? Or can they either in themselves, and not rather in the Lord their God ? . . . Why standest thou in thyself, and so standest not ? Cast thyself upon Him ; fear not, He will not withdraw Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself fearlessly upon Him : He will receive and will heal thee.'

The example quoted of David is not to the point, because *the arms of Saul*, as a gloss on the passage observes, *are the sacraments of the Law, as being burdensome* : whereas religion is the sweet yoke of Christ, for as Gregory says (*Moral. iv.*), *what burden does He lay on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome desires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this world ? To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their souls: to which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our Lord, Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen.*

The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas, in English

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